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Abstract
The Internet pervades modern life, offering up opportunities to con-
nect, inform and be informed. As the range and number of sources
for information online explode, how people select and interpret in-
formation has become a pertinent area for study, not least in light
of the prevalence of fake-news. People are well known to act upon
information they believe to be trustworthy and where the decision
to act incurs risk, an inability to accurately select and assess the
credibility of information presents a challenge. Bitcoin, the nascent
crypto-currency, presents a domain within which profound financial
risk abounds. Even for those armed with experience and knowledge
there are numerous challenges to assessing risk, especially as sources
of Bitcoin information can be observed to be partisan and of ques-
tionable accuracy.
Within the domain of bitcoin speculation, this thesis asks the central
research question of: are people able to select and correctly evaluate
information they might rely upon to make decisions? In addressing
this research question, this thesis offers - through the application of
a psychological model of informational trust to bitcoin speculators -
two fundamental contributions:
Firstly, that these users are able to identify relevant news without a
reliance upon confirmation bias.
Secondly, that a notable percentage of users are not evaluating the
credibility of online news by expertly interpreting the fundamentals
of information but, rather deferring their trust to either the source
news website or a more broad trust of information on the Internet.
For these users, chance or luck may mean that they are basing their
decisions upon factually accurate news. But this is a position which
makes them particularly vulnerable to fake-news where it is spread
via sources which they might trust. This position of susceptibility
provides evidence to support further security research of both the
prevalence of, and counter-measures for fake-news.
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Within cyber security, navigating risks is commonly viewed as a process of de-
cision making, normally as a precursor to taking evasive or mitigating action—
armed with information and the expertise to interpret that information we are
well placed to make risk decisions.
Such a perspective assumes the rational and systematic gathering and evalu-
ation of that information, something prevalent in modern risk assessment frame-
works [155, 71]. For example, the ‘conduct assessment’ phase of NIST 800-30r1
is split into two categories of task. Firstly, identify threats & vulnerabilities -
synonymous with being armed with the information. Secondly, determine the
likelihood, impact and risk - synonymous with having the expertise to interpret
the information. A similar approach is contained within ISO 31010 (see Fig-
ure 1.1).
However, this approach requires that we not only possess the relevant infor-
mation and the expertise but also bring both to bear on the task.
With the Internet becoming a primary source of information for many people,
assessing the credibility of that information has become an important task for the
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Step 2: Conduct Assessment
Expanded Task View
Determine Risk
Identify Threat Sources and Events
Identify Vulnerabilities and
Predisposing Conditions
Determine Magnitude of Impact






























Figure 1.1: Information gathering and interpretation aspects of NIST800 (left)
and ISO31010 (right).
find difficult [63]. Consequently information credibility online has been a signif-
icant area of study in cognitive science, HCI, privacy and security communities
for many years. More recently, considerable media attention has been paid to
such information quality concerns - commonly termed fake-news reporting (also
known as disinformation) - where the boundaries between truth and fiction are
blurred [81] and fact is traded for appealing to opinion or belief [135]. The race to
tackle this very real form of decisional interference, by flagging suspicious news,
is something of an admission that people are susceptible to acting upon ‘news’
that may have been manipulated or not be entirely truthful.
There are a number of cognitive biases which influence people’s susceptibility
to treating poor quality information as truth. Works by Lucassen and Schraa-
gen [99, 100, 101, 102, 103] have sought to distil prevalent bias and trust theory
into models of informational trust—seeing a continuum of decreasing expert anal-
ysis slide away to very basic human features of interpersonal trust whereby people
are no longer concerned with fact but are happy to take it on trust from oth-
ers than something is valid. This movement away from expert analysis of fact
presents a very real challenge to the rational decision approach towards risk and
requires further research within alternative contexts to those used in the cre-
ation of informational trust models. This thesis examines these issues within the




Nomenclature: The uppercase form, ‘Bitcoin’ is used to refer to the Bit-
coin ecosystem, including the protocol, based on community norms. Bitcoin
with a lowercase ‘b’ written as ‘bitcoin’ is usually associated specifically
with bitcoin as the currency [17].
On January 1st 2017 the crypto-currency bitcoin was valued at US$998 1, six
months later on June 11th bitcoin reached an all-time high of US$3,019 - a 303%
jump in value. A month later the pricing had fallen away by US$686 (23%, July
11th ’17), the drop being not far from the price of a whole bitcoin just a year prior
(US$612, June 11th, ’16). Just one month later on August 16th, 2017 bitcoin
was US$4,425, and by October had reached an new all time high of US$5,844.
For the crypto-currency community this roller-coaster pricing was hardly a
new phenomenom (see Figure 1.2) and seemed consistent with an ‘speculative
bubble’ [80] with erratic price fluctuations and seemingly no intrinsic value to
the nascent currency. Prior to the demise of the then market leading exchange
Mt.Gox, in February 2014, the pricing of a single bitcoin stretched from a mere
US$14 to rivalling that of gold at US$1,147, far outstripping percentage increase
yields from traditional stocks [159] and driving a body of works looking at the
phenomenon [91, 126, 147, 159, 163].
During the first boom cycle for bitcoin, and for those early adopters with large
stocks of bitcoin purchased early in the adoption cycle when prices were compar-
atively trivial, fortunes abounded. For others, the promise of vast returns saw
investors flock to bitcoin speculation [25], pulling investment from other vehicles
such as gold in the hope of realising profit. Research [20, 128] has found that this
speculation has played a significant part in driving the very meteoric price rises
which in turn has fuelled further adoption.
Research by Garcia et al [58] has shown that when making investment deci-
sions, bitcoin speculators partake in self-reinforcing feedback loops - discussing,




Figure 1.2: All time bitcoin pricing index (as at October 2017) -
source:Coindesk.com
searching for and utilizing information in the form of social media and news re-
porting. Of course with such pricing volatility has also come more widespread
news reporting of bitcoin further fuelling the feedback loop.
In order to mitigate the inherent risk in Bitcoin speculation, users not only
need to be able to locate this relevant information, but also interpret and as-
certain the truthfulness or credibility of the information they come across – the
more credible they believe that information to be, the more likely they are to
trust it and act upon it [112]. Yet, for investors the supply of “credible infor-
mation is limited” [25]. This lack of information being likely to cause a sense of
fear and anticipation with investors not used to this new cashless (non-tangible)
currency [130]. Certainly information quality issues that directly relate to Bitcoin
have been readily observable in recent years:
Social discussion - User discussions on forums and Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
can range from talks of impending doom for Bitcoin (“to the floor”) when neg-
ative news breaks, and stratospheric prices rises (“to the moon”) accompanying
positive news. These discussions can be frequent, boisterous and seemingly a col-
lective attempt hoping to move prices up or down – this being not dissimilar to
4
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information based market manipulations such as ‘pump and dump’ [72] or ‘short
and distort’ [73].
News (mis)reporting - Positive stories in the mainstream press are balanced
with those of a negative and often misleading tone. A good example is the
widespread reporting that China had “banned Bitcoin” in early December 2013.
In reality the People’s Bank of China had explicitly stated that “the public is
free to participate in Internet transactions [with bitcoin] provided they take on
the risk themselves,” [18] — a position which was far from a ban.
Misleading market data - A third information quality issue lays in the raw
market trading data itself and specifically what is known as the order-book – a
supposedly open declaration of users’ buy and sell orders used to match trades.
Whilst there is merely anecdotal evidence to support the order books themselves
being incorrect, there is analysis that suggests order books have been manipu-
lated. An example of this was the stagnation of trading volume towards the end of
the first bitcoin pricing boom in 2013 where, certainly on the now defunct Mt.Gox
exchange, orders were being placed and changed at a rate far quicker than a hu-
man could react, effectively stagnating trading volume whilst overt algorithmic
trading ‘bots’ duelled with each other for bitcoin. An anonymous report [3] in
May 2014 suggested this may have been a Mt.Gox ‘bot’ trying to recoup hitherto
undisclosed losses.
The information quality issues within social discussion and news reporting
exhibit features of the very post-truth ideal of appealing to opinion and belief
rather than fact.
1.3 Research Question
This thesis asks the central research question of: ‘to what extent are people able
to select and correctly evaluate information they might rely upon to make de-
cisions?’ Given the information quality issues observed (see Section 1.2), this
5
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Figure 1.3: Design Council ‘Double Diamond’ Model - source:dbstudio.ubc.ca
research question is homed within the Bitcoin ecosystem—specifically the spec-
ulative investment sub-community, for whom news reporting is a pertinent type
of information used when making investment decisions.
1.4 Research Methodology
This thesis is broadly based upon the ‘double diamond’ design process model
(see Figure 1.3) developed by the Design Council in 2005 [43]. The model was
developed based upon studied similarities between the processes used by eleven
companies and groups tasks into different phases, diverging and converging to
reach a goal.
To address the research question (see Section 1.3), this thesis is divided into three
research objectives which align with the ‘double diamond’ process (see Figure 1.4):
Objective 1 - Investigation of Human Notions of Trust
Within the Bitcoin ecosystem, certain sub-communities can be regularly
seen to express a lack of need for trust, or that trust being solely vested
in computation alone [4]. As trust pervades human society [35, 104], and
that people are more likely to utilise information the more credible (trust-
worthy) they believe it to be [112] this sub-community viewpoint on trust
seems rather narrow. This objective looks to investigate broader disclosed
6
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Figure 1.4: Overview of the thesis structure mapped to the design process
human notions of trust within the Bitcoin ecosystem, including the trust
and reliance upon news information within the speculative investment sub-
community.
The Investigation objective aligns neatly with the initial divergent quarter
of the process model and explores trust using an online survey of 125 Bit-
coin users, in which questions (see Appendix A) about their news, Internet
and Bitcoin usage were asked. Constructs for propensity to trust (a per-
sonality type), self-rated expertise and general sentiment towards Bitcoin
were created and tested against four key trust related facets: interpersonal,
institutional, technological and informational.
Objective 2 - Evaluation of Potential Confirmation Bias
The process of choosing which news information to base decisions upon—
the first part of the primary research question—is critical in the adop-
tion and usage of Bitcoin [58] when describing positive feedback loops in
which users discuss, search for and utilize information. Humans are pre-
programmed to take short-cuts with complex tasks [77] and tend to operate
within a form of ‘bounded rationality ’ [76, 143, 144]. It is reasonable to sus-
pect that Bitcoin speculators, when faced with the vast potential range of
news information and observable quality issues, defer their selection process
in the same way. Given the partisan sentiment found both within online
7
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communities and news reporting towards Bitcoin there is potential that the
short-cut being employed might be a simple confirmation bias—one where
the speculator overly favors news that aligns with their own sentiment.
The Evaluation objective aligns with the later part of the convergent second
quarter of the process model. Using stimulus experimentation, 57 Bitcoin
speculators evaluated the credibility of 6 news stories each. Statistical anal-
ysis of two key markers for potential confirmation bias—overly favourable
assessment and length of time on task—was made.
Objective 3 - Development of a Model of Informational Trust
The process of assessing credibility of information—the second part of the
primary research question—has been described as being both heuristic and
systematic [29] as well as being contextually dependent upon user moti-
vation [115], with users more likely to use information they believe to be
credible [112]. Whilst the online Bitcoin communities present their discus-
sions as expertise, understanding whether or not speculators are actually
able to correctly discern fact from fiction and the biases upon how that
assessment is made is critical for the design, implementation and main-
tainence decisions for systems.
The Development objective aligns with the final half of the process model
in developing and delivering a model of information trust grounded in this
experimentation with Bitcoin speculators. Using the same stimulus ex-
perimentation and participants as Objective 2, a statistical model for each
user’s information trust was derived.
It could be argued that in meeting Objective 3, this thesis completes the ‘dou-
ble diamond’ process in delivering a model of informational trust. However, there
are limitations to this model inherent with any attempt to model trust. As hu-
man trust is so contextual, changes to the stimulus alone would likely change the
shape of the model, as might the participant’s experiences and any other number
of potential independent variables. Simply, as Tweney & Dohery assert in their
work on rationality and inference, “there is... no experiment which clearly reveals
what mental processes underlie the tendency to seek... only information which
can verify a conditional rule.” [153]. To truly deliver a model of informational
trust may be impossible but any attempt to build a more generic model would re-
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quire significantly more data than that collected in this thesis. These limitations
are discussed in section 6.4.1. Withstanding potential generalizability to wider
use-cases, the model of informational trust presented in this thesis is valid for the
Bitcoin speculators who participated in the study who are, in turn, representative
of the broader socially-engaged online crypto-currency sub-community of users.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
This thesis makes two key contributions to both the crypto-currency and security
communities:
Firstly, in investigating where human trust is evident in the Bitcoin ecosystem—
as it transitions towards mainstream adoption—this study sheds light on the
potential barriers to that adoption, not only Bitcoin but also other blockchain-
based technologies. In particular this study highlights the consequences of design
choices such as the impact of loss or media exposure upon a user’s trust and
sentiment towards and within the ecosystem.
Secondly, through answering the research question of ‘to what extent are peo-
ple able to select and correctly evaluate information they might rely upon to make
decisions?’—exposes a model of informational trust for a sub-community of users
whom claim expertise yet exhibit a number of biases which suggests that they do
not actually utilise that expertise when making risky investment decisions. Such
deference to bias, rather than true understanding of information, presents a chal-
lenge to the rational and systematic process of evaluating risk normally found in
security frameworks. Whilst these frameworks are traditionally employed at an
organisational level for evaluating risk, this model suggests the same rationality
and systematization is not necessarily true of users themselves.
Other contributions are grouped around the three research objectives:
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Objective 1 - Investigation of Human Perspectives of Trust
An empirical study of human notions of trust within the speculative Bitcoin
investment community, based upon an online survey of 125 users.
C1: A summary of our respondents’ history and perception of Bitcoin in-
cluding how and when they discovered the crypto-currency, how are
they using it, general sentiments towards Bitcoin and self-perceived
expertise levels.
C2: Findings of trust within the Bitcoin ecosystem, beyond computation
alone, including:
• interpersonal trust in other users and those maintaining Bitcoin
along with how loss of bitcoin impacts upon trust. Surprisingly,
whilst the errant behaviours of others tends to have a negative im-
pact upon interpersonal trust, such losses (that can be attributed to
the respondent’s own actions) can actually increase certain types of
trust not least with those sustained during gambling activities.
• informational trust in the mediums and sources of information used.
Mediums displaying social interaction engendered the most trust.
Mediums with little or no social interaction were trusted where the
author could be identified and demonstrated expert opinion.
Objective 2 - Evaluation of Potential Confirmation Bias
An empirical study of the extent to which confirmation bias might be influ-
encing bitcoin speculator’s selection of new reporting (as a source of infor-
mation) to trust when making investment decisions. Based upon an online
stimulus evaluation task undertaken by 57 bitcoin speculators.
C1: Findings, of no statistical evidence within this sample population re-
lying upon confirmation bias in selecting news information.
C2: Findings, that speculators with sentiment alignment (negative or posi-
tive) to news information spend significantly less time evaluating stim-
ulus, contrary to prior works which found sentiment alignment led to
more time being spent on task.
C3: Evidence within approximately 1/3 of evaluations that another form
of bias (source bias) might be influencing decision making.
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Objective 3 - Development of a Model of Informational Trust
An empirical study and development of a model of how bitcoin speculators
form trust decisions about news information that they might rely upon to
support their investment decisions. Based upon an online stimulus evalua-
tion task undertaken by 57 bitcoin speculators.
C1: A summary of the types of news-based information being used by
bitcoin speculators.
C2: Findings, that significant percentages of these investors, i) are unable
to identify and discount information that is of low quality, and ii)
would act upon their poor evaluations.
C3: Findings, that expertise based credibility evaluation strategies are not
significantly being used by these investors and that trust is not being
placed in the fundamentals of the information itself.
C4: Findings, that Bitcoin investors are making credibility evaluations
based upon un-mediated biases for either the source or medium of
the information. For those making correct evaluations there is a trust
in the source of the information, otherwise trust is deferred to a more
general trust of information based on the Internet.
1.6 Structure
This thesis is presented as three interconnecting parts, each of which addresses one
of the research objectives (see Figure 1.4). Chapter 3 aligns to the Investigation
objective, Chapter 4 aligns to the Evaluation objective and Chapter 5 to the
Development objective. Each of these parts, whist building to answer the research
question, is dependent upon differing sets of literature and as such these are
contained within each chapter, along with the method of analysis, findings and
discussion as relates to the objective in question.
These chapters are preceded by this introduction (Chapter 1) and background
motivation for studying Bitcoin (Chapter 2). This thesis is concluded (Chapter 6)
with a reflection upon these works, the extent to which they have explored trust
within Bitcoin speculation and answered the research question, contributions to
11
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the wider community and a discussion of future work.
Chapter 3 (Objective 1 ) - Investigation of Human Perspectives of Trust in
Bitcoin
Within crypto-currency interested communities the term ‘trustless’ is often
used to describe the underlying trust model of bitcoin as a protocol for the
exchange of ownership of the currency unit. This trust model being based
solely in the mathematical basis of bitcoin rather than in human or organ-
isational intermediaries as is normally the case with currency. In light of
how bitcoin has evolved into the broader Bitcoin socio-technical ecosystem,
this article explores whether trustless is still a reasonable viewpoint to hold
and where trust does extend far beyond that cryptographic computation
alone.
Chapter 4 (Objective 2 ) - Evaluation of Potential Confirmation Bias
News reporting of Bitcoin has been shown to be part of a feedback loop
found in bitcoin speculation, and Objective 1 found evidence that specula-
tors used and trusted news information in their investment decision making
process, along with strongly held sentiments towards aspects of Bitcoin.
This chapter looks to whether those sentiments might be overly influencing
which news information speculator’s select and trust.
Chapter 5 (Objective 3 ) - Development of a Model of Informational Trust
With evidence of informational trust and a lack of support for confirmation
bias, this chapter explores how speculators form their decisions about which
news stories to use and, borrowing methodology for distinguishing between
true expert information evaluation and source biases, builds the first model





Conceptually bitcoin was a product of its time. By the late 2000s intrusive
organizational demands for personal data were being recognized [7, 28] and world
economies were in the early stages of incredible decline. The indiscretions of
financial institutions were laid bare for all to see and it was apparent that a
great many people were going to suffer loss in the years to come. Mistrust of the
handling of this crisis by financial institutions, central banks and governments
was growing. In a period of such uncertainty and, arguably, fear it was very easy
to view this as being an opportunity for an alternative approach to the hitherto
centrally regulated payment channels.
When Nakamoto [121] first proposed bitcoin as an alternative payments sys-
tem, the intention was to remove the need for this trust between or of parties,
human or institutional. Trust, in these parties, was viewed as a necessary evil
in traditional economics, borne out of the need to mitigate inherent risks where
bad actors exist in a system. Nakamoto argued that this was leading to orga-
nizations “hassling” customers for “more information than they would otherwise
need”, the implication being that this was in some way a form of risk mitigation
against customer’s potentially fraudulent behaviors.
By design bitcoin is trustworthy by being trustless in those very persons or
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organizations that one may mistrust. Following a Giddens [60] viewpoint that
there is no need for trust where the user has insight into the reasoning and
functionality of a system—rather than by opaque monetary policy, bitcoin was
to be created through an open source algorithm with transactions being logged
forever in a publicly viewable ledger (latterly named the blockchain). Auditability
and transparency was paramount. Evidence was... evident.
It appears Nakamoto never actually referred to bitcoin as being trustless –
the term was seemingly coined by an early adopter community with a converged
(arguably part anarchic, part libertarian [107, 148]) world-view. Yet for many
in and around Bitcoin this purist view of trustless is because the trust model
for payments is “based in computation rather than people” [4]. There is no need
to trust other people or organizations as trustlessness is afforded by the decen-
tralization of creation and governance to the distributed peers in the network,
away from centralized organizations. In trust literature parlance this would be
referred to as institutional (mis)trust being defined as both the environment and
the institutions that shape and influence it [111].
A note on decentralization: Whilst the creation and transactional log-
ging remain decentralized there are a great many organizations (effectively
synonymous with institutions) active within Bitcoin as an ecosystem. As
Gervais et al [59] articulate, for example, the core development team (who
whilst being a distributed group of individual people) are collectively an
organization within whom is vested centralized decision making and control
over the maintenance and ongoing development of Bitcoin. Laurie [96] ar-
gues that hard-coded blockchain checkpoints (used to prevent deep forking
- a process which could undermine the veracity of information stored in a
blockchain) are indicative of bitcoin not being truly decentralized as they
are chosen in a centralized manner. Further large mining pools, who again
may be distributed, can exert centralized control over the network (e.g. a
51% attack) [106].
But Bitcoin has evolved beyond payments into a more socio-technical ecosys-
tem; new use cases have emerged (e.g., investment speculation, gambling, laun-
dering, digital asset signing etc...) and the community around it has grown.
And organizations, decentralized or not, including mining pools, exchanges, wal-
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let providers and product/service vendors all need trust in order to cooperate,
negotiate and transact [164].
2.2 Locus of Existing Bitcoin Research
Taking the Nakamoto paper of 2008 [121] as a starting point for bitcoin research,
to the beginning of July 2017 nearly 15,0001 research papers have been published
(see Figure 2.1). Even allowing for duplicates and multiple copies of the same
research, this is a significant body of research in such a short period of time.
Whilst not about bitcoin per se, it is still necessary to situate this thesis within
this spiralling body of work. What follows is a synopsis of existing bitcoin works
to highlight the current lack of research into human trust within bitcoin, which
is where this thesis sits.
Figure 2.1: Google Scholar search for “Bitcoin” keyword published research.




2.2 Locus of Existing Bitcoin Research
Bonneau et al ’s systemization of knowledge work [21] affords a more in depth
review of the primarily technical research to its publication in late 2015. Key
research in Bitcoin falls, predominantly, into four primary streams (see Table 2.1)
being:
1 Technical aspects Research in and around Bitcoin is heavily weighted, as
one might expect of nascent technology, towards the three main technical com-
ponents of the system [21, 157, 164]: Transactions (including scripts) within
the Bitcoin world are a series of messages which are published to transfer the
bitcoin from one user to another. Bonneau et al [21] affirm that “[transactions
are] the only state in bitcoin. There is no built-in notion of higher-level concepts
such as users, account balances or identities—these all exist only to the extent
that they can be imputed from the list of published transactions.” The consen-
sus protocol being the permanent publicly accessible ledger (the blockchain)
used to record transactions, however to prevent fraud prior to inclusion on the
blockchain transactions must be verified by other peers in the network. The
communication network to bind these peers together in a network is on an ad
hoc basis and used to announce new transactions and proposed additions (blocks)
to the blockchain.
2 Security & stability The second main focus of study in Bitcoin has been in
and around security and stability. Even at its foundation security was viewed as
an intrinsic need within bitcoin with models for malicious mining [121]. Eyal &
Sirer [49] and Bonneau et al [21] expanded this to look more broadly at potential
vulnerability within bitcoin. Numerous other studies including [2, 4, 5, 10, 38,
87, 88, 56, 59, 92, 113, 119, 156] explore notions of security and privacy within
bitcoin.
3 Economic aspects & governance With bitcoin falling within the auspices
of financial markets the economic nature of bitcoin factors such as the economic
fundamentals of supply and demand, pricing factors, valuation and volatility are
widely researched, e.g., [19, 25, 30, 91, 92, 126, 128]. The inherent risk of bitcoin
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as a cross-governance jurisdiction financial technology has driven studies looking
at the uses and regulation/legal aspects of bitcoin, e.g., [20, 33, 58, 157, 158].
4 Alternative uses A fourth stream, adjunct to Bitcoin, looks at alternative
uses (primarily) for blockchains or distributed ledger technology (DLT) as it is
becoming known, e.g., [41, 88]. Shukla [142] suggests that blockchains might













































Androulaki, Karame, Roeschlin, Scherer, and Cap-
kun, (2013), “Evaluating user privacy in bitcoin”
• [2]
Apostolaki, Zohar, and Vanbever, (2017), “Hijacking
Bitcoin: Routing Attacks on Cryptocurrencies”
• [5]
Bastiaan, (2015), “Preventing the 51%-attack: a stochastic
analysis of two phase proof of work in bitcoin”
• • [10]
Bo¨hme, Christin, Edelman, and Moore, (2015), “Bit-
coin: Economics, technology, and governance”
• • [19]
Bohr and Bashir, (2014), “Who Uses Bitcoin? An explo-
ration of the Bitcoin community”
• • [20]
Bonneau, Miller, Clark, Narayanan, Kroll, and Fel-
ten, (2015), “SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for
Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies”
• • • • [21]
Bukovina and Marticˇek, (2016), “Sentiment and Bitcoin
Volatility”
• • [25]
Carboni, (2015), “Feedback based Reputation on top of the
Bitcoin Blockchain”
• [26]
Carroll and Bellotti, (2015), “Creating value together: The
emerging design space of peer-to-peer currency and exchange”
• [27]
Cheah and Fry, (2015), “Speculative bubbles in Bitcoin
markets? An empirical investigation into the fundamental
value of Bitcoin”
• [30]
Christin, (2013), “Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement
analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace”
• • [32]
Table 2.1: Categorised Bitcoin literature (continued over...)
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Christopher, (2014), “Why on Earth to People Use Bit-
coin”
• • • [33]
Courtois and Bahack, (2014), “On subversive miner
strategies and block withholding attack in bitcoin digital cur-
rency”
• [38]
Danezis and Meiklejohn, (2016), “Centrally Banked Cryp-
tocurrencies”
• • • [41]
Dyhrberg, (2016), “Bitcoin, gold and the dollar–A GARCH
volatility analysis”
• [46]
Eyal and Sirer, (2014), “Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin
Mining Is Vulnerable”
• • [49]
Gao, Clark, and Lindqvist, (2016), “Of Two Minds, Mul-
tiple Addresses, and One Ledger: Characterizing Opinions,
Knowledge, and Perceptions of Bitcoin Across Users and
Non-Users”
• [55]
Garay, Kiayias, and Leonardos, (2015), “The bitcoin
backbone protocol: Analysis and applications”
• • [56]
Garcia, Tessone, Mavrodiev, and Perony, (2014), “The
digital traces of bubbles: feedback cycles between socio-
economic signals in the Bitcoin economy”
• • [58]
Garcia and Schweitzer, (2015), “Social signals and algo-
rithmic trading of Bitcoin”
• • [57]
Gervais, Karame, Capkun, and Capkun, (2014), “Is
Bitcoin a decentralized currency?”
• • [59]
Glaser, Zimmermann, Haferkorn, Weber, and Sier-
ing, (2014), “Bitcoin-asset or currency? revealing users’ hid-
den intentions”
• • [61]
Kazan, Tan, and Lim, (2015), “Value Creation in Cryp-
tocurrency Networks: Towards A Taxonomy of Digital Busi-
ness Models for Bitcoin Companies”
• • [78]
Khairuddin, Sas, Clinch, and Davies, (2016), “Exploring
motivations for bitcoin technology usage”
• [82]
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Kogias, Jovanovic, Gailly, Khoffi, Gasser, and Ford,
(2016), “Enhancing bitcoin security and performance with
strong consistency via collective signing”
• • [87]
Kosba, Miller, Shi, Wen, and Papamanthou, (2015),
“Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-
Preserving Smart Contracts”
• • • [88]
Kristoufek, (2013), “BitCoin meets Google Trends and
Wikipedia: Quantifying the relationship between phenomena
of the Internet era”
• • [90]
Kristoufek, (2015), “What are the main drivers of the Bit-
coin price? Evidence from wavelet coherence analysis.”
• • [91]
Kroll, Davey, and Felten, (2013), “The economics of Bit-
coin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries”
• • [92]
Kumaresan, Moran, and Bentov, (2015), “How to use
bitcoin to play decentralized poker”
• [94]
Laurie, (2011), “Decentralised currencies are probably im-
possible (but let’s at least make them efficient)”
• [96]
Lustig and Nardi, (2015), “Algorithmic Authority: The
Case of Bitcoin”
• • [105]
Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz, (2013), “When perhaps the
real problem is money itself !: the practical materiality of Bit-
coin”
• [107]
Meiklejohn, Pomarole, Jordan, Levchenko, McCoy,
Voelker, and Savage, (2013), “A fistful of bitcoins: char-
acterizing payments among men with no names”
• • [114]
Meiklejohn and Orlandi, (2015), “Privacy-enhancing
overlays in bitcoin”
• [113]
Miers, Garman, Green, and Rubin, (2013), “Zerocoin:
Anonymous distributed e-cash from bitcoin”
• [116]
Miller, Kosba, Katz, and Shi, (2015), “Nonoutsourceable
scratch-off puzzles to discourage bitcoin mining coalitions”
• • [117]
Moore and Christin, (2013), “Beware the Middleman:
Empirical Analysis of Bitcoin-Exchange Risk”
• [119]
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Moser, Bohme, and Breuker, (2013), “An inquiry into
money laundering tools in the Bitcoin ecosystem”
• [120]
Pavel, Miroslava, and d’Artis, (2014), “The Economics
of BitCoin Price Formation”
• [126]
Pera¨, (2015), “Sharing behaviour of bitcoin investors - evi-
dence of confirmation bias?”
• [127]
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Lightfoot, (2015), “Price Fluctuations and the Use of Bit-
coin: An Empirical Inquiry”
• [128]
Reid and Harrigan, (2011), “An analysis of anonymity in
the bitcoin system”
• [133]
Ruffing, Kate, and Schro¨der, (2015), “Liar, liar, coins
on fire!: Penalizing equivocation by loss of bitcoins”
• • • [137]
Sas and Khairuddin, (2015), “Exploring trust in Bitcoin
technology: a framework for HCI research”
• [138]
Sas and Khairuddin, (2017), “Design for Trust: An explo-
ration of the challenges and opportunities of bitcoin users”
• [139]
Shcherbak, (2014), “How should Bitcoin be regulated?” • [141]
Shukla, (2017), “Editorial: Cyber Security, IoT, Block
Chains-Risks and Opportunities”
• [142]
Smyth, (2014), The Politics of Bitcoin • [148]
Vasek, Thornton, and Moore, (2014), “Empirical analy-
sis of denial-of-service attacks in the Bitcoin ecosystem”
• [156]
Viglione, (2015), “Does Governance Have a Role in Pric-
ing? Cross-Country Evidence from Bitcoin Markets”
• [158]
Vockathaler, (2015), “The Bitcoin Boom: An In Depth
Analysis Of The Price Of Bitcoins”
• [159]
Yelowitz and Wilson, (2015), “Characteristics of Bitcoin
users: an analysis of Google search data”
• [163]
Zarifis, Cheng, Dimitriou, and Efthymiou, (2015),
“Trust in Digital Currency Enabled Transactions Model”
• [164]
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2.3 Human Aspects Research in Bitcoin
Works examining the human aspects of Bitcoin are far more limited in number
than those looking to the four primary streams identified by Bonneau et al [21].
A summary of related human aspects research in Bitcoin is given below (see
Table 2.2). Within this research there are three themes of study: 1) user char-
acterization, intention and motivation, 2) social, behavioral & socio-economic
signals driving pricing / volatility, and 3) aspects of trust. Most of this research
spans two, or all three, themes.
2.3.1 User characterization, intention and motivation
Understandably, after the more technical streams of research (see Section 2.2),
studies looking to identify, characterize and explore user motivation are the most
numerous human aspects research. Principle work by Maurer, Nelms & Swartz
established an anthropological position of Bitcoin users [107], contrasting the
promise of Bitcoin to address issues of concern around governance and regulation
with those of privacy, equity for miners and true value of Bitcoin. Bohr & Bashir
[20] looked at the culture of those using Bitcoin identifying that a number of
demographic features of users determined how attracted they were to Bitcoin.
Yelowitz & Wilson [163] further honed analysis of user characteristics finding
that users with enthusiasm for computer programming and/or illegal activities
were further driving interest in Bitcoin.
Christopher [33] and Khairuddin et al [82] looked to understand why peo-
ple use Bitcoin. Christopher explored four distinct motivations (speculation,
algorithmic trust, spending power & money laundering). Of these motivations
speculation and money laundering are somewhat obvious. Spending power as dis-
cussed is something of a misnomer in that Christoper really talks to the perceived
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anonymity of Bitcoin and its cross-border application. Spending power in Bitcoin
would normally be more related to its deflationary nature in that as the supply
of new bitcoins dwindles there is an inevitable demand-driven increase in value
thusly affording greater spending power. This could be viewed as “if a coffee
costs me one bitcoin today, in a year it will likely be a quarter a bitcoin.”
Khairuddin et al found three motivations (a role in monetary revolution, user
empowerment and perception of real value) although these were on the basis of
only 9 user interviews which are unlikely to capture the diversity of the entire
Bitcoin community. Some similarities between user empowerment & perception
of real value and Christopher’s spending power can be drawn.
Gao et al [55] found that users held misconceptions about aspects of Bitcoin
and were not well versed in how Bitcoin technically functions. The study also
drew parallels in user motivation with both Christoper and Khairuddin et al with
regards perceptions on how Bitcoin might represent a future of payment systems.
Glaser et al [61] contrast this and looked at user intention within the very specific
use case of changing domestic (fiat) currency into a digital currency finding that
new and uninformed users had a biased intent towards speculation, as opposed
to using Bitcoin for payments.
2.3.2 Social, behavioral & socio-economic signals
A second research theme looks to how social interactions and user behavior plays
a role in Bitcoin, both its adoption and pricing.
Kristoufek [90, 91] looked to what drives user interest in Bitcoin. Within this
work, Kristoufek found that, beyond economic fundamentals, as the pricing of
bitcoin moved beyond pricing-trend norms there was a pronounced increase in
online search behavior of people looking for information about Bitcoin. Garcia et
al [57, 58] built upon Kristoufek’s discovery of the link between pricing and search
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behavior and developed a model of how social interactions between users not only
drove bitcoin pricing but also that very search behavior. In this study Garcia et
al identified two positive feedback loops (see Figure 2.2) which, in essence, meant
that as the price of bitcoin increased it created user attention through information
search volumes. This, in turn, lead to an increase in word-of-mouth discussion















Figure 2.2: Garcia et al’s socio-economic feedback cycles
Pera¨ [127] also looked at this user information sharing behavior and ques-
tionned whether this might be subject to confirmation bias - a cognitive fallacy
which might leave speculators open to making poor investment decisions where
that information forms part of the cycles found by both Kristoufek and Garcia et
al. Pera¨ concluded that there was evidence that users were sharing information
when it aligned within their own sentiment towards Bitcoin. Glaser et al, in their
work with users’ intentions, found that these users displayed a lack of “profes-
sionalism and objectivity” when using Bitcoin. Most markedly, “highlighted by
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their bias towards positive news” [61] - this being confirmation bias.
2.3.3 Aspects of trust
Works examining the human dimensions of trust and how they impact the adop-
tion and usage of Bitcoin are even more scarce. Works with either full or partial
attention to the role of trust are highlighted below (see Table 2.2).
Maurer, Nelms & Swartz observed that “the social dynamics of community
and trust [are] evident in the prose... produced by Bitcoin users” [107]. An
observation that was the first to counter the promise of Bitcoin’s trust being
“based [solely] in computation” [4]. Part of their rationale being based around
the fact that those algorithms were being trusted based on a community of users—
something embodying the distributed nature of Bitcoin itself and neatly summa-
rized by Gavin Andersen from the Bitcoin core-development team who found it,
“more comforting than thinking that politicians or central bankers wont screw it
up. I actually trust the wisdom of the crowds more” [62].
With regards algorithmic trust, Nakamoto when initially proposing bitcoin
did so as a “system for electronic transactions without relying on trust” [121]. As
the community around Bitcoin grew the definition of this lack of trust evolved to a
more pragmatic view that the trust was shifted to the algorithms or computation.
Christopher [33] determined that it was this very shift away from institutional to
algorithmic trust that was comforting to Bitcoin users as it was “mathematically
driven and not manipulated by central bankers” as these were mistrusted due to
their handling of the 2008 global financial crisis. Lustig & Nardi, whilst exploring
the culture of Bitcoin users, also found traces of algorithmic authority, “the trust
in algorithms to direct human action and to verify information, in place of trusting
or preferring human authority” [105]. Interestingly whilst this authority was
observable, they also found that this was not a ‘blind faith’ but rather users
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saw great value in that authority requiring/needing to be mediated by human
judgement. Ostensibly this mediation being a statement of mistrust in those
algorithms. Why else would one need to mediate that authority if it were fully
trusted?
Zarifis et al examined the nature of trust in the relationship between organi-
zations and consumers as transacting parties [164]. Their model of transactional
trust built upon McKnight et al’s web trust model [110] by adding validated
constructs specific to digital currencies. Whilst the model demonstrates how me-
diated transactions can benefit organizations and consumers alike, it is unclear
how this model holds up where fulfilment by the organization is not made. In
summary, whilst digital currencies can allow for trust in a payment having been







Figure 2.3: Sas & Khairuddin’s research framework
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Sas & Khairuddin, in a position paper predominantly to the HCI community,
presented an exploratory framework for trust research (see Figure 2.3) within
Bitcoin [138]. Broadly the framework identifies a need for research in the domains
of institutional, social and technological trust, these being based on well founded
works. However the framework has two key shortcomings. Firstly, the work
is grounded in Shcherbak’s stakeholder categorization [141] which strictly falls
into the trap of seeing Bitcoin not as an evolving ecosystem but only as its
initial intended payments-only mechanism. As such Shcherbak, and there-in Sas
& Khairuddin, only recognize four types of Bitcoin stakeholder—users, miners,
exchanges and merchants—making no mention of the role that governments, third
party service parties (as non-merchants) or any other parties might play. Nor does
this categorization differentiate between any of the many and varied use cases for
Bitcoin and, therefore, effectively views all users as being analogous. As trust is
contextually sensitive, these differing use cases will likely require differing views
on trust. The second shortcoming lays in the framework model not recognizing
the role that informational trust plays—given its well documented importance to
both the adoption and use of Bitcoin, nor the interplay between information and
the three layers presented.
Later work by Sas & Khairuddin, with 20 Bitcoin users, explored trust issues
in relation to key technical characteristics of Bitcoin [139]. Through interviews,
it was found that the main challenge to trust was from ‘insecure transactions’
and dealing with ‘dishonest traders’ both aspects that bitcoin (as the payments
mechanism) itself is unable to resolve. Directly addressing concerns from these
users, Sas & Khairuddin suggest two key design implications for Bitcoin for cre-
ating trust: i) support for transparency of two-way transactions, and ii) tools to
support reversible transactions. Technically some types of transaction are already
reversable, namely those marked as ‘multisignature’ [45] however to extend this
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to all transactions would be non-trivial, as accepted by Sas & Khairuddin.






Bohr and Bashir, (2014) Analysis of public Bitcoin survey data (1,193 responses) to explore de-
mographic structure of Bitcoin users.
Bukovina and Marticˇek, (2016) Attempt to model bitcoin pricing with user sentiment. Limitations
in only using single source of sentiment noted as possible explanation of finding that sentiment only
played a minor part of total pricing volatility.
Christopher, (2014) Discussion of literature around speculation, algorithmic trust, spending power
& money laundering to explain motivations for using bitcoin
•
Gao, Clark, and Lindqvist, (2016) Empirical study (20 user interviews) of user perceptions of Bit-
coin, highlighting user trade-offs and barriers to entry, misconceptions about privacy and a mistaken
user belief that they are “incapable of using Bitcoin.”
Garcia, Tessone, Mavrodiev, and Perony, (2014) Model of socio-economic signals, discovering
existence of reinforcing feedback cycles between pricing, the volume of social discussion online,
volume of information search and user base growth.
Garcia and Schweitzer, (2015) Development of algorithmic trading strategies, integrating the
previously found socio-economic signal feedback cycles.
Glaser, Zimmermann, Haferkorn, Weber, and Siering, (2014) Exploration the intentions
behind users converting domestic (fiat) currency into bitcoin, providing an empirical view on user
interest in bitcoin is driven by its appeal as an asset or a currency based upon econometric modelling.
Khairuddin, Sas, Clinch, and Davies, (2016) Empirical study (9 user interviews) reporting 3
key motivations for using Bitcoin: role in monetary revolution, increased empowerment & perception
of real value in bitcoin currency.
Kristoufek, (2013) Study of the relationship between interest in Bitcoin (using online search queries
for information as a proxy) and pricing. Asymmetry in effects of interest noted, where as pricing fall
below or exceeds trend an increase in interest reinforces the trend.
Kristoufek, (2015) Study of bitcoin price drivers. Findings that standard market fundamentals
have a long term impact upon price. Further evidence that user interest drives price both up and
down, especially in periods of rapid price rise or decline.
Lustig and Nardi, (2015) Empirical study (521 survey respondents & 22 user interviews) of the cul-
ture of Bitcoin users and their perceptions of trust in the algorithms that underpin bitcoin. Findings
include that users do not blindly trust algorithms, acknowledging need for human judgement.
•
Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz, (2013) View on the semiotics of Bitcoin broadly seeing users as
being drawn by signals of privatized transactions and a grounding of value in algorithmic authority
as opposed to centralized monetary policy. Social trust is attributed to the distributed nature of the
code behind bitcoin meaning many people can attest to its validity.
•
Table 2.2: Human aspects of Bitcoin literature (continued over...)
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Pera¨, (2015) Empirical analysis of whether Bitcoin users share information with other users in a
confirmation-biased manner. Findings that sharing behavior exhibits signs of confirmation bias with
users holding stronger beliefs being more willing to share sentiment aligned information.
Sas and Khairuddin, (2015) Position paper that highlights where in the wider Bitcoin ecosystem
trust may be necessary and proposes an HCI framework calling for the study of trust in Bitcoin.
•
Sas and Khairuddin, (2017) Empirical study (20 user interviews) exploring Bitcoin characteristic
impacts upon trust and proposing designing for trust.
•
Yelowitz and Wilson, (2015) Empirical analysis of Google trends (searches) in an attempt to un-
mask user characteristics for Bitcoin users, whom are able to mask their profile beyond the anonymity
of Bitcoin. Key finding that computer programming enthusiasts and illegal activity are key drivers
for user interest in Bitcoin.
Zarifis, Cheng, Dimitriou, and Efthymiou, (2015) Exploration of business:consumer trust, and
validation of digital currency transactions trust model. Incorporates both user propensity to trust and
institutional trust aspects. Highlights the role of ex-Bitcoin third parties in creating and maintaining
trust.
•
Table 2.2: Human aspects of Bitcoin literature. Research with specific focus (in
full or part) upon trust is highlighted.
2.4 Research Agenda
In the human aspects research discussed above it is clear social and behavioral
cues include the acquisition, evaluation and sharing of information by Bitcoin
users [58, 57, 90, 91]. Further that information sharing is subject to some cog-
nitive bias [61, 127]. Whilst works [33, 107, 138, 139, 164] have explored trust
none have looked to the importance of informational trust. Further none have
explored the processes by which information is evaluated or how it is actually
trusted. This thesis directly situates itself within this gap in asking ‘to what ex-
tent are people [speculative users of Bitcoin] able to select and correctly evaluate




Perspectives of Trust in Bitcoin
This part of the thesis addresses the first objective—investigation of human per-
spectives of trust—and, through the use of an online survey questions 125 Bitcoin





The crypto-trust that underpins Bitcoin is essential in securing the whole ecosytem
but as with all technologies relied upon to secure assets (informational or oth-
erwise) people are responsible for design, implementation and operation of these
technological tools [74, 95]. As Lacey [95] points out “despite the presence of
advanced technical controls, information systems remain vulnerable because of
human behavior” – something which Bitcoin’s inception was designed to actively
mitigate against. Yet cases of miscreant and inadvertent detrimental behavior
abound.
Thusly, understanding human behavior, and more specifically concepts of
trust [138], is a critical underpinning to the design, implementation and mainte-
nance of any technological attempt to mitigate security risk.
Given this need to understand human concepts of trust within Bitcoin, and
commonly expressed conflations of trustlessness & institutional mistrust as mean-
ing Bitcoin is devoid of trust (especially in people) it is, therefore, fundamentally
important to examine whether trustless is still an entirely appropriate way to
describe Bitcoin. This chapter examines this very question through an online
study of users in the socio-technical Bitcoin ecosystem.
3.1.1 Contributions
181 subjects responded to the advertised online study, out of which 125 provided
valid responses. In-depth examination of responses to a range of questions and in-
formation scenarios shows that, contrary to opinions suggesting a lack of need for
trust in people when using Bitcoin, respondents do rely upon informational trust
– this often being under-pinned by a high degree of reliance upon interpersonal
trust. This chapter’s key contributions are as follows:
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• A summary of respondents’ history and perception of Bitcoin: how and when
they discovered the crypto-currency, how are they using it, general sentiments
towards Bitcoin and self-perceived expertise levels.
• Findings of interpersonal trust in other users and those maintaining Bitcoin
along with how loss of bitcoin impacts upon trust.
Surprisingly, whilst the errant behaviours of others tends to have a negative
impact upon interpersonal trust, such losses (that can be attributed to the
respondent’s own actions) can actually increase certain types of trust not least
with those sustained during gambling activities.
• Findings of informational trust in the mediums and sources of information
used in making speculative decisions in Bitcoin. Mediums which display social
interaction (such as discussion forums or news websites with active comment
communities) engendered the most trust. Those mediums with little or no
social interaction were clearly trusted where the author could be identified and
demonstrate expert opinion. In both cases it is clear that trust in information
mediums is based in, at least in part, interpersonal trust of those authoring
the text.
Design Implications - As this study highlights perceptions of trust within
the Bitcoin ecosystem, it seems fair to expect similar trust aspects within other
crypto-currency implementations as well as technologies being built upon the
blockchain. With this in mind, design choices being made at the time of devel-
opment of similar socio-technical systems are likely to have consequences upon
the trust that users have in those systems—the less a user finds a system trust-
worthy, the less likely they are to adopt and use it. Two key areas of system
design that impact upon user trust relate to the loss of bitcoin are, transaction
confirmation and pseudonymity .
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It is all but impossible to reverse erroneous transactions in Bitcoin. This is
a result of the design choice to not mandate multi-signatory transactions (which
are facilitated by the protocols) where at least two of the confirmations are made
by the transacting parties and the casting vote is made by a third party in the
event of disagreement. As confirmations are left open to peers on the network,
confirmations are blind to transaction fulfilment, and the loss of bitcoin due to
fraudulent or theft events is permanent. Further, the pseudonomity afforded in
Bitcoin means that attempts to recover losses via mechanisms such as legal action
are at best unlikely.
Thusly, it should come as no surprise that trust in exchanges, people and
Bitcoin itself is impacted negatively by loss events (see Section 3.4.3.3). In an
ecosystem where loss through fraud and theft is widely publicized, the knowledge
that the transfer of one’s bitcoins is one-way is perceived as a huge trust issue by
potential users, with potential to hamper mainstream adoption.
For designers, understanding how technical implementations impact upon user
trust is critical. It is with no small irony that, despite Nakamoto’s intention to
remove the need for institutional trust in transactions, the decision to not man-
date multi-signatory confirmation has meant users deferring institutional trust to
third-party mechanisms such as escrow. The technical protocols of Bitcoin may
be trustless, but in order for humans to feel secure when using Bitcoin they very
much rely upon trust — a key insight of this study.
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, related literature is pro-
vided for both interpersonal and informational trust (Section 3.2). Secondly, a
description of the method by which the questions surrounding trust in Bitcoin
(Section 3.3) are examined, followed by a presentation of results from the on-
line study (Section 3.4). Thirdly, a discussion of key findings of this study is
presented, along with areas for further investigation (Section 3.5). Finally, this
chapter concludes (Section 3.7) that whilst not technically incorrect, trustless is
too narrow a notion to be applied to Bitcoin given the complexities and intricacies




In this section works related to trust in people (interpersonal) and in information
are presented, along with how Bitcoin actually has need for both.
3.2.1 Interpersonal trust (trust in people)
Trust is often defined as being empirically based and probabilistic: “to a degree
consistent with our perception of the available evidence. In human interaction, we
trust individuals and institutions to the degree that they have, over time, proved
trustworthy” [48]. Mayer et al [108] similarly argue that any such trust is cycli-
cally developed based upon the trustor’s perception of the other party and their
own propensity to trust and that without both factors, trust cannot exist.
Trust also lies at the core of almost all theories of interpersonal relationships
[145]. There are few aspects of life within which trust does not play an indispens-
able role – trust pervades human society [35, 60, 104]. Kramer and Carnevale [89]
argue that trust involves a set of beliefs and expectations that another’s actions
will be in some way beneficial to long term self-interest; a position that could
only be established were the trustor able to cognitively assess another person’s
(or organization’s) actions from an empathetic perspective.
Within Bitcoin an emergent notion of trustlessness comes from its practical
use as a pseudonymous peer-to-peer based network. Once a transaction has been
logged within the blockchain it is known to everyone, in the network, that it has
been concluded. Consequently, there is no need to trust, or even know, who a
counter-party is when transacting – merely that they have made payment.
However this view is problematic in that it only caters for the payment side
of a transaction and in no way affords guarantee that the goods or services being
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purchased will actually be delivered. This non-fulfilment being either a result of a
deliberate exploitation or, simply the counter-party being unable to deliver that
which is expected [44].
With the pseudonymous nature of Bitcoin, and therefore a breakdown in the
ability to rely upon Raub & Weeise’s temporal, social or institutional embedded-
ness [132], this assurity [53] of fulfilment is utterly dependent upon either trust
of, and intermediation by a third party. This, in turn, requires institutional trust
(of that third party) from the users. The third party intermediary being seen as
trustworthy not only by being identifiable, but also likely subject to some form
of penalty - reputation, legal or loss of trade congruent with Raub & Weeise’s
embeddedness factors. With people needing to mitigate risk by placing trust in
something beyond computation alone, services like escrow and smart contracts
built around the blockchain fill the void – and incidentally also act as as explicit
statements of mistrust in the initial trustee. Ironically this very signalling to the
trustee that they are not trusted - by using a third party service such as escrow
- “may actually reduce their motivation to act in a trustworthy manner” [134].
Zarifis et al point out that a user’s “level of trust in a technology is an im-
portant factor in the level of its adoption particularly when there is some finan-
cial risk” [164]. A viewpoint echoed by most researchers, agreeing that trust is
required where an individual takes a risk [108, 104]. And financial risk is partic-
ularly prevalent in Bitcoin. Aside from fluctuations in exchange rates, criminal
activity (such as fraud or theft) and organizational collapse, Bitcoin can be also
considered a speculative investment [25, 41]. A number of works, e.g., [20, 58,
128], highlight that this speculative investment has been a key use for Bitcoin




It follows that, with as new uses emerge for Bitcoin and the blockchain, the
ecosystem is evolving not to remove centrality or the need to trust a governing
institution but rather to cater for a very human need to be able to understand and
remove risk in everyday life – to be able to see certainty in outcomes. As such,
and whilst some will argue that Bitcoin is still just a cryptographically signed
payments mechanism trustless by design, to the wider world Bitcoin is more a
conflation of all uses and one in which interpersonal trust is instrumental.
3.2.2 Trust in information
Garcia et al [58] looked at socio-economic traces in the behaviors of Bitcoin
investors and identified positive ‘feedback loops ’ in which users discuss, search
for and utilize information (in the form of social media and news) when making
decisions as to whether to adopt and use Bitcoin. Prior work looking at video
summarization [40], addressing the intention gap between the information sought
and returned, has shown that a user’s ability to interpret the information being
presented to him/her was fundamental to his/her ability to make a decision.
Yet with Bitcoin, more than any other investment market before, the lay person
replete with basic technical capability can readily create an account on a Bitcoin
exchange and begin trading, with no training or professional/expert advice.
Therefore, in order to mitigate risk, users need to be able to ascertain the
truthfulness or credibility of the information they come across – the more credible
they believe that information to be, the more likely they are to act upon it
[112]. For anyone who followed Bitcoin news and markets during the period of
the bitcoin pricing boom from mid-2013 through to the global collapse following
the demise of Mt.Gox in early 2014, the variety of information available was
incredible. Similarly, Bukoniva and Martiek [25] have noted that the supply of
“credible information is limited” for those using Bitcoin.
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During this period, for those trying to ascertain the trustworthiness of other
parties within the Bitcoin ecosystem or whether the information they might act
upon was credible, any such assessment must have been particularly difficult.
Next, the reference information trust model used as the basis of this study
is presented, followed by a summary of respondents and the method used - dis-




3.3.1 Reference information trust model
Information credibility assessment can be thought of as both a heuristic and
systematic process [29]. Decisions as to which process to use are dependent upon
user motivation at the time [115]. Lucassen & Schraagen [103] extend this decision
to being based upon ‘rules-of-thumb’ (cognitive bias) and offer a clear model for
trust in information which takes account of these biases by partitioning trust into
four key layers (see Figure 3.1).
Trust in the information
Trust in the source
Trust in the medium
Propensity to trust
Figure 3.1: Lucassen & Schraagen’s model of informational trust
This study does not seek to reconstruct a model of respondents’ information
trust (this being within Chapter 5). This study does, however, re-purpose Lu-
cassen & Schraagen’s three outermost layers for exploring respondents’ notions
of trust. To explore interpersonal and informational trust we utilize propensity
to trust as a construct (see Section 3.3.3). It also looks to mediums and sources




The study was widely advertised to a number of online forums, websites, social
media and also through direct email asking for voluntary participation with no
offer of payment. The study was split into two key parts. Part one was a series
of questions looking at (i) discovery and use of the cryptocurrency, general sen-
timent towards Bitcoin and its long-term prospects; (ii) self perceived levels of
knowledge and expertise; and (iii) a general set of questions around technology
and news consumption. Part two was a news report stimulus evaluation task,
open to respondents who had usage experience of Bitcoin, and forms the basis of
Chapters 4 & 5. The normal ethical principles of informed consent, data storage
and anonymization were observed (with ethical review and approval given by the
relevant body at the authors’ institution prior to the study). In total 181 re-
sponded to the invitation with fifty-six excluded from the analysis for either not
having completed the questionnaire part of the study or for bogus participation.
Respondents were allowed to only participate once (enforced by client-side cookie
and server-side IP registration) with the ability to take the study in stages over
a maximum of five days in total. A fully copy of the questions asked is given in
Appendix A.
Demographics Of the qualified responses (N=125), overwhelmingly 88% of
respondents were male. Sixty-seven percent of all respondents considered them-
selves ‘employed’ with another 26% ‘still in education’. Looking into educational
backgrounds, 64% had a college degree or higher with only 2 respondents believ-
ing they had had no education and 12 having gone no further than high school.
Eighty-eight percent were located in either Europe (n = 68) or the Americas
(North & South) (n = 42).
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Respondent Source The majority (78%) came from respondents recruited
from Reddit (see Table 1) and were spread across 9 sub-Reddit forums (r/Bit-
coin 32, r/SampleSize 23, r/BTC 12, r/Economics 12, r/BitcoinBeginners 11,
r/Markets 3, r/Mining 2, r/CryptoCurrency 1 and r/CryptoMarkets 1).
Bitcoin Usage Exposure to Bitcoin amongst respondents peaked in 2012-2013
(as did the price of bitcoin) with 86% having heard of Bitcoin prior to the collapse
in pricing in early 2014 (see Figure 3.2). Amongst respondents, online discussion
forums provided first exposure for 43%, with friends/family member/colleagues
and online news websites accounting for another 41%.
Ninety-four (94) respondents expressed how they have or are using Bitcoin.
Of those: purchasing or selling things was the most prevalent use (86%), then
investment/speculation (71%) (see Table 3.1). Investment / speculation was the
highest ranked use by respondents.
Whilst only 9% of the 125 respondents agreed that Bitcoin was primarily being
used for criminal activity, 36% felt theft was hampering Bitcoin’s adoption. Three



























































Reddit 97 77 67 54 2 57 35 6 5
Internal 8 3 2 1 - 1 - - 1
Twitter 7 3 3 3 - 3 2 - -
BitCoinTalk 5 5 5 3 1 5 4 - -
Unknown 5 4 3 3 - 1 - 1 1
Email 1 1 - - - - - 1 -
Facebook 1 - - - - - - - -
StackExchange 1 1 1 1 - - 1 - -
Total 125 94 81 65 3 67 42 8 7
Table 3.1: Bitcoin usage by survey respondent source
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News Website Online Forum Printed News
Academic Paper Can't remember Friend/Family/Colleague





















Figure 3.2: When and how survey respondents first heard about Bitcoin
3.3.3 Measures and constructs
This study was designed to reveal aspects of interpersonal and informational
trust amongst respondents. Firstly, a number of broad questions around Bitcoin
including discovery and usage were asked. Secondly, each respondent’s levels of
interpersonal trust in other Bitcoin users (TU) and the people maintaining Bitcoin
(TD) was directly extracted — each determined through a single five-point Likert
response. Thirdly, three constructs for each respondent were created:
3.3.3.1 Construct 1: Propensity to trust
The NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) [37] looks to define the ‘Big Five’
personality domains of neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agree-
ableness and conscientiousness. Taken together, the five domains with their un-
derlying thirty facets (or sub-traits) are viewed as a “comprehensive and detailed
assessment of normal adult personality.” This study looks to the domain of
agreeableness which is a personality trait where a low score relates to selfish be-
haviors and lack of empathy. Congruent with Lucassen and Schraagen [103] there
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is not a full application of the NEO-PI-R questionnaire as other traits (and sub-
traits) are not relevant to this study, choosing to only apply sub-trait questions
for propensity to trust.
Respondents answered eight questions (see below) as to how much they felt
the statements applied to themselves, with the total sum of results being used to
assign a score to the participant (TP ). The construct TP allows to determine as
to whether this underlying personality trait is having significant influence upon
the participant’s credibility assessment of the stimuli.
Propensity to Trust (TP )
Propensity to trust is based upon the sub-questions in ‘Q2.13 Without
spending too much time thinking about each question; how much do the
following statements apply to you?’, being:
• Regarding the intentions of others I am rather cynical and sceptical.
• I believe that you will be used by most people if you allow them to.
• I believe that most people have good intentions.
• I believe that most people, with whom I have dealings, are honest and
trustworthy.
• I become distrustful when someone does me a favour.
• My first reaction is to trust people.
• I tend to assume the best of others.
• I have a good deal of trust in human nature.
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3.3.3.2 Construct 2: Sentiment towards Bitcoin
Sentiment towards Bitcoin was measured using 6 questions about aspects of Bit-
coin: price rises, adoption, regulation, viability as a currency, investment po-
tential and criminal activity. The total sum of results being used to assign a
sentiment score to the respondent (S). The construct S allows approximation
of whether a respondent’s underlying sentiment (positive or negative) to Bitcoin
might influence interpersonal or information trust ratings.
Sentiment towards Bitcoin (S)
Sentiment towards Bitcoin is based upon a selection of the sub-questions in
‘Q5.3 How much do you agree with the following statements about Bitcoin?’,
being:
• Long term (3 years +) bitcoin prices will always rise.
• Long term adoption by retailers will be good for Bitcoin.
• Governments will regulate Bitcoin.
• Bitcoin provides a viable alternative to traditional fiat (currency).
• Long term bitcoin offers a better financial return (as an investment)
than stocks.
• Bitcoin is primarily a tool for criminal activity.
3.3.3.3 Construct 3: Self-rated expertise in Bitcoin
A participant’s self-rated expertise (as perceived knowledge) was determined to
be a suitable proxy for actual expertise. Alternative approaches to assessing
expertise such as using discriminality and consistency protocols [140] or infer-
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ence models [97] require further effort on the part of the participant and were
deemed onerous for the purposes of this study. Following the lead of Parket al’s
study into information valuation and confirmation bias with stock pricing [125],
self-rated expertise in Bitcoin was created using three questions around how well
informed participants believed they were with regards to Bitcoin technologies,
markets and other related news that might impact Bitcoin (e.g., sovereign mon-
etary policy). The total sum being used to assign a score to the participant (E)
allowing observation the influence of expertise upon credibility evaluation. Based
upon Lucassen & Schraagen’s work it would be expected to see some differences
between respondents’ trust levels in relation to their expertise in the subject — E
affords the ability to differentiate respondents by their own perception of personal
expertise in Bitcoin.
Self-Rated Expertise in Bitcoin (E)
Self-Rated expertise in Bitcoin is based upon a selection of the sub-
questions in ‘Q5.6 How well do these statements describe you?’, being:
• I am well informed about bitcoin technologies.
• I am well informed about bitcoin markets.
• I am well informed about non-Bitcoin news that might impact the bit-
coin markets.
For all three constructs (TP , S & E) questions used a five-point Likert scale
where 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 = ‘strongly agree’. Cronbach’s Alpha (α)




3.4.1 Validity of construct questions
Cronbach’s Alpha (α), is a commonly used statistical method for estimating the
reliability of a psychometric test. As a function of the number of items in a test,
it measures the covariance between item-pairs in a construct and the variance
of the total score. As such α can be viewed as the expected correlation that
tests measure the same construct. For example the construct TP had 8 questions,
each being an item. In psychometric testing, common ‘rule-of-thumb’ minimum
acceptable requirements for internal reliability are α ≥ 0.7.
Respondent’s propensity to trust (TP ) is derived from the NEO-PI-R ques-
tionnaire [37] and had a Cronbach’s α of 0.81 indicating good reliability in the
questions as an indicator of trust. Sentiment (S) had a Cronbach’s α of 0.70
indicating acceptable reliability. Self-rated expertise (E) had a Cronbach’s α of
0.90 indicating excellent reliability.
3.4.2 Constructs
Overall, respondents (see Table 3.2) were moderately trusting in general (x¯ = 27,
SD = 5.1) with a positive sentiment towards Bitcoin (x¯ = 21, SD = 4.3) and a
high level of self-rated expertise in Bitcoin (x¯ = 11, SD = 3.2).
Testing for statistical dependence between these constructs and when the
respondent discovered Bitcoin was assessed using Pearson’s Chi Squared (x2)
tests. This determines the statistical likelihood of any observed difference between
two categorical sets (constructs to when) might be to chance. Simply, Pearson’s
Chi Squared tests whether when a respondent discovered Bitcoin impacts upon
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their sentiment (S) towards, or expertise (E) in Bitcoin. Slightly surprisingly, no
significant relationship to S was observed (x2(16, N = 125) = 20.553, p = 0.196),
meaning that how long a respondent had known about Bitcoin was not influencing
their sentiment. A significant relationship between self-rated expertise (E) and
when a respondent first discovered Bitcoin (x2(20, N = 123) = 53.866, p < 0.05)
was found, with the longer a respondent had known about Bitcoin the greater
their perception of their own expertise.
Propensity for Sentiment towards Self-rated
Trust (TP ) Bitcoin (S) Expertise (E)
Category Score % Score % Score %
Very high 36-40 3.2% 26-30 15.2% 13-15 29.3%
High 31-35 24.8% 21-25 44.0% 10-12 39.0%
Moderate/Neutral 20-30 68.0% 16-20 32.0% 9-9 10.6%
Low 13-19 3.2% 11-15 8.0% 6-8 13.8%
Very Low 8-12 0.8$ 6-10 0.8% 3-5 7.3%
100% (N=125) 100% (N=125) 100% (N=123)
Mean score x¯TP = 27, SD = 5.1 x¯S = 21, SD = 4.3 x¯E = 11, SD = 3.2
Table 3.2: Summary of survey participant constructs
3.4.3 Interpersonal trust
3.4.3.1 Trust in users of Bitcoin
The average rating for trust in users of Bitcoin (x¯TU = 2.928, SD = 0.805) was just
below neutral, indicating a slight mistrust. Using ordinal logistic regression to test
the null hypothesis that neither TP or S have no influence upon TU , three models
are built as shown in Table 3.3. As zero is within the interval of models TU ∼ TP
and TU ∼ TP + S these models are rejected. Only the model TU ∼ S can reject
the null hypothesis, i.e, sentiment towards Bitcoin has a significant estimated




































Figure 3.3: Trust in people (TU & TD) against Trust propensity (TP ) and Senti-
ment (S)
Reasons for trust in people ratings.. Using a manual open-coding [149]
approach to classify respondents’ reasons for how and why they rated their trust
in other people using Bitcoin identified three broad categories:
1. Aspects – something that is part of or facilitated by the technology of Bitcoin,
e.g., anonymity.




Model Coef 2.5% 97.5% Rej. H0
TU ∼ TP + S β(TP ) = 0.037 -0.033 0.108 FALSE
β(S) = 0.111 0.029 0.194 TRUE
TU ∼ S β(S) = 0.112 0.030 0.194 TRUE
TU ∼ TP β(TP ) = 0.037 -0.031 0.106 FALSE
TD ∼ TP + S β(TP ) = 0.122 0.051 0.196 TRUE
β(S) = 0.154 0.070 0.241 TRUE
TD ∼ S β(S) = 0.143 0.060 0.229 TRUE
TD ∼ TP β(TP ) = 0.111 0.041 0.184 TRUE
Table 3.3: Trust in people - regression outputs
3. General – other general comments around trust.
A further 15 responses went un-encoded, mainly through no response being
given. A full list of sub-categories is given in table 3.4. From these it is clear that
the behavior of other users is a common reason for a trust assessment, particularly
behaviors that might be either criminal or in some way manipulative. Arguably
the anonymous/pseudonymous aspect also relates to behaviors in so much as it
was most commonly given in conjunction with, and as a precursor to, errant
behavior. Aside from general comments about trust, 15 respondents were clear
to point out that merely using a technology (Bitcoin or otherwise) was not in
itself a good yardstick by which to assess trustworthiness.
Of note are two points. Firstly, respondents who cited ‘community driven’ as
a reason had a markedly higher trust in other users (TU). Secondly, the majority
of other reasons given were used to express mistrust.
3.4.3.2 Trust in people maintaining Bitcoin
The average rating for trust in people maintaining Bitcoin (x¯TD = 3.064, SD =
0.905) was above neutral indicating a slight trust. Unlike trust in users, ordinal




Aspects n x¯TU x¯TP x¯S x¯E
Anon / Pseudonymity 7 2.714 26.571 20.571 9.857
Community driven 6 4.000 29.000 23.333 11.667
Technical 6 3.833 26.167 21.167 11.167
Volatility 1 2.000 30.000 16.000 14.000
x¯(Aspects) = 3.400 27.350 21.350 11.000
Behaviors n x¯TU x¯TP x¯S x¯E
Criminal / Manipu-
lation 26 2.385 27.962 19.077 9.885
Greed 2 2.500 26.000 23.000 12.000
x¯(Behaviours) = 2.393 27.821 19.357 10.036
General n x¯TU x¯TP x¯S x¯E
General common 33 3.121 28.121 22.485 11.121
‘Just a tool, nothing
to do with trust’ 15 2.467 27.133 22.933 11.000
Too context sens-
itive to be specific 11 2.818 28.000 18.909 10.000
No need for trust 3 3.000 21.333 23.333 14.000
x¯(General) = 2.903 27.532 22.000 11.032
Table 3.4: Reasons given for trust in people ratings
Using a backwards selection process with the three valid models, analysis
starts with all p variables (TP & S). Removing either results in a significant
decrease in the quality of the model fit, and therefore the model TD ∼ TP + S
is chosen as the best fit - i.e., propensity to trust when combined with sentiment
towards Bitcoin has a significant estimated effect of sensitivity upon the trust
rating of people maintaining Bitcoin at 95% confidence level.
3.4.3.3 Impacts of loss on trust
Of the respondents who claimed to have or being using Bitcoin (N = 94), 62.4%
felt they have incurred a loss of Bitcoin (see Table 3.5). Forty-five respondents
gave details as to how they had lost bitcoin and rated on a five point Likert scale
how this loss had impacted upon their interpersonal trust in Bitcoin users (TU)
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and, in the people maintaining Bitcoin (TD). The mean impacts of loss (x¯TU =
2.689 & x¯TD = 2.911) both indicated that interpersonal trust was slightly reduced
when losing Bitcoin.
Moving slightly away from interpersonal trust briefly; analysis also looked
at whether loss impacts upon a general trust in Bitcoin (TB) and, in Bitcoin
exchanges (TE). Whilst loss had no mean impact upon trust in Bitcoin (x¯TB =
3.000) there was a more marked reduction in trust of the exchanges (x¯TE = 2.489).
Looking at individual types of loss (see Table 3.5) a more nuanced impact
with trust being, in the main, negatively impacted by loss is observable. In-
terpersonal trust (TU) is most negatively impacted by fraud and theft events.
Non-interpersonal trust tends to remain reasonably stable. However, trust in
exchanges (TE) suffers markedly through both technical problems at exchanges
(1.600 or much lower / lower) and collapse of an exchange (1.889 or lower).
Interestingly trust in the people maintaining Bitcoin (TD) was most negatively
impacted by loss from technical problems at exchanges, something for which they
have no direct, and little (if any) indirect responsibility.
Pearson’s Chi-Squared tests of impact of loss (by reason) against these four
parties show significant results (see Table 3.5)—the most notable being TE being
pegged to the collapse of exchanges, and TU being pegged to gambling.
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Mean Impact on Trust Significant Impacts
After Loss* Upon Party
Reason for Loss n TU TD TB TE Party x
2 DF p
Fraud 18 2.444 3.000 3.056 2.222 - - - -
Exchange Collapse 18 2.778 2.778 2.833 1.889 TE 24.058 3 0.000
Rate Variations 12 2.583 2.667 2.667 2.167 TE 7.878 3 0.049
User Error 11 2.727 3.091 3.273 3.000 TE 12.419 3 0.006
Theft 8 2.375 2.750 2.875 1.875 TU 7.805 3 0.050
TE 7.879 3 0.049
Exchange Problems 5 2.600 2.400 2.400 1.600 TD 9.056 3 0.029
TE 13.715 3 0.003
TB 9.562 4 0.048
Other 4 2.750 2.750 3.000 3.000 - - - -
Gambling 2 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.000 TU 22.213 3 0.000
TB 10.334 4 0.035
(Notes: *where 1=“much lower” 2=“lower” 3=“about same” 4=“higher” 5=“much higher”)
Table 3.5: Impacts of loss upon trust
3.4.4 Informational trust
3.4.4.1 Mediums of information
Table 3.6 shows analysis of the relationship between trust and use of information
mediums. When comparing the ranked order of trust (RT ) against respondents’
usage (U), all mediums of information have a negative relationship. That is,
the more trusted a medium becomes the less respondents tend to use it (see Fig-
ure 3.4). With the exception of general news websites (WG), technology websites
(WT ) and printed newspapers (PN) this is a significant negative relationship.
In addition to these key mediums, 91 respondents also claimed to ‘often’
use Bitcoin pricing charts before making investment with 32 asserting they used






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Relationship between trust of, and use of information mediums
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WB WF WG WI WT
DF FF PB PN SN


























Figure 3.4: Correlation between information mediums and their use
3.4.4.2 The influence of news reporting as a medium
123 respondents provided a rating for agreement with the statement ‘I am in-
fluenced in bitcoin buy/sell decisions by what I read in newspapers (online or
printed).’ The mean response of ‘disagree’ (x¯ = 2.390, SD = 1.157) indicated
that respondents broadly felt they were not overly influenced by news reports,
although this was likely skewed by the inclusion of printed news which ranked 9th
for both usage and trust. However, looking at the information mediums (see Ta-
ble 3.6), only discussion forums (DF ) were either used or seen as more trustworthy
than the three most obvious Bitcoin-related news websites — Bitcoin/Cryptocur-
rency (WB), Technology (WT ), and Financial (WF ), taking second to fourth in
both usage and trust.
3.4.4.3 Source credibility in Bitcoin related news websites
In a study analysing discussions of Bitcoin on Twitter [64], it was concluded that
“total shares [of a story URL] is a far more accurate measure... for assessing the
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Credibility Rating (5 Stars = Highest / 1 Star = Lowest) 5 4 3 2 1
Figure 3.5: Credibility of news websites
unique Bitcoin related URLs shared on Twitter in February 2014 – that Coin-
desk.com (581 URLs 31,698 shares) was more than twice as popular as its nearest
competitor. Following the rationale in [64], respondents were asked to rate 8 of
the most popular website sources. Wired and Wall Street Journal were excluded
on the basis they did not provide open access at the time of study.
Whilst all eight websites had a modal credibility rating of 3 out of 5, there
is a clear hierarchy of trustworthiness in the sources based upon the 110 rank-
ings given by respondents (see Figure 3.5). Unsurprisingly Coindesk – the only
cryptocurrency specific website in the list – ranked highest and with 75.45% of
respondents giving it a 3 or higher rating. The total of Coindesk’s maximum cred-
ibility ratings (a score of 5) (n = 24) was more than double that of its nearest




This chapter addresses Objective 1 in seeking to better understand human per-
spectives of trust within Bitcoin. Not least as colloquial viewpoints on trust tend
towards it either being something that is purely based in computation not peo-
ple or, indeed, that Bitcoin is devoid of trust altogether. Throughout the online
study respondents were asked to quantify and discuss notions of trust from their
perspective – where, how and why they mattered. This section highlights key
findings from those responses and, where appropriate, looks to the literature for
support. The implications for this research are also discussed along with limita-
tions. As the often held viewpoint is that trust in people is not necessary when
using bitcoin we start with notions of interpersonal trust.
3.5.1 Interpersonal trust
From the generated constructs (see Section 3.3.3), the 125 respondents exhibited
a moderate level of propensity to trust others (TP ) based on the NEO-PI-R test
– they were neither particularly trusting nor mistrusting of people in general.
Throughout the results, respondents were willing to express both trust and mis-
trust in other people using and maintaining Bitcoin – perhaps unsurprising given
the importance of interpersonal trust described by Simpson [145] yet clearly in
contradiction to any notion that there is no requirement for trust in people within
Bitcoin.
To recap: on average there was a slight mistrust in other users of Bitcoin
being significantly determined by the respondent’s own sentiment to Bitcoin (S)
and not a propensity to trust (TP ). Trust in those people maintaining Bitcoin
(the core development team) was found to be very slightly trusting (higher than
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that of other users) and dependent upon both sentiment and propensity, more
so when combined. This aligns well with Mayer et al ’s [108] assertion that it is
actually these two factors (trust judgement / sentiment and propensity) together
are necessary for trust to be established.
3.5.1.1 Trust can be contextual
A number of respondents did allude to interpersonal trust being context spe-
cific, something supported by Sitkin and Roth [146] who assert that assessments
of trust may not generalize across dissimilar contexts. For example, trusting a
‘bricks and mortar’ vendor selling books for small amounts of bitcoin might re-
quire a different assessment of trust compared to, say, a person peddling drugs
on a Dark Web marketplace. Indeed Mayer et al stress that a question of ‘do you
trust them? ’ needs to be qualified with context via a reciprocal, ‘trust them to
do what? ’.
3.5.1.2 Sentiment is critical
The role of sentiment towards Bitcoin appears to be critical in how respondents
assess other people (see Sections 3.4.3.1 & 3.4.3.2). It is unclear as to why this
might be the case although there is perhaps a key difference in the roles that ‘other
users’ and ‘people maintaining Bitcoin’ play – especially in terms of interaction
with respondents.
As respondents (in the majority) were also users of Bitcoin it is likely they had
had numerous cyclical interactions [108] in similar contexts (multiple discussions
across different forums for example) with ‘other users’—sufficient to generate
trust judgements. The same is not necessarily true of interactions with ‘peo-
ple maintaining Bitcoin.’ This core development team is generally well known
throughout the Bitcoin community with members regularly being called upon by
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news agencies and conferences to pass comment or judgement on various cryp-
tocurrency aspects. But these one-way interactions (i.e., the respondent is con-
suming information from a core development person) are different to that of the
two-way interactions within an active discussion.
So whilst trust in ‘other users’ may be linked to those prior interactions,
it seems plausible (given the critical role the core development team play in
maintaining Bitcoin) that a positive sentiment towards Bitcoin (S ) may be acting
as some form of proxy for that missing interaction when making judgement on
what are a distant non-interacting party. Objective 2 (see Chapter 4) studying
confirmation bias sheds further light on the role of sentiment.
3.5.1.3 Reasons expressed for interpersonal trust
When looking to the reasons given for trustworthiness ratings of other Bitcoin
users interesting points of note were as follows:
Financial risk reduces trust.. Three people openly disclosed they had used
Bitcoin for illicit purposes and one specifically mentioned that when they trans-
act on the Dark Web that they definitely trust others less. At face value this
comment is logical. With no payment reversal mechanism in Bitcoin (something
mentioned by a respondent as a reason for not trusting other users) continuing
to transact with untrusted third parties would appear to contradict Zarifis et al ’s
[164] assertion that trust is an important factor where financial risk is evident.
In the event of a failed transaction, reversal of funds is not possible and legal
action unlikely—at best. This brings in to question why someone would continue
to transact in a seemingly untrustworthy and untrustable situation. A plausible
rationale lays in another mechanism external to Bitcoin applying pressure to
the counter-party to fulfil their obligation. One such mechanism that could be
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observed on the Silk Road, whilst still active, was that of party reputation [9, 32]
itself being a trust metric common in modern peer-to-peer transactional models
online such as eBay.
Mistrust tends to be based on errant behavior.. The behaviors of other
users (e.g., fraud, theft or market manipulation) were cited by several respondents
as rationale for trust judgements – in the main mistrust. It is unclear from the
data collected if these judgements were based on single, perceived, vicarious or
repeated (cyclical) experiences. Respondents citing behavior did exhibit slightly
below average scores for trust in other users (TU) and a slightly negative sentiment
(S) and it is possible these contribute to the rationale. Without specifically asking
for qualification from respondents, this is conjecture. That said, with behavior
of others applied as a rationale for trust this reinforces that interpersonal trust
is evident in Bitcoin.
Limited expressions of trustless meaning no trust.. Only three people
openly declared that there was no need to trust people “as Bitcoin is trustless.”
No reasoning for this is offered other than from a construct perspective in that
all three had very low TP (between 9-11)—significantly lower than the average
respondent (27). All three had sentiment scores (S) within the average cate-
gorization of ‘moderate’ and all three had high or very high levels of self-rated
expertise (E).
3.5.1.4 Impacts of loss
With behavior (errant behaviors in particular) being a common reason for trust
and mistrust of others, analysis also sought further insight into ways in which
respondents had lost bitcoin in the past and how this impacted on four different
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parties: in other users (TU) the people maintaining Bitcoin (TD), trust in Bitcoin
(TB), and trust in exchanges (TE).
Over half of respondents (62.4%) had suffered loss. Trust in Bitcoin (TB)—
which was deliberately left as a generic question with no context as Bitcoin means
different things to differing communities of use—went unaffected by loss. The
other three parties were impacted. Notable aspects are as follows:
Gamblers trust more.. Whilst gambling is fully related to TU , it appears that
loss from gambling actually increases trust across all four parties. Some caution
is applied to this finding as this context sample size was only two — however it is
posited that, as an often repeated behavior, gambling actually fulfils the cyclical
pattern of interactions. A key issue in trusting within gambling is fairness. If
one player has lost, but s/he does not suspect the game is rigged or the other
party is cheating, any loss would not likely reduce their trust, as some loss is
an essential element of gambling and thus expected. Further the acceptance of
bitcoin as a payment method on gambling websites may demonstrate a desirable
level of technical prowess which when combined with a consistency in aspects
such as reliable payment of winnings helps to engender or even bolster trust.
Self enacted loss can increase trust.. Where respondents were able to at-
tribute loss to their own failings (user error) it reduced TU , the reasons for which
are unclear. A common theme for ‘user error’ was lost wallets, keys or pass-
words. An increase in TD & TB might be linked to this personal error reinforcing
underpinning concepts of security within Bitcoin wallets.
An equally plausible scenario is based in economic fundamentals which dic-
tates how the relationship between supply and demand will impact upon price.
For example as supply in oil decreases, given a stable demand, the price will in-
crease. Conversely a drop in demand and increase in supply will drop prices. For
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anyone with a belief in these fundamentals and knowing there is limited supply of
bitcoin (the hard limit of 21 million), any loss of bitcoin would actually result in
the value of retained bitcoin actually increasing—a process which would reinforce
foundational notions of decentralization and (insitutional) trustlessness.
Exchange collapses impact all aspects of trust.. Trust in exchanges (TE)
suffers the most as a result of technical problems or a collapse of the exchange
itself. Given the high profile collapse of Mt Gox in early 2014 and the widespread
technical problems it and other exchanges endured in the weeks prior, this is
not surprising. The more interesting insight is that these technical problems or
collapses negatively impact all four measured parties including TU .
Post study, in August 2016, the bitcoin exchange Bitfinex underwent a security breach
in which a ∼US$70M of customer’s bitcoin was stolen. Preliminary analysis of this
breach in relation to this study’s findings and discussions of trust is given in Sec-
tion 3.6).
Fraud does not reduce trust in Bitcoin, but theft does.. Finally, there are
notable differences in impact between fraud and theft events. Both are behaviors
undertaken by other parties but it appears respondents view them differently. For
example, fraud has negligible impact upon TD & TB and its greatest impact upon
TE. For theft the impact is across the board, again with the most pronounced
being upon TE. In both cases it appears that other users might be perceived to
be to blame for the loss and that exchanges may in fact shoulder greater blame
(again perhaps these reports pertain to the huge losses incurred by many in early
2014). The lack of impact on TD & TB through fraud suggests that these parties
are not viewed as being at fault, the same is not true in theft events – something




Work by Lucassen and Schraagen [103] studies information mediums in terms
of ‘the Internet’, ‘printed newspapers’ or ‘television.’ Sources in this context
would be the individual websites, newspapers or television programmes. There
is a problem with this taxonomy in that it assumes all sources within a medium
are in some way analogous with each other from a user’s perspective, something
alluded to in acknowledging that their study was conducted on a single website’s
contents. A more realistic taxonomy would likely acknowledge that all websites
on the Internet are not alike as neither are all printed newspapers or television
channels. This could be achieved by either creating a new layer between medium
and source to cater for a further level of categorization or seeing the medium
and source layers as more fluid, changing position and influence upon each other
depending on context.
Following the concept of medium and source layers, this analysis recognizes
that there is a dichotomy in the mediums of information presented to respondents
in the study. The first group (social networks, discussion forums, blogs/vlogs and
friends/family/colleagues) can be considered as offering bi-directional, often social
communication. The second group (printed newspapers and five types of website)
can be considered to be uni-directional mediums where social interaction is not
the normal modality.
3.5.2.1 Social mediums
Looking at the first group there is a clear break in both usages and trust. The
very poor usage and rankings ascribed to social networks and friends/ family/
colleagues would suggest, that for respondents, their own social and familial circles
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are either not using or are not well informed about Bitcoin enough to be valuable.
Discussion forums, however, are viewed as the most highly trusted and used of all
mediums. Looking to statements made by respondents as to why they use and
trust discussion forums, there are three clear themes as to why this might be:
Other forum users are perceived as being similar in some way.. “I think
they share my idealism”, “..compatible levels of intelligence”, “..their purpose is
the same as mine.”
There is value to be gained from dissimilar (often more experienced
or more influential) forum users.. “..you still can talk with major players,
and the most amazing people in the industry”, “..everyone on Bitcoin Markets
knows what they’re talking about and are all big investors”, “..ultimately, it is the
people who use Bitcoin that affect Bitcoin the most. As such, knowing what they
do trumps most other things.”
Making credibility assessments on discussions is made easier by the
community.. “..it’s easy to spot fud and what isn’t obvious fud is easily dis-
credited, often in the very same thread.”
This reliance upon personal interaction suggests that trust in discussion fo-
rums (as a medium) may actually be more based in interpersonal trust of the
individuals (a source) being interacted with and would requires examination us-
ing methods similar to Lucassen & Schraagen but using these different, more
interactive types of mediums and sources. Objective 3 of this thesis (see Chap-




Interpersonal trust of authors increases trust in medium of informa-
tion.. The non-social group contains Bitcoin, financial and technology news
websites, all of which are (not unexpectedly) both highly ranked and used with
respondents expressing perceptions of there being a higher level of expertise in
these three website types than in others. Respondents also talk to the ability to
make credibility assessments upon the authors themselves through understanding
the authors own knowledge “..there’s usually a disclaimer for the writer whether
they use or have crypto-currencies or not,“ and how biased they might be “..gauge
how partial the writers are by looking at their other articles.” A desire to correct
mistakes in order to “maintain reputation” was also cited as a reason for trust.
Mistrust in newspapers is not based on temporality of stories.. The
starkest difference was between online websites and their printed contemporaries.
It might be presumed that this lack of both use and trust in printed newspapers
might be due to temporal issues such as the time taken for a breaking news story
to actually be reported. Respondents actually expressed two other clear percep-
tions of printed news; firstly, bias based upon newspapers being “institutions..
having no bearing on Bitcoin price or culture” and secondly, a perceived lack of
knowledge of Bitcoin in general. It is noted that respondents did not express these
same justifications when assessing the websites of those printed newspapers.
3.5.2.3 Trust in news websites as a source
It is interesting that in the main respondents felt they were not overly influenced
by news reporting as demonstrably news reporting is an important medium for
information surrounding Bitcoin, second only to discussion forums. The extent
to which this may or may not be true is (again) explored in Obective 3.
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Credibility of websites linked to usage and popularity.. Following the
rationale set out by Harris [64], which ostensibly confirmed that crypto-currency,
technology and financial websites are the most popular sources of Bitcoin news
(on Twitter), this study looked to 8 of the top ten of those websites as sources
of information and questioned the respondents directly for their views on website
credibility. Whilst there was a slight mismatch in this study’s credibility rank-
ings and Harris’ popularity assessment, there is agreement on four of the top five
websites.
Interestingly ALL of this study’s top five websites belong to the four highest
ranked and used website mediums — Coindesk (crypto-currency), Techcrunch
(technology), Forbes (financial), New York Times and Reuters (general news).
There is an apparent linkage between use, trust and popularity of websites as
sources of information.
64
3.6 Post-study Reflection of Bitfinex Hack















































Bitfinex 2016 Breach Announcements (https://www.bitfinex.com/posts)
A − Security Breach − Update 1
B − Security Breach − Update 2
C − Security Breach − Update 3
D − Site Relaunch
E − Platform Service Update
F − Interim Update
G − Bitfinex signs letter of intent with BnkToTheFuture
H − Redemption of 1.1812% of BFX Tokens
I − BFX Token−for−Equity Exchange Details Imminent
J − Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) Opportunities
K − BFX token to iFinex equity conversion update
L − Redemption of 1.3152% of BFX Tokens
M − RRT Exchange Trading Enabled
N − Bitfinex Announces Sizable Token−for−Equity Exchange by Customers
O − Message to the individual responsible for the security incident of 2nd Aug 2016
Figure 3.6: Impact of Bitfinex security breach and subsequent recovery efforts on
bitcoin markets
The breach. On August, 2nd 2016 Bitfinex — the largest (by volume) ex-
change at the time — was hacked [15], resulting in a loss of ∼US$70M worth of
bitcoin and being the largest single loss since the collapse of MT Gox in 2014.
As news broke, the velocity of the already falling price of bitcoin increased, with
closing prices having fallen ∼17% to under US$500. In the immediate aftermath
press coverage was largely negative with many predicting another full exchange
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collapse. However Bitfinex, recognising the potential impact of the negative press
in conjunction with significant financial loss, reacted swiftly and released almost
daily press announcements about the event.
The response. On August, 6th Bitfinex posted details of a recovery plan in
which losses would be generalized (socialized) across all depositors - a 36.067%
‘haircut’ - by way of a $1 bond-like security (‘BFX’ token) for later redemption,
“we are crediting a token labelled BFX to record each customer’s discrete losses.
Tokens will be distributed without release or waiver. The BFX tokens will remain
outstanding until redeemed in full by Bitfinex or possibly exchanged upon the cred-
itor’s request and Bitfinex’s acceptance for shares of iFinex Inc.” [16]. This was
a clear indication by Bitfinex, and their parent company iFinex, that they not
only intended to keep trading but also to make good on those losses, and could
readily be interpreted as an exercise in re-building customer & market trust.
The announcements updating customers, now creditors, continued over the
following weeks, detailing how breach investigations were proceeding, how BFX
redemptions were being made and when tokens were being converted at scale into
equity as promised.
The ‘effect’. Exactly how users viewed this breach is unclear. For some the
attack may have been viewed as theft, decreasing interpersonal trust. For others,
Bitfinex may have been viewed as institutionally untrustworthy. For some it is
possible that as the underlying protocols were not overtly viewed as being at fault
and trust in Bitcoin itself might have actually increased. What is likely from this
study’s findings is that trust will have been impacted across all parties (TU , TD,
TB & TE). In all cases, however, this supports this study’s view that the trust
model of Bitcoin—as an evolving ecosystem—goes beyond computation alone.
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Given this, the efforts by Bitfinex to restore confidence seem well placed.
A visual inspection of average bitcoin pricing [131] across multiple exchanges (as
this flattens out the more direct impact on Bitfinex-only pricing) shows that post-
breach the velocity of price rises actually increased, and the decline in volume
eased (see Figure 3.6). Whilst Bitfinex’s actions cannot be proven to be causal
— without both statistical and user confirmation — when the timings of their
announcements are superimposed (with the exception of A,F & H) each was
followed within a day by a rise in price, albeit a slight one. Announcements F &




This chapter empirically examined the extent to which Bitcoin, as an ecosystem,
can really still be referred to as trustless – a term which has become semantically
loaded by communities of users to infer that Bitcoin is in some way devoid of
trust in institutions and users.
Counter to the assertion that the trust model in Bitcoin is based solely in
computation [4], this study found that both interpersonal and institutional trust
not only exists in Bitcoin, but also that trust is directly impacted by loss —
most markedly where that loss is the result of an exchange collapse or gambling.
Further analysis found that interpersonal trust can be context specific and that
it is dependent upon a respondent’s own sentiment towards Bitcoin.
This study also found that trust in information plays a key role in the usage
of Bitcoin, with crypto-currency related discussion forums being the most used
medium of information and the most trusted. In part this can be attributed to the
trust in the most used information mediums actually being based on how social
that medium is—something which further strengthens the case for interpersonal
trust being important in Bitcoin. Looking to news reporting as a medium, anal-
ysis found that whilst the average respondent claimed to not be overly influenced
by what they read in those reports, news websites still ranked highly for both
usage and trust—indicating that they are still widely relied upon, although there
is a tendency for usage to actually fall the greater a medium is trusted. Trust in
individual websites was found to broadly aligned with other research into website
popularity.
The preliminary visual analysis of the Bitfinex hack-recovery lends weight
to the distinction between bitcoin the currency and Bitcoin as the wider socio-
technical ecosystem and where trust is evident. The positive market movements
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post recovery announcements suggest bitcoin users, whilst trusting in the com-
putation, also placed trust in an exchange (an institution) and their messages
(information).
Overall this chapter concludes that the term trustless is perfectly applicable
to bitcoin but that this, i) is a loaded term not well understood and often mis-
interpreted to mean that there is no notion of trust in the Bitcoin ecosystem,
ii) that trustless only applies to central banks being intermediaries—as intended
in and from the perspective of the foundation paper—and not all organizations
/ institutions involved in Bitcoin, and iii) that whilst at its core Bitcoin may
rely upon computation for trust, the day to day operation is dependent upon





This part of the thesis addresses the second objective—evaluation of potential con-
firmation bias—and, through the use of stimulus experimentation, tests whether





Whilst bitcoin was initially conceived as a peer-to-peer remittance technology,
where a technology affords otherwise unintended opportunity it is likely human
nature will re-purpose to take advantage of this utility. In the case of bitcoin,
somewhat inevitably, this meant the emergence of firstly trading bitcoin against
the very fiat currencies it was designed to replace and from there marketplaces
(exchanges) upon which speculation more akin to that found elsewhere in finan-
cial services could be undertaken. Unlike existing and highly regulated financial
services, the advent of bitcoin brought forth an era of investment opportunity to
the lay person not previously imagined. No longer were they required to utilise in-
termediaries replete with training, expertise, real-time / highly costly intelligence
and certification. In this new emergent market anyone equipped with access to
the Internet, and willing to take on the risk without expert counsel, was able to
do so. Bitcoin exchanges were the new, all but lawless wild-west of speculative
investment.
For those aligned with the ethos of bitcoin and with a grounding in economic
fundamentals, the limited supply of 21 million bitcoins [14] and firm belief that
demand would trend upwards meant that no matter where the pricing sat or how
short to medium market movements played out, long term returns for holding
bitcoin would always be astronomical in comparison to initial investment. Indeed
throughout the period leading up to the pricing crash of early 2014 it appeared
that such optimistic outlooks would hold true as the price inflated from mere
cents on the US dollar to around US$1,000 at its peak. Today, in October 2017,
after approximately two years of relatively stable prices, bitcoin is again on a
rapid upward march with peak pricing at around US$5,800 per bitcoin. Simple
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gains from the price rises, especially through techniques such as arbitrage - the
practice of buying assets in a cheaper market and selling in a more expensive one
- have been both obvious and tempting.
The finite supply of bitcoin, a rapidly rising price and increasing discussion
of Bitcoin in the news press and online forums would have presented an environ-
ment in which a wider group of opportunistic speculators would likely succumb
to some form of band-wagoning [98] - an effect where the preference for bitcoin
would increase purely based upon other people discussing and buying bitcoin. In-
deed Becker [13] argues that the band-wagon effect alone could be strong enough
to make the “demand curve slope upward” resulting in a feedback loop. In other
words the very process of bitcoin being bought and discussed might be enough
to drive others to buy and discuss bitcoin—these feedback loops being identified
as occurring within Bitcoin by Garcia et al [58].
This chapter addresses the second objective of this thesis—evaluation of po-
tential confirmation bias. It evaluates the extent to which speculators rely upon
confirmation bias - in lieu of more systematic processes - to assess the credibility
of news articles upon which they might base their bitcoin investment decisions.
This is a position which could render them susceptible to questionable and ma-
nipulatable information. It has become apparent to the world during 2016-17,
more so than ever before, that the factual accuracy within news reporting is
questionable at times and overtly manipulated at other times often to appeal to
opinion and belief rather than fact [135]. This paradigm collectively referred to as
‘fake-news ’ has long been understood in financial market manipulation through
techniques such as ‘pump-and-dump’ [72] and ‘short-and-distort ’ [73] whereby the
flow and accuracy of information to potential investors is illegally controlled by
bad-actors for gain. More broadly such forms of information-based attack have
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been long recognized [109] as having the potential to wield incredible destruction
upon those structures they are set upon.
Speculation, as a key use and contributing growth factor of Bitcoin [20, 25, 58,
128], has been shown to be as least partially influenced by the information con-
tained within news reporting [58]. Where the quality of that news is questionable
it is plausible that speculators might be basing their investment decisions upon
factually deficient information. As the ecosystem, and arguably sub-culture, of
Bitcoin has emerged it has presented a challenge (by design) to the power struc-
tures of sovereign currencies and financial incumbents. In this context it seem rea-
sonable to examine whether bitcoin and its speculators, by relying upon personal
belief (confirmation bias), might be vulnerable to a campaign of disinformation.
4.1.1 Contributions
Our key contributions are, as follows:
• The first empirical work that looks to whether Bitcoin speculators are re-
liant upon confirmation bias when evaluating news reporting upon which they
might rely.
• Findings that overall there is no statistical evidence to support the reliance
upon confirmation bias.
• Findings that speculators with either positive or negative sentiment towards
Bitcoin, when evaluating news which aligns in sentiment, spend significantly
less time on that evaluation than those with counter-aligning sentiment, con-
trary to findings by Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng [86].
• Findings that in approximately 34% of evaluations, credibility evaluation was
based upon very minimal stimulus suggesting that in the absence of confirma-
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tion bias that other heuristic approaches may be influencing decision making.
Implication of Findings - Given the often polarised and vocal opinions of
those discussing Bitcoin online, it had been expected that confirmation bias would
be evident. The findings do not support an over reliance, by speculators, on
confirmation bias however they do point to other biases being at play to support
decision making. Any bias presents a risk to the validity of a decision.
One example of this is the belief in the trust model for Bitcoin laying solely
within computation. There is no doubt many proponents of Bitcoin are well
versed in both the mathematics and software engineering required to fully under-
stand how trustworthy this computation is. Similarly, there can be little doubt
that significant proportions of proponents do not possess those skills and defer
their trust to a bias towards other people they believe to possess more expert
opinion—this was evident in Chapter 3. The obvious risk in this source bias
lays with the trustee not actually being an expert, or holding their own confir-
mation biases or themselves deferring to others. A situation which would cause
something of a trust house-of-cards.
Work in Chapter 5 develops a model of informational trust for participants,
highlighting further biases.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, this chapter provides
background literature on confirmation bias and its role in seeking and evaluating
information with reference to financial speculative decision making and Bitcoin.
Secondly, description of the method by which this research examines whether
bitcoin speculators are exhibiting potential confirmation bias when evaluating
news followed by a presentation and discussion of experimental results. This
chapter concludes that confirmation bias is not a statistically significant factor
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influencing credibility evaluation, but that there is some evidence to support other




The following section discusses confirmation bias related work with respect to
information selection, and financial (bitcoin) decision making.
Humans are pre-programmed to make use of short-cuts in everyday life. Such
decision making approaches easing a cognitive load that is simply unsustainable
or impractical, especially in times of stress - a process Festinger [51] describes as
trying to maintain cognitive equilibrium.
Simon [143, 144] suggests that heuristics are necessary as humans we oper-
ate in a mode of “bounded rationality” within which rational decision making is
constrained by the limitations of our mental capacity to process information and
solve complex decisions. These heuristic tactics fall back on instinct or ‘rule-of-
thumbs ’ and serve to provide swift & efficient outcome [77]. Tversky & Kah-
neman acknowledge that these short-cuts might lead to “severe and systematic
errors” [152], or cognitive biases. Whilst Klayman [83] points out that bias can
also refer to merely a tendency or inclination, within this thesis bias is taken to
be a rational or logical failure of judgement. In this context cognitive bias serves
to help the human achieve cognitive equilibrium by providing shortcuts for one
or more of three task-based goals:
• Reducing the complexity and volume of information to enable a decision to
be made,
• Forming meaning from seemingly disparate or meaningless information,
• Filtering what information is valuable enough to retain.
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Figure 4.1: Confirmation bias cartoon -
source:chainsawsuit.com/comic/2014/09/16/on-research
4.2.1 Confirmation bias.
Wason’s seminal selection task experiment [160] was one of the first to demon-
strate the difficulty humans have in making counter-positive inference. Simply,
the experiment showed that humans tended to seek outcomes in the test which
were confirmatory rather that to look for evidence disproving their belief - a
behaviour conforming to the need to seek equilibrium. Klayman and Ha [84]
argue that the questions posed in the test actually influenced people to think in
a more positive way and that confirmation bias is better thought of a positive
test strategy - being a default heuristic strategy. Cosmides and Tooby [36] fur-
ther supported Wason’s findings and provided evidence to underpin this default
positive heuristic being a context sensitive process borne out of evolutionary nat-
ural selection - where situations involve threat or risk logical reasonning taking a
secondary role to baser fight-flight instinctual heuristics. In other words humans
are indeed pre-programmed to take short-cuts, at times.
Nickerson argues that of all the cognitive biases, the one most deserving of
attention is that of confirmation bias. It is “the seeking or interpreting of ev-
idence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis
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in hand” [122]. From this definition it can be taken that both the searching for
and acquisition of information and the interpretation of that information can be
subject to confirmation bias. It is important to note that Nickerson takes a view
that this preferential attention may be either deliberate or unwitting.
Klayman, in agreement with Festinger, suggests that the conditions that cre-
ate cognitive dissonance also create powerful enabling mechanisms for systematic
judgement failures - confirmation bias being an emergent property of complex
decision making systems and the result of the human trying to achieve cognitive
equilibrium through one or more of the task based goals of reduction, meaning
or filtering.
4.2.2 Sentiment as a predictor of confirmation bias.
Fazio [50] defines an attitude (sentiment) as “an association in memory, between
a given object and a given summary evaluations of the object.” The role of sen-
timent (sometimes referred to as attitude in psychological works) as a predictor
of confirmation bias was a key concept in Festinger’s work [51] and, arguably,
stems as far back as Bacon “the human understanding when it has once adopted
an opinion (either as being the received opinion or as being agreeable to itself)
draws all things else to support and agree with it” [6].
Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng [86] explore attitude as a predictor highlight-
ing that the more extreme the strength of sentiment the greater the possibility for
cognitive dissonance to occur. Brannon, Tagler & Eagly [23] explain this position
as being one in which “persons with strong attitudes tend to seek out attitudinally
consistent information and thereby avoid the very information that might lead to
a change of attitude.”
In works looking at confirmation bias and political sentiment [85, 86], found
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that attitude-consistent (sentiment consistent) search results amongst voters were
preferred, as were those from ‘high credibility’ sources. Further, that people with
sentiment consistent with media messages being viewed spent, on average, 36%
more time reading those messages [86].
4.2.3 Selection and evaluation of information in financial
markets
Traditional neoclassic economics has, in the past, viewed the decisions and ac-
tions of investors as being in some way rational and unbiased. More recently be-
havioural economists - a discipline that assumes financial markets are composed
of ‘imperfectly rational’ humans in imperfect markets - have questioned this view-
point, looking to the decision making processes of traders and investors [68, 75,
123].
Following Wason’s selection task [160] approach, Jones and Sugden [75] looked
for positive confirmation bias in how people chose what information to purchase,
prior to making a decision - this study taking a very literal stance on the term
acquisition. Jones and Sugden found evidence of positive confirmation bias in
selecting information and that this behavior appeared to persist irrespective of
experience. That is, people tended to continue to display bias even though it
provided sub-optimal outcomes.
Oberlechner and Hocking [123] found that the sentiments of foreign exchange
market traders were tightly coupled with how they valued and assessed finan-
cial news. Barber and Odean [8] found that investors were more likely to visit
and interact with chatrooms and forums frequented by likeminded investors - an
indication of shared sentiment. Park et al found that confirmation bias in select-
ing and evaluating stock tips and news on forums led to an over confidence and
increase in trading losses [125].
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Hilton [68] discusses confirmation bias in financial decision making as the first
of ‘seven deadly sins’ citing a U.K. investment fund manager as having said,
“there is a lot of data out there. The data will support almost anything. You have
to watch out for confirmation bias in your thinking.” Pouget and Villeneuve [129]
found confirmation bias creates excess volatility and that an over-confidence by
traders can lead to pricing bubbles - a situation where prices lay beyond those
expected by the economic fundamentals of supply and demand [80]. Hilton also
points to those who actively follow a disconfirmation strategy (counter-attitudinal
position) will profit. This is an interesting position given that this promotes
cognitive dissonance as a positive investment behavior.
Figure 4.2: Pera¨’s model of biweekly bitcoin price changes and indexed average
retweet volumes for positive-negative sentiment news.
4.2.4 Sentiment and confirmation bias in Bitcoin
Within Bitcoin literature discussions of the role of sentiment and confirmation
bias are limited. Bukovina and Marticˇek [25] expressly explore the influence of
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speculator sentiment upon the volatility of bitcoin pricing. Within this study
sentiment was found to be only a minor driver of volatility, however in periods
of excessive volatility the influence was far stronger suggesting that the excessive
nature is driven by speculators with stronger sentiment. Pera¨ [127] found evi-
dence that investors were selectively evaluating information to re-share to others
based upon their own sentiment towards that information and that this sharing
behavior was aligned to bitcoin pricing (see Figure 4.2). Glaser et al [61], whilst
not looking for confirmation bias, clearly articulate that Bitcoin is seen as an asset
by users but that those same users are “limited in their level of professionalism
and objectivity... highlighted by the bias towards positive news.”
Bitcoin has experienced pricing bubbles [30, 58]. The insight that such bub-
bles can be associated with confirmation bias [129] which in turn is based with
information selection and evaluation fallacy brings into question whether Bit-
coin speculators are subject to confirmation bias. This chapter now proceeds to




This section describes the recruitment process and demographics of the partici-
pants. Also described here are the information evaluation task and the stimuli
used for testing whether Bitcoin speculators are displaying signs of confirmation
bias when seeking and evaluating information.
4.3.1 Participants
The study was advertised on social media, online discussion forums, websites and
also through direct email. Whilst remuneration is a common tactic for study
recruitment - technical, privacy and ethical considerations meant we requested
voluntary participation with no offer of payment.
The study was split into two key parts. Part one was a series of questions
looking at (i) discovery and use of the crypto-currency (ii) self perceived levels
of knowledge and expertise; and (iii) a general set of questions around technol-
ogy and news consumption—as described in Chapter 3. Part two was a news
article stimuli evaluation task, open to participants who had usage experience
of Bitcoin. The normal ethical principles of informed consent, data storage and
anonymization were observed, with ethical review and approval given by the rel-
evant body at the authors’ institution prior to the study. In total 71 responded
to the invitation with fourteen excluded from the analysis for not having fully
completed the stimuli evaluation part of the study. Participants were allowed to
only take the study once, enforced by client-side cookie and server-side IP regis-
tration. We acknowledge such restrictions can be bypassed with effort, however
the likelihood of participants engaging in such a deceptive way is unlikely given




Of the 57 qualified participants, 75.4% (n = 43) were recruited from the on-
line discussion forum Reddit - spread between 9 sub-Reddit forums (r/Bitcoin
17, r/SampleSize 9, r/BTC 6, r/Economics 4, r/BitcoinBeginners 2, r/Mining
2, r/CryptoCurrency 1, r/CryptoMarkets 1, r/Markets 1). The remaining par-
ticipants were recruited across six other sources: BitcoinTalk (4), Internal (3),
Twitter (3), Unknown (2), Facebook (1) and StackExchange (1).
Thirty-eight (66.7%) participants considered themselves as primarily being in
paid employment (full or part-time) and a further 21% (n = 12) were students.
Looking at education backgrounds, 63.1% (n = 36) had a college degree or higher
with only one participant considering themselves having no education and 5 hav-
ing gone no further than high-school. All participants were seasoned long-term
(over six years) users of the Internet with 89.5% (n = 51) claiming more than 11
years of Internet usage.
The majority of participants (86%) were located in either Europe (n = 32)
or the Americas (North & South) (n = 17). Non-native English speaking partic-
ipants rated their written English on a scale of 1 to 5 (poor to excellent). Mean
written English score were: Europeans (n = 17, x¯ = 4.27) and Eastern Mediter-
raneans (n = 1, x¯ = 5) - thusly language was not deemed to be an over-riding
challenge for participants.
4.3.1.2 Bitcoin
Exposure to Bitcoin amongst participants peaked in 2012-2013 (as did both the
price and press coverage) with 91.2% (n = 52) having knowledge of Bitcoin prior
to the collapse in pricing in early 2014, (see Figure 4.3). Online discussion forums
provided the first point of exposure for 47.4% (n = 27) of participants, with news
accounting for another 26.3% (n = 15).
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An online discussion forum Can't remember
A friend / family / colleague A news website A printed newspaper
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Figure 4.3: When and how experimental participants discovered Bitcoin
Gen. Tech. Finance Bitcoin Info.
Never 14 11 10 6 20
Rarely 10 6 12 8 11
Sometimes 8 9 6 8 4
Often 5 12 8 13 6
Always 5 4 6 7 1
n 28 31 32 36 22
Consulted 50% 64.5% 68.8% 83.3% 9.1%
Table 4.1: Use of news when making buy/sell decisions
Looking to the use of news as an information source; 52.6% (n = 30) felt
they were not influenced by news stories when making buy/sell bitcoin decisions.
Sixteen participants admitted being influenced by news but only one strongly
agreed.
Where responses were given, it is clear that use of Bitcoin, Finance and Tech-
nology websites is prevalent in participant’s decision making process (see Ta-
ble 4.1).
Of the 32 participants who declared owning bitcoin at the time of the study,
71.9% (n = 23) had assumed a ‘hold’ position neither looking to buy nor sell
their bitcoin. The remaining nine participants all took a ‘buy’ position looking




Post questionnaire; participants who had declared they had or did use Bitcoin
were offered the opportunity to evaluate six news articles, one at a time in the
order presented in Table 4.2. For each evaluation the participant was first shown
a banner similar to that which might be observed on an online search engine (see
Appendix B.1) along with five questions:
1. How credible is this story?
2. How much did you already know about this story before determining its cred-
ibility?
3. Did you go off to another website to further research this story before deter-
mining its credibility?
4. Having read this story, if it were current, what position would you now take
in bitcoin?
5. Can you briefly say why?
Whilst within an evaluation task, the participant was able to click the banner
to bring up a copy of the full article content, as described in Section 4.3.3.2.
The next sub-section describes the process by which news stories were selected
and processed to create the stimulus used in the experimentation.
4.3.3 Stimuli selection
The volume of news about Bitcoin online alone is vast. A search on Google yielded
2.6M website articles for 2016 alone. Social media and forum posts of news likely






















1 HQ 212 Neg Reuters 02/09/14 Russian authorities say Bitcoin illegal
2 LQ 237 Neu Coindesk 02/27/14 New Fed Chair: We Have Authority To Regulate...
3 HQ 467 Neu Coindesk 12/30/13 The Reserve Bank of India Has No Plans to Reg...
4 LQ 402 Pos Coindesk 02/23/14 Top UK Payments Body Weighs in on Bitcoins...
5 LQ 375 Neg Coindesk 07/29/13 Bank of Thailand officially declares bitcoin illegal
6 HQ 378 Pos Coindesk 12/05/13 Bank of America: Bitcoin Has Clear Potential...
Table 4.2: Stimulus used in evaluation
analysed over 1.3 million tweets mentioning bitcoin (or Satoshi Nakamoto) from
February 2014 with the aim of discovering who was interested in the fledgling
crypto-currency. Within this study Harris identified over 247,000 unique Bitcoin
related URLs being shared and concluded that the number of shares for each
URL was indicative of the popularity of the underlying website.
Using the top ten most popular websites identified by Harris as a starting point
for news stimulus, we eliminated two (Wired and The Wall Street Journal) as
candidates for not providing open access. From the remaining eight—Coindesk,
Techcrunch, Reuters, Mashable, The Next Web, New York Times, The Verge
and Forbes—we applied a set of criteria to filter potential articles down to the
required six for evaluation.
4.3.3.1 Filter criteria
Initial filtering criteria were that articles should: i) have been originally published
between April 2013 and March 2014 thus covering the period directly proceed-
ing Harris’ study, ii) relate to Bitcoin and be economic or government-policy in
nature, and iii) have been broadly factually correct at the time of publication.
Further we determined it was necessary to cater for properties of articles which




Source bias. A pre-test with ten Bitcoin users highlighted that, of the eight
possible news sources, there was disparity in how credible each website was viewed
with respect to Bitcoin news. This difference in perception can be observed within
Thorndike’s Halo Effect bias [151] whereby an overall impression of the website’s
credibility could influence disposition to it’s contents, i.e., where a website is
viewed as credible it is likely that everything upon that website might be viewed
as broadly credible. To control for this we chose the two most credibly rated
websites from that pre-test (Coindesk and Reuters) as the source for stimuli as
they were viewed as being equally credible.
Information bias. The length of the stimulus was considered. Too long and
the task becomes not only onerous, but also introduces potential for an effect of
illusionary truth [65] whereby repeated exposure to a concept within the stimu-
lus might overly influence the participants belief of credibility. Were the article
too short to afford sufficient context and detail for evaluation, this might likely
push the participant to evaluate based upon any number of other possible biases.
Therefore, as with Lucassen & Schraagen’s testing approach [103] we set a bracket
of word-length for full articles - in this study 200-600 words.
Confirmation bias. To be able to test for confirmation bias it was critical to
measure the sentiment of the article and to choose two of each broad sentiment
group - negative, neutral or positive in overall tone. Methodology set out by Breen
[24] matches words contained within the target article with pre-rated valence word
lists (both positive and negative in sentiment) derived from and maintained by
Hu & Liu [70], returning a count of matching terms. This was then converted




To enable a further experiment as to whether participants were able to identify
fake-news (see Chapter 5) three of the selected six articles (one of each sentiment
- negative, neutral and positive) were edited by a professional journalist to be of
low quality (LQ) and contain factual errors whilst retaining the same sentiment.
The remaining three high quality (HQ) stories were left as published. All six were
then converted to Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) so as be viewable
by participants with branding, layout and other surface features consistent with
the source web-page.
In addition to the six articles, a simple banner for each was produced with the
same sentiment scoring and processing to resemble how the web-page might be
located on a popular search engine (see examples in Figure 4.4). All evaluation
stimuli (banners and full page articles) along with the original article text can be
found in Appendix B.
(a) Banner 1 - HQ Negative
(b) Banner 2 - LQ Neutral




The background literature highlights two phenomena that are thought to show a
evidence of potential confirmation bias. Firstly, from Park et al [125] that people
showing potential confirmation bias will overly value information whose sentiment
aligns with their own. Secondly, from Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng [86] that
time spent evaluating information will be significantly greater where there is
alignment of a participant’s sentiment and the information.
Therefore, it is posited that participants with sentiment alignment to stimulus:
will evaluate article credibility more highly H1 and, will spend significantly more
time on that evaluation H2—in both cases, in comparison to participants with
counter-sentiment alignment.
4.3.5 Measures and constructs
To test the two given hypotheses it was necessary to be able to determine whether
there was sentiment alignment between the participant and the stimulus being
evaluated.
Category Score n Rel.%
Very Positive 26-30 11 19.30
Positive 21-25 21 36.84
Neutral 16-20 19 33.33
Negative 11-15 5 8.77
Very Negative 6-10 1 1.75
x¯PS = 20.81, SD = 4.85
Table 4.3: Summary of participant’s sentiment (PS)
Sentiment towards Bitcoin. Each participant’s sentiment towards Bitcoin
was measured using six questions (see Section 3.3.3.3) relating to price rises,
adoption, regulation, viability as a currency, investment potential and criminal
89
4.3 Method
activity as aspects of Bitcoin. Each question was measured on a five-point Likert
scale where 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 = ‘strongly agree’. The total sum of
results being used to assign a sentiment score (SP ) to each participant.
To test the internal reliability of this construct a Cronbach’s Alpha (α) was
used - a common statistical tool in psychometric testing which measures the
covariance between item-pairs in a construct and the variance of the total score.
As such α can be viewed as the expected correlation that tests measure the same
construct. Participant sentiment had an α = 0.79 indicating very acceptable
reliability thus exceeding the psychometric ‘rule-of-thumb’ minimum of 0.7.
Overall the mean sentiment of participants was 20.81 - a neutral to very
slightly positive sentiment towards Bitcoin (see Table 4.3).
Sentiment alignment. For each of the six evaluations the participant under-
took (see Table 4.2) the alignment was noted as being:
• ‘Aligned ’ where both the stimulus and participant had the same sentiment.
e.g., both were negative towards Bitcoin,
• ‘Counter-Aligned ’ where the sentiments of stimulus and participant were op-
posite. e.g., negative:positive or positive:negative,
• ‘Neutral ’ in all other cases.
As this research is interested in where sentiment exists; evaluations marked
as being neutral (n = 195) were discarded from the analysis leaving 147 valid
sentiment-containing evaluations for analysis.
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4.4 Discussion of Findings
This section discusses the main findings of the research looking at whether Bit-
coin speculators exhibit signs of confirmation bias when evaluating news based
stimulus, such as that they might use when making investment decisions.
To recap; this study asked 57 Bitcoin users to evaluate six news articles. Each
participant was asked six questions to determine their personal sentiment towards
Bitcoin (S), and each news article was scored for its sentiment (Negative, Neutral
or Positive) towards Bitcoin. The alignment of participant to article sentiment
was noted and after neutral observations were removed we were left with 147
sentiment-containing evaluations. Two hypotheses were posited - that partici-
pants with sentiment alignment to the stimulus would evaluate article credibility
more highly (H1), and would spend significantly more time on that evaluation
(H2).
Since the stimulus credibility scores are reported on a five point scale, and
the time spent on task is in seconds, these measures are viewed as ordinal and
continuous (respectively) and therefore the Mann-Whitney U test is used to de-
termine significance. The Mann-Whitney U test (also known as Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney) is a non-parametric statistical test for differences between two groups
- in this case the groups being sentiment alignment or counter-alignment and
the scale being H1 the credibility score assigned to each evaluation by a par-
ticipant and H2 the time taken for that evaluation. The Mann-Whitney U test
was applied to the medians of each group (aligned / counter-aligned) with the
alternative hypothesis (H1A & H2A) that the medians of the two groups are not
equal - given differences might be expected. All tests were performed using the
base ‘R’ wilcox.test.
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4.4.1 Support for hypotheses
H1 Visual inspection of the results (see Figure 4.5a) appears to support the
alternative hypothesis (H1A), with an obvious difference in the medians. A
Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if the alternative hypothesis is sta-
tistically supported. Median credibility scores for aligned participants (4.0) and
counter-aligned participants (3.0) were not significantly different, U = 3137.0, z =
−1.753, p = 0.080 and therefore cannot accept the alternative hypothesis that the
medians are not equal. As such, we can reject the hypothesis (H1) as participants
do not evaluate sentiment-aligned articles more highly.
H2 In this case, visual inspection of the results (see Figure 4.5b) appears to show
the completely opposite effect than that expected—based on works by Knobloch-
Westerwick & Meng [86]—with the median time on task for aligned participants
(55 seconds) being far less than that for counter-aligned participants (82 seconds).
Therefore, we reject the initial hypothesis (H2) as participants do not spend
significantly more time evaluating sentiment-aligned articles.
Whilst the original hypothesis is rejected, there still appears to be a marked
difference in the median scores suggesting that this marker for confirmation bias
may still be valid, albeit in the opposite direction to that first proposed by
Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng. This inverted result may, in part, be due to
experimental design. In this study, participants were given the ability to eval-
uate stimulus based upon a banner only without being forced to read the full
article. Further, the nature of the subject matter and context—Bitcoin and
investment—often necessitates rapid decision making and thus it seems logical
that if speculators are relying upon a form of confirmation bias that they skim
and accept sentiment-aligned news more quickly.
On this basis the alternate hypothesis can still be tested as this is looking
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at the difference in medians only. Applying a Mann-Whitney U test, U =
2166.5, z = −2.069, p = 0.039, finds that this difference is significant at the 0.05
level and therefore the alternative hypothesis that there is a difference in the me-
dians is accepted - i.e., participants spend less time evaluating sentiment-aligned
stimulus.
(a) H1 Credibility Scores (b) H2 Time on Task
Figure 4.5: Hypotheses Alignment Results
4.4.2 Influence of independent variables
Whilst H1 goes unsupported and H2A is supported—albeit at the 0.05 level
and inverse to the actual hypothesis set, it is apparent from the study design
that other independent variables may have had influence upon the result. Given
the limited number of observations a regression model to test these variables
was not able to be successfully fitted in the case of either credibility score or
time on task. Taking a more pragmatic approach, the process was broken down
into simple pairwise tests between the aligned and counter-aligned participants
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for hierarchical groups of independent variables - a process which allows us to
explore the data in a similar manner to regression in finding which variables are
influential. Our variable groupings were:
• What was evaluated?
The banner only (B) or the full-article (A)
• Was more information sought off-study?
No (0) or yes (1)
• Was there prior knowledge of story?
(None) or (Some)
• What was the quality of the stimulus?
Low-quality (LQ) or high-quality (HQ)
For example group A:0:Some:HQ (n = 29) would be evaluations that were made
on the full article, with no off-study research, some prior knowledge of the story
and where the stimilus was of high quality (see Section 4.3.3.2). A full list of
tests is given in Appendix C. Again Mann-Whitney U tests were applied to the
aligned and counter-aligned evaluations within each of these variable groupings.
Significant findings are shown in Table 4.4.
4.4.2.1 Judging a book by its cover
Just over a third of evaluations (34.01%) were made solely on viewing the article
banner only (group B), that is - the participant did not view the full story article
before making their evaluation. Interestingly it is only within group B that
significant differences in the median credibility scores / time on task between
aligned and counter-aligned participants can be observed.
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Table 4.4: Significant group difference Mann-Whitney U test results
Median credibility scores between participants with sentiment alignment
(4.0) and those counter-aligned (3.0), U = 417.0, z = −2.135, p = 0.033.
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Median time on task aligned participants (11 seconds) and counter-aligned
(66 seconds), U = 110.5, z = −3.886, p =< 0.01.
For these 50 banner-only evaluations the higher credibility score and substan-
tially shortened time on task would seem to suggest that some form of bias may
be guiding the participants and that they might have been pre-judging the cred-
ibility at face value. Given that our two tests for possible confirmation are not
fully supported this also suggests that this bias might might lay elsewhere. This
bias potential is statistically supported by the subgroup B : 0 (n = 38) who made
the assessment without researching the story more widely on the Internet before
scoring (see Table 4.4).
4.4.2.2 A little knowledge goes a long way
Further support for bias can be found in when a participant’s prior knowledge of
the story is added to the mix. The subgroup B : 0 : Some (n = 25) is significant
again for credibility score and time on task.
4.4.2.3 Accuracy matters
Within the sub-group B : 0 : Some : HQ (n = 14) there is evidence that bias
might be influencing the decision making process, but only when the stimuli is
of high quality. This suggests that participants are discriminating in evaluations
towards the high quality banners. However, with very little content to accurately
assess the quality of the banner (there simply are is not enough detail), it seems
plausible that they are deferring to other information based decision making
processes such as those described by Lucassen and Schraagen [103], and explored




This chapter presented an empirical study of Bitcoin users and how they evalu-
ated Bitcoin-related news articles, with a view to determining if those evaluations
might be influenced by a confirmation bias. This work determined the sentiment
alignment of participants and the stimulus they were evaluating. For potential
confirmation bias it had been expected to observe sentiment aligned participants
both scoring articles more favorably and taking longer to do so. It was found
that there was no statistical support for favourable article scoring, but that those
with sentiment alignment spent significantly less time undertaking the evaluation
than those counter-aligned - a position completely the opposite to that expected.
This chapter concludes that statistical support for potential confirmation bias
was very weak for social online forum Bitcoin investors and that in all likelihood
another form of bias was being exhibited but only within a subgroup of evalua-
tions, namely those that made decisions without viewing the full news article.
In the next part of this thesis, participant biases towards the source and
medium of news information is tested along with how they utilize self-claimed
expertise when evaluating the credibility of the stimulus. This knowledge is used
to build a model of informational trust for Bitcoin speculators.
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Development of a Model of
Informational Trust
This part of the thesis addresses the third and final objective—development of a
model of informational trust. Through the use of stimulus experimentation this
objective tests whether 57 Bitcoin users can correctly identify factually correct
news information from incorrect information, and models how users base their




As Bitcoin has grown, users have evolved new uses for it, beyond merely a pay-
ments mechanism. One such use is speculative investment [25] and a number of
works [20, 58, 128] have highlighted such speculation as being not only a key use
of Bitcoin but also a contributing factor for its growth. Speculative investment,
by its very definition, is risky. The need for sound information has long been
viewed by investors as critical in mitigating such risk. Prior work [58] has shown
that when making decisions as to whether to adopt and use Bitcoin, investors
discussed, searched for and utilized information in the form of social media and
news.
For investors the supply of “credible information is limited” [25]. Information
quality issues can be readily observed within Bitcoin news reporting with positive
pro-Bitcoin stories in the mainstream press being counter-balanced with those of a
negative and often misleading tone. A good example is the widespread reporting
that China had “banned Bitcoin” in early December 2013 when in reality the
People’s Bank of China had explicitly stated that “the public is free to participate
in Internet transactions [with bitcoin] provided they take on the risk themselves,”
[18] which was far from a ban.
5.1.1 Contributions
This part of the thesis questions whether investors, in a post-truth era, possess
the skills and abilities necessary to separate factual from non-factual information
in order to mitigate the inherent financial risk in speculative Bitcoin speculation.
Fifty-seven participants took part in this study’s online experiment in which
they asked them questions around their news consumption and Bitcoin behaviors.
Participants then undertook a news article evaluation task in which they were
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asked to read and rate the credibility of six articles to determine which they
believed to be the most credible and how this might impact their investment
behavior. Our key contributions are, as follows—we present:
• The first empirical work that explores how Bitcoin investors are making de-
cisions based upon information credibility evaluations, prior to speculative
investment moves.
• A summary of the types of news-based information being used by these in-
vestors.
• Findings, that significant percentages of these investors, i) are unable to iden-
tify and discount information that is of low quality, and ii) would act upon
their poor evaluations.
• Findings, that expertise based credibility evaluation strategies are not signifi-
cantly being used by these investors and that trust is not being placed in the
fundamentals of the information itself.
• Findings, that Bitcoin investors are making credibility evaluations based upon
un-mediated biases for either the source or medium of the information. For
those making correct evaluations there is a trust in the source of the informa-
tion, otherwise trust is deferred to a more general trust of information based
on the Internet.
Implication of Findings - Fake-news is where the boundaries between truth
and fiction are blurred [81] and fact is traded for appealing to opinion or be-
lief [135]. In 2017, it is apparent that such fake-news is the new normal, from
online blog posts to mainstream broadsheet press. Sifting through news for truth
is already being widely recognised as a challenge to consumers world-wide. For
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investors reliant upon not only the timeliness but also the accuracy of news it is
critical they are equipped with the skills and where-with-all to filter as needed.
Whilst Chapter 4 found no meaningful evidence of confirmation bias, this
study has shown that overly reliance upon those sources and mediums is being
made. In Chapter 3, an investor’s use and trust in mediums and sources of news
was shown to be important (see Section 3.5.2). More importantly participant’s
claimed their trust were, at least in part, based upon some personal assessment
of the author’s expertise or ideology.
In a world where fake-news is readily created, published and shared, with-
out truly understanding the truthfulness of the news information being relied
upon, and by deferring that trust to a third party, investors are actually gener-
ating greater risk for themselves. Within Bitcoin in particular—where there is
still a relatively limited community of users and trusted news sources (compared
to traditional finance)—there is also potential for significant risk to the stabil-
ity of bitcoin. Given the links between news, discussion and pricing [58, 57],
were concerted effort made to subvert bitcoin-related news it is plausable that
whole markets could readily be shifted, based upon investor’s overly trusting news
sources not fact.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, related literature is
provided for information credibility and informational trust (Section 5.2). Sec-
ondly, the method by which questions surrounding how Bitcoin users make de-
cisions about trust in information are examined (Section 5.3). Thirdly, this is
followed by a presentation of findings from the experimentation in which partic-
ipants were asked to assess the credibility of a number of high and low quality
news stories. Fourthly, a discussion of the key findings of the study with ref-
erence to literature. Finally, this chapter concludes that, given apparent biases
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towards source and Internet based information and with nearly half of those mak-
ing poor evaluations being willing to act upon their evaluation, there is potential




In this section related works for information credibility and informational trust
are presented.
5.2.1 Information credibility
Definitions of information credibility online vary slightly, but collectively are de-
termined to be the extent to which a user finds information to be believable or
true [1, 54].
Figure 5.1: Lucassen et al ’s 3S model
Chaiken [29] argues that credibility assessment can be thought of as both a
heuristic and systematic process, with Metzger et al [115] expressing that deci-
sions as to which process to use are dependent upon user motivation at the time.
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Following this argument, Lucassen et al [99, 102] claim that evaluating credibil-
ity is always in part heuristic and proposed their ‘3S’ model of three differing
strategies a user might utilize (see Figure 5.1).
The first strategy is based upon the semantic features of the information
such as accuracy or neutrality, requiring a level of domain expertise from the user
— domain expertise having been shown to have positive impact upon a user’s
capacity for credibility evaluation [31, 79, 102].
The second strategy looks to surface features such as the way in which infor-
mation is presented or number of references, for which sound information skills
are necessary — information skills are seen to improve with education [22, 67].
The third strategy focusses on the source features of the information, namely
not the actual information but considering only the website from where the in-
formation came — Hovland and Weiss [69] first identified perceptions of trust-
worthiness of a source as a key factor in evaluating credibility. More commonly
accepted is Whitehead’s duality of trustworthiness being the perceived goodness
or morality and perceived expertise of the source [162].
5.2.2 Informational trust
McKnight & Kacmar [112] assert that information credibility differs from trust
in so much as credibility is focussed not upon the website or organization but
rather the information artefact itself. They do concede that “credibility and trust
are probably closely related” as “the more credible they (the user) believe that
information to be, the more likely they are to act upon it.”
Lucassen and Schraagen [99] argue that credibility evaluation is always at
least partly heuristic, and that a “dichotomous choice between heuristic and sys-
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tematic processing is somewhat simplistic in the [psychological] domain of trust.”
They illustrate this simply with “if a user would consider all aspects of credibility
systematically, she or he would be certain of the credibility of the information.
This means that the concept of trust is eliminated. Hence, absolute systematic
processing is not possible in credibility evaluation.”
As information normally flows from one party to another (for example: person
to person or organization to person) Lucassen and Schraagen therefore promote
trust in information as a valid concept, defined as “the expectation that the infor-
mation is correct.” Credibility being a property of information upon which trust
is based.
To explore informational trust, Lucassen and Schraagen [103] view trust in
information decisions as being based upon “rules-of-thumb” (cognitive biases).
They offer a clear model for trust in information which takes account of these
biases by partitioning trust into four key layers (see Figure. 3.1):
• Propensity to trust (personality type)
• Trust in the information medium (e.g., the Internet)
• Trust in the information source (e.g., a particular website)
• Trust in the fundamentals of the information itself.
Whilst for many the base trust model in Bitcoin is “based in computation
rather than people” [4], the need for trust in the Bitcoin ecosystem is critical,
from adoption [164] to its everyday use.
Next follows a brief discussion of the sub-objectives for this study of Bitcoin




This section describes: i) the sub-objectives for addressing Objective 3, our re-
cruitment process and demographics of the participants, ii) the information eval-
uation task and procedure along with the stimuli used, and iii) the measures and
constructs used to explore a participant’s trust in information.
5.3.1 Sub-objectives
This study has three sub-objectives:
1. Firstly, to ascertain whether or not Bitcoin users can make valid information
credibility evaluations when assessing news articles upon which they might
base speculative investment decisions.
2. Secondly, to identify and subsequently understand the influence of expertise
in Bitcoin upon that decision making — congruent with Lucassen et al ’s ‘3S’
model [99].
3. Thirdly, to explore other dimensions of informational trust that may influence
an investor’s decision as to whether to trust information – congruent with,
and through application of Lucassen and Schraagen’s model of informational
trust [103].
4. Thirdly, to explore other dimensions of informational trust that may influence
an investor’s decision as to whether to trust information – congruent with,





To recap, the study (see section 4.3.1) was widely advertised to a number of online
forums, websites, social media and also through direct email asking for voluntary
participation with no offer of payment. The study was split into two key parts.
Part one was a series of questions looking at (i) discovery and use of the crypto-
currency (ii) self perceived levels of knowledge and expertise; and (iii) a general
set of questions around technology and news consumption. Part two was a news
article stimulus evaluation task, open to participants who had usage experience
of Bitcoin. After incomplete evaluations were removed, 57 people completed the
experiment. A summary of their demographics can be seen in Section 4.3.1.1.
5.3.3 Evaluation task: procedure and stimuli
The experimentation for Objective 3 followed the same task procedure and used
the same stimuli as Objective 2 (see Sections 4.3.2 & 4.3.3). The key differ-
ence being that rather than focussing upon the sentiment of the stimulus, this
experiment is based around the quality of the stimulus: high quality factually ac-
curate (HQ) and low quality innaccurate (LQ). Details of this process are given
in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.3.2).
5.3.4 Measures and Constructs
Moving beyond the simple evaluation task (sub-objective 1 ) and to explore the




5.3.4.1 Influence of expertise
Construct 1 - Self-rated expertise : To meet the sub-objective 2 of this
study in understanding the influence of expertise upon credibility evaluation, a
participant’s self-rated expertise (as perceived knowledge) was determined to be
a suitable proxy for actual expertise and calculated as in Section 3.3.3.3.
5.3.4.2 Influence of informational trust
To meet sub-objective 3 of this study in examining other facets of informational
trust, this experiment borrowed from Lucassen and Schraagen’s model of infor-
mational trust [103] (see section 5.2).
Construct 2 - Propensity to trust : Each participant’s propensity towards
having a trusting personality was calculated using the NEO-PI-R questions as in
Section 3.3.3.1.
The construct TP allows to determine as to whether this underlying person-
ality trait is having significant influence upon the participant’s credibility assess-
ment of the stimuli.
Construct 3 - Trust in the medium : Respondent’s general trust in the
Internet (as a medium of information) was measured with six questions, the total
sum being used to assign a score to the participant (TM). The construct TM
allows for determination of whether this more general trust of things online is
having a significant influence on credibility evaluation.
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Trust in the (Information) Medium (TM)
Trust in the medium of information is based upon a selection of the sub-
questions in ‘Q4.4 Without spending too much time thinking about the state-
ment; how much do you agree with the following statements?’, being:
• I find much of the information on the Internet credible.
• In general I trust the companies and people running the Internet.
• I trust people I interact with on the Internet.
• Information in Internet forums tends to be credible and trustworthy.
Construct 4 - Trust in the source : Respondent’s trust in the source of
the information (TS) was directly extracted from the participant’s own credibility
rating of the website from which they chose the most credible story and allows
for determination of whether a reliance upon a pre-held opinion of the source
website significantly influences credibility evaluation.
For the constructs E, TP & TM all questions used a five-point Likert scale
where 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 = ‘strongly agree’. Internal reliability of each
of these three constructs is tested using Cronbach’s Alpha (α) (see Section 5.4.2).
Reliability tests for TS are not needed as this was a directly extracted score rather




In this section, the findings of this study are presented in relation to the sub-
objectives (see Section 5.3.1), being: i) the outcome of the basic evaluation task,
ii) an assessment and summary of the constructs used to explore the second &
third sub-objectives of the study, iii) the influence of expertise upon credibility
evaluation, and finally iv) the influence of informational trust.
5.4.1 Credibility evaluations
Of the 57 participants who undertook the evaluation, on average participants
rated their chosen most credible stimulus 4.37 out of 5 (see Table 5.1)—this score
being henceforth referred to as the participants’ trust in the information (TI).
Very little difference was observed between the group correctly identifying high
quality (HQ) stimulus (f = 37, x¯(TI) = 4.37) and those choosing low quality
(LQ) stimulus (n = 20, x¯(TI) = 4.25).
ALL HQ LQ
Respondents (n) 57 37 20
Credibility Score (TI)
1 (x¯) 4.37 (0.67) 4.43 (0.65) 4.25 (0.72)
Prior knowledge 2 (x¯) 2.78 (1.05) 2.24 (1.04) 2.35 (1.09)
Off-study research (n) 10 7 3
Full story pop-ups (x¯) 0.74 0.74 0.85
Zero full-story views (n) 20 15 5
Evaluation time (x¯) 60.5s 42.7s 90.9s
Standard deviations shown in brackets
1 Story credibility rated 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest)
2 Prior knowledge of story 1 (none), 2 (little), 3 (some), 4 (a lot)
Table 5.1: Summary of stimulus evaluation results
5.4.1.1 Post evaluation investment position
Post evaluation task, participants were asked what bitcoin investment position




Buy 5 (8.8%) 5 (13.5%) 0 (0.0%)
Hold 36 (63.2%) 25 (67.6%) 11 (55%)
Sell 16 (28.1%) 7 (18.9%) 9 (45%)
Table 5.2: Post evaluation investment position
Forty-five percent of LQ participants declared they would make a change in po-
sition based upon that incorrect story—in all 9 cases this was to sell any bitcoin
they possessed.
5.4.2 Validity of constructs
Self-rated expertise (E) had a Cronbach’s α of 0.93 indicating excellent relia-
bility. Respondent’s propensity to trust (TP ) is derived from the NEO-PI-R
questionnaire [37] and had a Cronbach’s α of 0.84 indicating good reliability in
the questions as an indicator of trust. Trust in the information medium (TM)
had a Cronbach’s α of 0.75 being an acceptable indication of trust.
5.4.3 Construct summary
Across all constructs (TP , TM , TS & E) the mean scores by evaluation group
(HQ/LQ) varies little with both groups seeing their means in the same category
(see Table 5.3). For example, both groups (x¯(HQ) = 27.973, x¯(LQ) = 28.600)
displayed a moderate propensity for trust. Within constructs, interesting points
are:
E - Both evaluation groups on average shared a ‘high’ level of self-rated expertise
in Bitcoin, however the LQ group had a pronounced skew towards viewing their
own expertise as being very high.




Category Score n Rel.% HQ Rel.% LQ Rel.%
5) Very High 13-15 21 36.84 10 27.03 11 55.00
4) High 10-12 21 36.84 17 45.95 4 20.00
3) Middling 9-9 3 5.26 1 2.70 2 10.00
2) Low 6-8 9 15.79 6 16.22 3 15.00
1) Very Low 3-5 3 5.26 3 8.11 0 0.00
x¯(Score) All = 11.035 HQ = 10.514 LQ = 12.000
Propensity to trust (TP )
Category Score n Rel.% HQ Rel.% LQ Rel.%
5) Very High 36-40 4 7.02 3 8.11 1 5.00
4) High 31-35 15 26.32 7 18.92 8 40.00
3) Moderate 20-30 36 63.16 26 70.27 10 50.00
2) Low 13-19 2 3.51 1 2.70 1 5.00
1) Very Low 8-12 0 0 - - - -
x¯(Score) All = 28.193 HQ = 27.973 LQ = 28.600
Trust in the medium (TM )
Category Score n Rel.% HQ Rel.% LQ Rel.%
5) Very High 18-20 1 1.75 - - 1 5.00
4) High 15-17 8 14.04 6 16.22 2 10.00
3) Middling 10-14 33 57.89 19 51.35 14 70.00
2) Low 7-9 12 21.05 11 29.73 1 5.00
1) Very Low 4-6 3 5.26 1 2.70 2 10.00
x¯(Score) All = 11.439 HQ = 11.108 LQ = 12.050
Trust in the source (TS)
Category Score n Rel.% HQ Rel.% LQ Rel.%
5) Very High 5 12 21.05 7 18.92 5 25.00
4) High 4 14 24.56 11 29.73 3 15.00
3) Middling 3 18 31.58 11 29.73 7 35.00
2) Low 2 4 7.02 2 5.41 2 10.00
1) Very Low 1 9 15.79 6 16.22 3 15.00
x¯(Score) All = 3.281 HQ = 3.297 LQ = 3.250
Table 5.3: Construct summaries by evaluation group
with a slight skew towards being more trusting than not.
TM - Both evaluation groups shared a ‘middling’ trust in the information medium
(the Internet) but the HQ group were skewed towards being less trusting than
those in the LQ group.
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TS - Both evaluation groups shared a ‘middling’ trust in the information source
(the website of the chosen story). Both groups were skewed to being more trust-
ing in the source, more so HQ group.
ALL HQ LQ
















Figure 5.2: Construct (TP , TM & TS) influence upon trust in information (TI)
5.4.4 The influence of expertise
Following Lucassen et al ’s ‘3S’ model [99], expertise facets that support semantic
and surface feature strategies for credibility assessment were tested.
Firstly, statistical dependence between E and demographic markers was as-
sessed using Pearson’s Chi Squared (x2) tests. This determines the statistical
likelihood of any observed difference between two categorical sets being based
upon chance. No significant relationship between E and when a participant dis-
covered Bitcoin was found, x2(12, N = 57) = 12.00, p > 0.05. The relationship
was greater with the HQ group (x2(12, N = 37) = 14.55, p = 0.27) than the LQ
group (x2(9, N = 20) = 6.92, p = 0.65), but still insignificant.
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Similarly, no significant relationship was found between E and educational
background, x2(24, N = 57) = 19.77, p > 0.05. Again the strength of the rela-
tionship was greater in the HQ group than the LQ group but still insignificant.
As such neither a participant’s self-rated expertise was not influenced by either
their educational background or how long they had known about Bitcoin and,
therefore, these demographic differences are discounted.
5.4.4.1 Semantic evaluation
Semantic evaluation strategies, requiring domain expertise, were evaluated using
a one-way ANOVA test (TI ∼ E). No significant relationship was found between
a participant’s self-rated expertise and their trust in the information, F (1, 55) =
1.113, p = 0.296. Using Chi Squared (x2), the participant’s choice of either a HQ
or LQ article as being most credible was not found to be dependent upon E,
x2(11, N = 57) = 11.59, p > 0.05.
5.4.4.2 Surface evaluation
Surface evaluation strategies, requiring information processing skills, were also
evaluated using a one-way ANOVA (TI ∼ Education). No significant relation-
ship was found between a participant’s education and their trust in information,
F (1, 55) = 0.075, p = 0.786. Again no dependency was found for the article
choice based on education, x2(6, N = 57) = 6.07, p > 0.05.
5.4.5 Resulting informational trust model
With no significant relationship between self-rated expertise (either in education






















Figure 5.3: Cross-section of applied Lucassen and Schraagen informational trust
layer model
Group Coef p Interval Rej.H0 Coef p Interval Rej.H0
a1 (TM ∼ TP ) a2 (TS ∼ TP )
ALL 0.285 0.000 0.166, 0.404 yes 0.068 0.077 -0.007, 0.142 no
HQ 0.267 0.000 0.127, 0.407 yes 0.110 0.012 0.024, 0.197 yes
LQ 0.308 0.005 0.093, 0.523 yes -0.015 0.823 -0.149, 0.118 no
b1 (TI ∼ TM ) b2 (TI ∼ TS)
ALL 0.074 0.023 0.010, 0.139 yes 0.158 0.010 0.038, 0.279 yes
HQ 0.068 0.095 -0.012, 0.148 no 0.217 0.004 0.068, 0.367 yes
LQ 0.116 0.029 0.012, 0.220 yes 0.063 0.529 -0.133, 0.258 no
c1 (TI ∼ TP ) c′ (TS ∼ TM )
All 0.000 0.990 -0.036, 0.036 no -0.017 0.814 -0.155, 0.122 yes
HQ -0.009 0.674 -0.053, 0.034 no -0.076 0.382 -0.246, 0.094 no
LQ 0.004 0.901 -0.056, 0.063 no 0.087 0.460 -0.144, 0.317 no
Table 5.4: Mediated regression analysis
To test the null hypothesis that a construct has no influence upon a par-
ticipant’s trust in the information (TI), 6 regression models were fitted to the
cross-section of Lucassen and Schraagen’s trust in information layer model. To
validate the models, mediation analysis was conducted using the lavaan package
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in R [136]. Models between constructs are shown in Table 5.4 and where zero
lays within the confidence interval < 2.5%, 97.5% > the model cannot reject the
null hypothesis and therefore no significant influence is found.
Applying the analysis to the graphical representation of the model (see Fig-
ure 5.3), the pathways for construct influence can be readily observed:
• Pathways with no significant influence between constructs are represented by
dotted-gray notation
• Pathways with significant influence are shown in solid-blue
• Primary influences are highlighted in solid-gold
ALL Users No direct influence (pathway c1 on Figure 5.3) was found and
TI ∼ TP is rejected, meaning that neither TM or TS mediate this relationship
even though TM is influenced by TP itself.
There are subtle differences between the HQ and LQ groups, however.
HQ evaluations For the participants correctly identifying a high quality article
as most credible, there is a significant influence from the source of the information
pathway b2 : TI ∼ TS (0.217, p = 0.004). i.e., For users who correctly identified
factually correct stimulus as being the most credible, there was a significant
influence of the source of the information upon the decision.
LQ evaluations For those who made an incorrect evaluation there is a sig-
nificant influence from the medium of the information pathway b1 : TI ∼ TM
(0.116, p = 0.029) and this is not mediated by TS. i.e., For users who identified
factually incorrect stimulus as being the most credible, there was a significant




This section discusses the major findings of this study, being:
1. A lack of reliance on expertise in Bitcoin to evaluate related news,
2. A significant source bias by participants who were able to make correct cred-
ibility evaluations only,
3. A significant bias towards a general trust in Internet based information by
participants making erroneous credibility evaluations, and
4. A concerning declaration by 45% of erroneous participants that they would
act upon their evaluations prior to making investment decisions.
To recap; this study asked 57 Bitcoin users to evaluate six news articles and
identify the one they believed to be the most credible. For each participant four
constructs were created, based upon a reference model of informational trust
which takes into account underlying biases in information credibility decision
making. In conjunction with how each participant evaluated the article it was
possible to observe the influence of these constructs, and derive an understanding
of how decisions were being made. In summary, 37 participants identified factu-
ally correct (HQ) news articles as being most credible, and 20 incorrectly chose
low quality (LQ) articles.
5.5.1 A lack of reliance upon expertise
Sub-objective 2 was to identify the role of expertise in making credibility evalua-
tions within our participants. Following the rationale set out in Lucassen et al ’s




5.5.1.1 Semantic evaluation through domain expertise
A participant’s domain expertise in Bitcoin was based upon a self-reported level of
expertise (see Section 5.3.4). This domain expertise is important when evaluating
the semantic features of information. No significant influence of this expertise
upon the credibility evaluation (TI ∼ E) was found in this study (F = 1.113, p =
0.296).
At a glance, it might be presumed that this lack of influence may be a re-
sult of mis-reporting or over-estimation of domain expertise on the part of the
participant—this being a well understood phenomena [42, 93, 118]—something
that could be controlled for with a specific domain knowledge test.
Support for this presumption could be inferred if significant differences in
the expertise scores of those in the HQ and LQ response groups were observed.
Whilst there was a slightly greater skew towards higher levels of self-rated exper-
tise in the LQ group this was not overly so and median scores for both groups
were both within the ‘high’ category of expertise (see Table 5.3). Further there
is no statistical support for the participant’s choice of either HQ or LQ stimuli
being based upon domain expertise or length of time using Bitcoin.
It is therefore unlikely, but not impossible, that participants were subject to
a Kruger-Dunning effect [93]. More likely is that participant’s were not utilizing
a semantic strategy—deferring evaluation to other approaches.
5.5.1.2 Surface evaluation through information skills
Information skills are shown to be directly related to the education a participant
has attained [22, 67]. With over 60% of participants having a college degree or
higher (see Section 5.3) it would be expected for participants to possess good
information skills and, in the absence of semantic evaluation (above), be bringing
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these to bear in the credibility assessment by looking at the surface features of
the news story—such as the number or type of references within the story, related
author stories etc.
As with semantic evaluation, the participant’s choice of a HQ or LQ article
as being the most credible was not seen to be dependent upon an under-pinning
factor—in this case their education. Again, no evidence was found of partici-
pants significantly using surface strategies (TI ∼ Education). The strength of
this influence(F = 0.075, p = 0.786) was less than that of semantic strategies
(above) indicating this was even less likely to be the credibility evaluation ap-
proach being used.
As neither expertise based strategy for credibility evaluation has been shown
to be significant in this study, the implication is that the third possible strategy—
based upon source evaluation—is likely at play.
This study has already found that, i) participants making correct evaluations
do employ source trust and those making erroneous evaluations do not, defer-
ring to a more general trust of the Internet, and ii) significant percentages of
those making erroneous evaluations would act upon their assessments. Next is a
discussion of these findings of informational trust.
5.5.2 Source trust only used in correct evaluations
Lucassen et al ’s ‘3S’ model [99] presented a third strategy for credibility evalua-
tion based upon how credible (trustworthy) a participant perceives the source to
be. This bias towards a trust in the source is illustrated in Lucassen and Schraa-
gen’s model of informational trust (see Figure ??). In this study participants
were asked to rate the credibility of eight different websites (as sources) prior to
taking the stimulus task.
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Looking to this model of informational trust and in particular the mediated
aspects as shown in Figure 5.3: A very strong relationship between source trust
and a participant’s trust in information (TI ∼ TS) was found, however this was
only the case where participants correctly identified an HQ article as most cred-
ible (coef = 0.217, p = 0.010). This indicates that for these participants, and
again as there was no evidence of significant expert strategies in effect, they were
basing their credibility evaluations in a bias for the source of the information
in-line with common theories on source credibility [54, 69, 150, 162].
The same was not true of those making erroneous evaluations. For these
participants we found that credibility was not being assessed based upon a trust
in the source. This, obviously, does not concur with source credibility theories.
Rationale for a similar finding made by Lucassen and Schraagen [103] looks to
either i) participants being able to compare multiple articles from the same source,
or the nature of their stimuli source. Neither of these hold true for this study as
multiple sources were used and source credibility (the prior rating of the sources
by participants) was approximate for the sources used.
Thusly for the erroneous group (LQ), trust was found to be placed in a more
general trust in Internet (TI ∼ TM , coef = 0.116, p = 0.029). As expected this
was a weaker level of trust than for those trusting the source—as TM is more
distant from TI in Lucassen and Schraagen’s mediated informational trust model
(see Figure 5.3).
5.5.3 A little knowledge can also be dangerous
Evidence clearly links a user being willing to act upon information the more they
believe it to be credible [112] so it should not really come as a surprise that 37%
(n = 21) of all participants expressed a willingness to make ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ decision
based on their credibility evaluation. For those making correct evaluations, this
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willingness is perfectly understandable—the decision about which position to hold
being one based on investment motivations not explored in this study.
For the 9 participants willing to ‘sell’ their bitcoin holdings based upon their
erroneous credibility evaluation this axiom also appears to hold true. Kruger
and Dunning, controversially, offer one plausible explanation that moves away
from credibility evaluation in that “people tend to hold overly favorable views of
their abilities... this over-estimation occur[ing], in part, because people who are
unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not only do these people reach
erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs
them of the meta-cognitive ability to realize it” [93].
Simply, in this study, participants making erroneous credibility evaluations
may just not be able to recognize they are not very well informed about Bitcoin
and are over-confident in their abilities. Statistical support for over-estimation of
domain expertise was not observed, however it has already been noted that for





This chapter presented an empirical study of Bitcoin users and how they evalu-
ated credibility in Bitcoin related news prior to making speculative investment
decisions. The study found that just over a third of participants (35%) identified
low quality, inaccurate news articles as being most credible. Counter to expec-
tation no significant evidence of a participant’s (self-rated) expertise in Bitcoin
influencing this evaluation was found. It is noted that incorrect participants did
tend to claim a higher level of expertise than who were correct in their evaluation.
It was also found that for those who made a correct evaluation, their trust in the
information was influenced by a trust in the source (website) of the story.
This chapter concludes that for social online forum Bitcoin investors, there
is enhanced potential for financial risk resulting from speculative decisions made
not on an expert evaluation of Bitcoin related news but rather a bias for trusting





The principle question asked by this thesis is: to what extent are people able to
select and correctly evaluate information they might rely upon to make decisions
within the sub-community of Bitcoin users for whom speculative investment is
an important use of the crypto-currency. This thesis sought to answer this by
addressing three key research objectives:
1. Investigation and exploration of disclosed human notions of trust within the
Bitcoin ecosystem,
2. Evaluation of bitcoin speculator’s reliance upon confirmation bias when se-
lecting news reporting used to support investment decisions and,
3. Development of an informational trust model for speculators which highlights




The investigation objective serves to build a foundation of knowledge around
how information quality issues in the Bitcoin community create a potential risk
to speculators whom rely upon this information when making investment deci-
sions.
Chapter 1 highlights the motivation for investment and information quality
concerns. Chapter 2 briefly summarizes the inception of bitcoin and where com-
munity expressions of trustlessness stem from. Chapter 2 also points to where
the majority of existing research lays and highlights the gap for human aspects
trust research within the Bitcoin space. Chapter 3 breaks through the community
adherence to trust in bitcoin being based solely in computation by empirically
studying human notions of interpersonal, informational, institutional and tech-
nological trust in and around Bitcoin.
Having established in Chapter 3 that human notions of trust extend far be-
yond computation alone, and that trust in information is indeed an applicable
concept in the Bitcoin community, the evaluation objective addresses the first
part of the overall research question, ‘to what extent are speculators able to select
relevant information.’ Chapter 4 empirically evaluates, using stimulus experi-
mentation, whether or not confirmation bias might be in some way influencing
speculators to select information as relevant by overly favoring that which had a
sentiment towards Bitcoin aligning with their own.
Whilst bitcoin speculators did spend less time evaluating stimulus with which
their own sentiment aligned—a marker for confirmation bias—no significant ev-
idence of confirmation was observed. However approximately 1/3 of stimulus
evaluations did exhibit potential source bias.
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In Chapter 5 the development objective builds on the experimental work of
Chapter 4 to address the second part of the overall research question, ‘to what
extent are speculators able to correctly evaluate information’. Within Chapter 5,
further stimulus experimentation establishes to what extent domain expertise in
Bitcoin may or may not be being brought to bear on this evaluation task along
with other potential biases Bitcoin speculators might be exhibiting when trying
evaluate the credibility of the information.
The development of a model of informational trust highlights that speculators
do not appear to rely upon their own domain expertise but rather place their trust
as to the quality of news information in its source, or even a more general trust
of online media. This is a position which sits hand-in-hand with findings from
Chapter 3 that interpersonal trust is critical when forming opinions of trust on




This thesis makes two key contribution to both the crypto-currency and security
communities.
Firstly, in investigating where human trust is evident in the Bitcoin ecosystem—
as it transitions towards mainstream adoption—this study sheds light on the
potential barriers to that adoption, not only Bitcoin but also other blockchain-
based technologies. In particular this study highlights the consequences of design
choices such as the impact of loss or media exposure upon a user’s trust and
sentiment towards and within the ecosystem.
Secondly, through answering the research question of are people able to select
and correctly evaluate information they might rely upon to make decisions?—
exposes a model of informational trust for a sub-community of users whom claim
expertise yet exhibit a number of biases which suggests that they do not actually
utilise that expertise when making risky investment decisions. Such deference
to bias, rather than true understanding of information, presents a challenge to
the rational and systematic process of evaluating risk normally found in security
frameworks. Whilst these frameworks are traditionally employed at an organi-
sational level for evaluating risk, this model suggests the same rationality and
systematization is not necessarily true of users themselves.
These two key contributions are supported by the findings (see Section 1.5)
from each of the three primary research objectives, which build a hitherto un-
explored picture of the Bitcoin ecosystem; not only that trust exists beyond
computation but where that trust is placed and, by whom.
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6.3 Application to Research Question
The methodological approach used to guide this thesis has addressed the objec-
tives and allowed for the exploration of the principle research question: to what
extent are Bitcoin speculators able to select and correctly evaluate news based in-
formation upon which they might be making investment decisions in a way which
reduces risk to themselves?
Objective 1 - Investigation Prior research has suggested that aspects of trust
within the broader ecosystem of Bitcon exist (see Section 2.3.3). Given the degree
of assertive discussion around Bitcoin within online forums, it had been expected
that bitcoin speculators were adhering to the colloquial notions of trustlessness.
Consequently it was important to have been able to empirically show not only
that trust beyond computation does exist, but also where it is placed and how it
can be impacted by both loss and media coverage.
In terms of the investigation, one of the most revealing aspects was just how
important interpersonal trust was when looking at information sources. Rationale
discussing information sources / mediums clearly articulated that the level of
social interaction was a key element for trust, and where that didn’t exist evidence
of expertise on the part of the author could be deferred to.
As regards expertise, outwardly many speculators present as being ‘knowledge-
able’ about aspects of Bitcoin. However, the reliance upon trust of information
sources based upon interpersonal facets suggests that some speculators may have
been basing their decisions upon their own and others’ belief in Bitcoin - poten-
tially more so than they might be relying upon their own expertise in evaluating
factual information.
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Objective 2 - Evaluation The potential that speculators might be basing
decisions upon belief in the future of Bitcoin directly aligns with the ‘ability to
select new information’ aspect of the research question. Selecting information
(news) based upon belief is a form of confirmation bias and would have the
ability to hugely distort the view on Bitcoin to one which aligned only with that
of the speculator. Confirmation bias has been shown to impact upon the risk to
investors [125]. Some limited support for confirmation bias was found - however
limitations encountered (see Section 6.4.1) meant that it was not possible to
observe statistical support for both key markers of confirmation bias; time on
task and overly favouring sentiment aligned news.
The other key finding from Objective 2 was that the time spent on task was
far less for those with sentiment (attitudinal) alignment, directly the opposite of
the findings by Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng [86]. The tendency for people to
spend more time reading information that conforms to their own sentiment is a
well understood phenomenon and critical for the spread of fake-news - by only
reading sentiment-affirming information the discomfort of cognitive dissonance
is mitigated. So for Bitcoin speculators to buck this tendency is surprising. As
noted, the limitation from sample size meant that this was not a significant result
and lends itself to future study.
Objective 3 - Development Basing method upon information credibility as-
sessment works within the psychology community [99, 101, 102], the final objec-
tive of this thesis built upon previous two objectives and sought to address the
second part of the research question, the ‘ability to correctly evaluate informa-
tion... in a way which reduces risk.’ Within this process a model of information
trust was constructed which highlighted two key points:
Firstly, that rather than applying expert knowledge of Bitcoin, speculators
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tended to evaluate credibility based upon the source or medium of the news in-
formation. This sits well with the findings of objective 1 - in so much as these
sources were also previously rated as highly credible based upon their social inter-
action or transparency of author’s related writing. This also follows from objective
2 as the lack of overt confirmation bias also suggested that other forms of bias
might have been relied upon.
Secondly, that a notable percentage (35%) of credibility evaluations were in-
correct (where factually inaccurate news stories were identified as being most
credible) with nearly half of those erroneous evaluations being viewed as sound
enough to base an investment change upon.
6.4 Reflection
The process of developing the model of informational trust for Bitcoin speculators
has led to a number of observations which fall outside the main body of analysis
yet are worthy of consideration.
6.4.1 Limitations of the study
The breadth and depth of usage around Bitcoin is significant and, as succinctly
put by Bohr & Bashir [20], “due to the decentralized and relatively anonymous
nature of Bitcoin, it is impossible to draw a random sample and confidently gen-
eralize to the global or English-speaking Bitcoin community.” More simply, the
culture of Bitcoin effectively makes it impossible to access all potential commu-
nities of users and thus to overly generalize any study findings is problematic.
This thesis, in addressing its three key objectives, acknowledges these issues
with wider generalizability and in doing so is focussed solely upon those utilizing
bitcoin as a speculative investment vehicle. Moreover the objectives are targeted
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at the use of online news reporting (as a source of information) as this thesis (see
Chapter 3) and other works have shown such sources of information are of great
importance to Bitcoin users.
As such it seems reasonable to have recruited participants online and acknowl-
edge that respondents were drawn primarily from Bitcoin related sources. The
125 survey respondents and 57 experimental participants, who expended signif-
icant periods of time within the study, displayed demographic diversity (with
the exception of language) and would be considered representative of this online
speculative user base.
Had an incentive mechanism (such as bitcoin or voucher reward) been em-
ployed to entice participation it is possible that a greater number of respondents
might have been recruited. However, this would have introduced an additional
layer of complexity to the administration of the study as well as potentially
encouraging investment in bitcoin - which would have presented as an ethical
constraint. Tighter controls of independent variables—such as the ability to un-
dertake off-site research in study—combined with greater observation numbers
might have allowed for a regression model to have been fitted.
With these caveats, the findings of this thesis still not only afford an important
insight into how Bitcoin users really perceive trust but also opens a door into
studying how Bitcoin users select and evaluation information prior to investment
decision making.
6.4.2 Alternative approaches
It is accepted that this work is predominantly quantitative in nature—excepting
rationales for loss contained in Chapter 3. These quantitative methods are bor-
rowed from disciplines within which such methods are considered normal. It is
becoming more common in cyber security fields to see such fully quantitative
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work applied only to formal proofs and for human aspects work to be predomi-
nantly qualitatively based.
Qualitative works by Sas and Khairuddin [138, 82, 139] lean to interviews
and case studies with limited numbers of participants, however they do more
clearly seek to address questions of why people trust. This thesis affords a more
in depth quantitative look at the how side of trust and as such each set of works
complements each other.
6.5 Future Work
Inves�gate Deﬁne Develop Deliver






Figure 6.1: Overview of the design process methodology used for this thesis
highlighting where future work lays in completing the delivery phase.
It can be noticed, in the illustrative map of methodology (see Figure 6.1), that
the final quarter (delivery) of the Design Council’s Double Diamond model is left
incomplete. This is deliberate for two key reasons. Firstly, it is incredibly difficult,
and arguably impossible, to accurately model out human decision making in such
a way as to be truly generalizable. Secondly, and as a result of this, any model
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is only ever as complete as the data behind it, and the every changing contexts
within which people make trust decisions
Figure 6.2: Blockchain as viewed on Gartner Hype Cycle for Emerging Technolo-
gies
Three key areas of future research, stemming directly from this thesis have been
identified:
6.5.1 Trust in blockchain-based technologies
Whilst a generalizable model of information trust may be something unobtain-
able, it is apparent that the blockchain underpinning bitcoin presents an interest-
ing context for further study. The Gartner ‘Hype Cycle’ for Emerging Technolo-
gies (see Figure 6.2) clearly views blockchains as having passed its peak of inflated
expectation and heading towards the trough of disillusionment - the point where
people realize the hyped promise may not be as realizable as at first suggested.
Anecdotally, it is not uncommon to hear discussions of how blockchains will rev-
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olutionize everything from banking to security in the Internet of Things (IoT)
from the press to government, often with the presumption that the transparency
of an accessible ledger will promote, engender or increase trust in the applica-
ble industry. With blockchains expected to reach mainstream adoption within 5
years, this slip into disillusionment is expected and rapidly being approached.
Contemporary research in blockchain looks to domain application for dis-
tributed ledgers. Underwood [154] and Hawlitschek et al [66] both point to the
necessity for trust in the wider application of blockchains. In contrast, Beck
et al [12] and Weber et al [161] assert the application of blockchains is reliant
upon them being trustless or trust-free in much the same manner of early Bitcoin
research.
There is significant potential to move the information trust model into under-
standing where trust exists or is absent within these use cases for blockchain and
how those promoting blockchains are forming their opinions of trust. If the hype
is based upon an abstracted trust to, for example, their own sources of informa-
tion as opposed to a fundamental understanding of how blockchains work, then
it seems plausible that the trough of disillusionment will be reached more quickly
and potentially be much deeper than expected.
6.5.2 Informational trust in alternative domains
Leading on from looking at trust in blockchain-based technology, there is also
scope to examine how the shape of informational trust differs, from Bitcoin,
within other blockchain-based domains. Thesis insights into how users defer
trust to sources of information, rather than leveraging expert method/knowledge,
have been taken forward into a funded research project (HoSEM [47]) within the
context of a blockchain-based peer-to-peer energy trading market.
Using a mixed-methods approach the study will employ both stimulus ex-
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perimentation (using methods evolved from this thesis) and more qualitative ap-
proaches, including semi-structured interviews and stakeholder workshops, to un-
derstand how renewable energy prosumers form trust in third parties, information
and user interfaces.
Findings from this study will be used to inform software engineering design de-
cisions for the marketplace platform, and how best to drive and sustain adoption
by such prosumers.
6.5.3 User-Susceptibility to fake-news
As discussed in this thesis, by deferring informational trust to either the source
or medium of the information, users potentially renders themselves susceptible to
not only receiving but also being influenced by fake-news. Simply, they rely upon
others’ credibility assessment rather than their own expert assessment. Insights
from this thesis as to the susceptibility of bitcoin speculators to fake-news have
been published [39], however further work is required.
Firstly, future work is needed to understand how generalizable this suscepti-
bility may be, i.e., does it extend, and to what extent, to other domains, and in
particular those which profess user expertise?
Secondly, whilst technological approaches to automatically identifying and
removing fake-news may be considered the desirable option for many social net-
works, news publishers and governments alike, it is not without issue. Such tech-
nology is still in its infancy, often resulting in false-positive or uncertain selection
of news as being fake. Through being able to reliably identify user-susceptability,
it might be possible to mitigate this technological limitation by alerting more
susceptible users to potentially fake content. This approach not only provides a
complimentary approach to automated removal, but arguably might also improve




Bitcoin has become far more than its intended payments mechanism roots in
2008/9 could have envisaged. Whilst it initially sought to remove the need for
trust in third party intermediaries, such as banks and governments, the reality of
Bitcoin as a socio-technical ecosystem is that not only does trust exist but that it
is utterly essential to its adoption, maintenance and ongoing usage. Simply this
is due to trust being pervasive in human society [35, 104]. At its most elemental
level, trust in Bitcoin is based in the validity of the computation - a technological
or algorithmical trust - that underpins the whole system, although in practice
this is equally an interpersonal trust in those maintaining that computation.
Interpersonal trust also underpins transactions. Whilst the bitcoin protocol does
indeed allow for assurance of payment it does nothing to enforce the reciprocity
of exchange. For example, bitcoin itself does not require, enforce or trace a
counter-party actually sending the thing being paid for.
Trust also extends to institutions around the ecosystem from exchanges to the
core-development team and further into information, its sources and mediums of
delivery. In all cases, though, this is all underpinned by that very human need
for interpersonal trust not least as humans are so very intrinsically involved at
every level of Bitcoin.
But this very reliance upon interpersonal trust, in a predominantly digital
online community, does appear to present a challenge to speculative investors. In
traditional financial services much reliance is placed upon the accurate assimila-
tion and interpretation of information to reduce risk, and this in most markets is
undertaken by trained and (often) licensed professional services upon whom rests
a duty of care to protect investors.
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In Bitcoin anyone can quickly and simply create accounts, transfer funds and
start trading. There is no regulatory requirement currently for professional in-
termediation and as such speculators are left to their own wits. It appears that
significant proportions of Bitcoin speculators do not possess the requisite expert
skill, relying upon that interpersonal trust for third party selection and interpre-
tation of information. In a world where fake-news, appealing to belief rather than
fact, is a pertinent and rapidly pervasive problem it is somewhat worrisome that
bitcoin speculators are left to their own devices.
Huge pricing volatility over the period 2011-2017 has no doubt made many
very wealthy. Many others, through their own poor decision making or criminal
activity, have incurred significant loss. The future for Bitcoin is not yet clear,
however as we transition through towards mainstream adoption of foundation
technologies and alternative currency this thesis is presented to both the nascent
crypto-currencies and security research communities to help shape understanding
of where the main barriers to mass adoption of blockchain based technologies may
lay. In particular this thesis is a stepping stone for studying trust in Bitcoin to
allow these communities to understand the consequences of design choices such




This appendix contains a copy of the questions presented to our study participants
using the University’s own hosted implementation of Qualtrics. The formatting
of the questions may vary from those presented due to the nature of online web
based interfaces and text layout within this thesis, however the content remains
the same. The appendix is split into two parts; firstly the questions asked and
used within the analysis of this thesis and its constituent papers. The second
part of questions asked in the survey but not used in this analysis.
Conventions: Where numeric codes were assigned to responses these are given
in brackets beside each option. Where the order of available responses was ran-
domized this is indicated with an asterisk after the question title. Where question
or section logic was used to display options or questions this is given at the foot
of each question in curly braces { }. For multiple choice type questions, single an-
swer only are in round brackets ( ), and multiple answers are in square brackets [ ]
137
A.1 Questions used in Analysis
A.1 Questions used in Analysis
Introduction
Welcome. Thanks for dropping by to help out with this piece of academic research into how
people use information when using bitcoin. The study is open until the end of February, and is
split into three sections;
1. Some simple questions about how you get news information and use the internet.
2. A more in depth look at your understanding and use of bitcoin.
3. A task where we ask you to read a few news stories and tell us how you felt about them.
Participation is voluntary and ideally we would love you to complete all three sections, but if
you’ve had enough by the end of section 2 (about 10-15 minutes) that’s fine just click the “skip
experiment button” when it appears and we part ways with our thanks.
The whole study takes about 35 minutes (depending on how fast you read). Again, thanks for
volunteering your help and we would suggest doing this on a desktop or laptop computer for ease.
Barney Craggs, Security Lancaster / Highwire DTC, Lancaster University
What We Collect Just to make it clear & simple we don’t collect ANY personal / contact
information but the survey software does use simple cookies to track your progress through the
study. The only thing we do automatically collect is a random unique participant number and
your responses to the questions.
Data Usage It is Lancaster University’s policy to retain collected data for a minimum of 10 years,
and we may well use it for later academic works including publication of research findings. We
will NOT pass or sell this data on to anyone outside of Lancaster University.
Removing Your Data from the Survey If you wish to withdraw from the study at any point
before 31 March 2016 please make a note of your unique participant number given at the end
of the study - write this down as without this number we have no way of removing your data if
you wish so. To remove yourself from the study please just drop an email with your participant
number and a message to the address below. After 31 March 2016 all data will be locked having
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been anonymised where necessary & analysed to ensure integrity of the study and removal will
NOT be possible.
Contacting Us If you would like more information about this study, its findings or to remove
yourself from the study (if you have remembered to keep your participant number) please con-
tact Barney Craggs,
by email: b.craggs [ @ ] lancaster.ac.uk, or
in writing: School of Computing and Communications, Lancaster University, LA1 4WA, UK
Q1.1 Consent
Consent: Please indicate that you understand the task being set and that you are willing to
undertake this study.
[ ] Yes, I will participate in the study
[ ] No I WILL NOT participate and I want to leave now
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Demographics
Q2.2 Where in the world do you Live?
( ) Africa (1)
( ) The Americas (2)
( ) Europe (3)
( ) Eastern Mediterranean (4)
( ) South-East Asia (5)
( ) Western Pacific (6)
Q2.3 Is English your primary language?
( ) Yes
( ) No
{If ‘Yes’ skip to Q2.5}
Q2.4 What is your primary language?*
( ) Spanish (1)
( ) Chinese (2)
( ) French (3)
( ) Hindi (4)
( ) Russian (5)
( ) Japanese (6)
( ) Hebrew (7)
( ) Arabic (8)
( ) Other......... (9)
Q2.5 How good do you consider your English to be?
Written English
Spoken English
Q2.6 How old are you?
( ) Under 13 (1)
( ) 13 - 17 (2)
( ) 18 - 25 (3)
( ) 26 - 35 (4)
( ) 35-54 (5)
( ) 55-64 (6)
( ) 65 or over (7)
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Q2.7 Which gender do you most identify yourself with?
( ) Female (1)
( ) Male (2)
( ) Other......... (3)
( ) Prefer not to say (4)
Q2.8 Is this the same gender you had at birth?
( ) Yes (1)
( ) No (2)
( ) Prefer not to say (3)
Q2.9 Please indicate the highest level of education completed.
( ) High school or equivalent (1)
( ) Vocational/Technical school, 2yrs (2)
( ) Some college (3)
( ) College graduate, 4yrs (4)
( ) Master’s degree (MS, MA...) (5)
( ) Doctoral degree (PhD) (6)
( ) Professional degree (MD, JD...) (7)
( ) Other......... (8)
Q2.10 Do you see yourself primarily as...
( ) Still in education (1)
( ) Home-maker (2)
( ) Full time employed (3)
( ) Self employed (4)
( ) Part time employed (5)
( ) Temp employed (e.g., holiday cover) (6)
( ) Retired (7)
( ) Unemployed (8)
{If 1,2,7 or 8 skip to Q2.13}
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Q2.14 Without spending too much time thinking about each question; how much













































Regarding the intentions of others I am rather cyni-
cal and sceptical.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I believe that you will be used by most people if you
allow them to.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I believe that most people have good intentions. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I believe that most people, with whom I have deal-
ings, are honest and trustworthy.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I become distrustful when someone does me a favour. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
My first reaction is to trust people. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I tend to assume the best of others. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I have a good deal of trust in human nature. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Internet Use
Q4.1 How long have you been using the Internet (including using e-mail, social
networks, websites, etc...)?
( ) Less than 1 year (1)
( ) 1 to 5 years (2)
( ) 6 to 10 years (3)
( ) 11 years or more (4)
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Social networks ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Discussion forums ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
General news ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Technology news ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Leisure/hobby ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Financial news ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Internet banking ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Personal blogs/vlogs ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Video sharing sites ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Information/Wiki’s ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q4.4 Without spending too much time thinking about the statement; how much













































I tend to use the Internet for information rather than
off-line sources.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I find much of the information on the Internet cred-
ible.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
In general I trust the companies and people running
the Internet.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I trust people I interact with on the Internet. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Information in Internet forums tends to be credible
and trustworthy.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I am confident I can find information on the Internet,
when I need it.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I find it easy to filter out inaccurate or incorrect in-
formation I find online.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Bitcoin Use
Q5.1 Roughly, when did you first hear about Bitcoin?
( ) 2016 (6)
( ) 2014 - 2015 (1)
( ) 2012 - 2013 (2)
( ) 2010 - 2011 (3)
( ) 2008 - 2009 (4)
( ) Cannot remember (5)
Q5.2 Can you remember from where you first heard about Bitcoin?
( ) A friend / family member / colleague (1)
( ) An online discussion forum (2)
( ) A printed newspaper, magazine or periodical (3)
( ) An academic paper (4)
( ) A news website (5)
( ) Cannot remember (6)
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Short term (1-3 years) bitcoin prices will be very
volatile.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Long term (3 years +) bitcoin prices will always rise. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Long term adoption by retailers will be good for Bit-
coin.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Theft of bitcoin is currently hampering adoption. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Governments will regulate Bitcoin. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Bitcoin provides a viable alternative to traditional
fiat (currency).
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Speculation has driven price rises & falls in the last
5 years.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
The people maintaining Bitcoin are trustworthy. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
The real value of Bitcoin is not as a currency. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Long term bitcoin offers a better financial return (as
an investment) than stocks.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Bitcoin is primarily a tool for criminal activity. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
People using bitcoin are trustworthy. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q5.4 You said you ${Q5.3 Response 12} that “people using bitcoin are trustwor-
thy.” Can you briefly explain why?
Q5.5 Can you explain why you ${Q5.3 Response 2} that long term (3 years +)
prices for bitcoin will always rise?













































I am influenced in bitcoin buy/sell decisions by what
I read in newspapers (online or printed).
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I am well informed about bitcoin technologies. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I am well informed about bitcoin markets. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I am well informed about non-Bitcoin news that
might impact the bitcoin markets.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Q5.7 Can you tell us five (5) words you feel describe bitcoin? [ use a new line for
each word ]
Q5.8 Have you ever actually used bitcoin?
( ) Yes (1)
( ) No (2)
{If No skip to Q5.25}
Q5.9 What have you used bitcoin for? [tick all that apply]
[ ] Purchase something (1)
[ ] Transfer funds to someone (2)
[ ] Launder money (3)
[ ] For investment / speculation (4)
[ ] To drive adoption / disrupt current monetary system (5)
[ ] Other......... (6)
Q5.10 Can you rank your uses of bitcoin in order of importance to you?
[1 = most important]
Purchase something (1)
Transfer funds to someone (2)
Launder money (3)
For investment / speculation (4)
To drive adoption / disrupt current monetary system (5)
Other......... (6)
Q5.11 You said you have used bitcoin for investment / speculation; what position
do you currently have?
{Display if investment use selected}
( ) Sell (1)
( ) Hold (2)
( ) Buy (3)
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Q5.12 Can you briefly explain why you have this position?
Q5.19 Have you ever lost bitcoin? How? [tick all that apply]
[ ] Never (1)
[ ] Fraud (2)
[ ] Theft (3)
[ ] Collapse of an exchange (4)
[ ] Variations in exchange rates (5)
[ ] Technical problems with exchange (6)
[ ] Other......... (7)
Note: post study analysis found that ‘other’ led to two further loss categories... ‘User error’
(8), and ‘Gambling’ (9)






































Trust in Bitcoin in general. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Trust in exchanges. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Trust in people using bitcoin. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Trust in people maintaining bitcoin. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Q5.21 Thinking about when you buy or sell bitcoin, do you look at / read / consult


































Bitcoin market charts/data. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
General news websites. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Technology news websites. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Financial news websites. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Bitcoin / Cryptocurrency news websites. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Printed newspapers / magazines / periodicals. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Social networks. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Friends / family / colleagues. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Information websites (e.g. Wikipedia). ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Discussion forums (e.g. Reddit, Stack Exchange,
Bitcointalk).
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Personal blogs / vlogs / podcasts. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q5.25 Can you rank these sources of information about bitcoin in the order you
would likely trust before making any decision on using / trading?*





Bitcoin / Cryptocurrency news websites.
Printed newspapers or magazines/periodicals.
Social networks.
Friends / family / colleagues.
Information websites (e.g. Wikipedia).
Discussion forums (e.g. Reddit, Stack Exchange or Bitcointalk).
Personal blogs / vlogs / podcasts.
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Q5.28 Can you tell us how credible you think the following websites are for bitcoin
news & information?*
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A.2 Questions NOT used in analysis
Demographics (Unused)
Q2.11 Which of the following categories best describes the industry you primarily
work in?
( ) Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and
Hunting (1)
( ) Retail (17)
( ) Utilities (2) ( ) Publishing (18)
( ) Computer and Electronics Manufactur-
ing (3)
( ) Telecommunications (19)
( ) Wholesale (4) ( ) Information Services and Data Process-
ing (20)
( ) Transportation and Warehousing (5) ( ) Finance and Insurance (21)
( ) Software (6) ( ) College, University, and Adult Educa-
tion (22)
( ) Broadcasting (7) ( ) Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
(23)
( ) Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (8) ( ) Government and Public Administration
(24)
( ) Primary/Secondary (K-12) Education
(9)
( ) Scientific or Technical Services (25)
( ) Health Care and Social Assistance (10) ( ) Military (26)
( ) Hotel and Food Services (11) ( ) Trained Professional (27)
( ) Legal Services (12) ( ) Skilled Laborer (28)
( ) Religious (14) ( ) Consultant (29)
( ) Mining (15) ( ) Researcher (31)
( ) Construction (16) ( ) Other..... (specify) (33)
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Compared to other people in my country, I earn... ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Compared to my friends, I earn... ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q2.13 If your income was greater than it is now, would you feel...
( ) Much less content happy (1)
( ) A bit less content happy (2)
( ) About the same (3)
( ) a bit more content happy (4)
( ) A lot more content happy (5)
News Consumption (Unused)
Q3.1 Do you read newspapers and/or magazines/periodicals (printed or on the
Web)? [ tick all that apply ]
[ ] Newspapers (1)
[ ] Magazines / Periodicals (2)
[ ] Neither (3)
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I tend to read more than one newspaper daily ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I tend to purchase my own newspapers ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I tend to read newspapers in printed form more than
online
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
The newspapers I read often challenge or disagree
with my own opinions
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
In general I trust the content I read in newspapers ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I find the content in newspapers that I read accurate ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I often go away and find more information about
things I read in newspapers
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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I tend to read more than one magazine a month ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I tend to purchase my own magazines ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I tend to read magazines in printed form more than
online
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
The magazines I read often challenge or disagree with
my own opinions
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
In general I trust the content I read in magazines ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I find the content in magazines that I read accurate ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I often go away and find more information about
things I read in magazines
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q3.4 You said you don’t trust newspapers; can you briefly explain why?
Q3.5 You said you don’t trust magazines/periodicals; can you briefly explain why?
Q3.6 You said you tend to read newspapers in printed form; can you briefly explain
why you don’t read them online?
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Internet Use (Unused)





























































Mobile telephone / smartphone ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Tablet ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Laptop computer ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Desktop computer ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Bitcoin (Unused)
Q5.13 Thinking about when you speculate; do you prefer to...
( ) Use automated tools (bots, algorithmic trading) (1)
( ) Manually place orders (2)
Q5.14 Can you briefly explain why you prefer to ${Q5.13/Response}?
Q5.15 What type of Bitcoin wallet do you use? [ tick all that apply ]
[ ] Online - Exchange based (1)
[ ] Online - Third Party ( e.g. blockchain.info ) (2)
[ ] Oﬄine - Mental or Paper (3)
[ ] Oﬄine - Digital (4)
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Have you How much do you





















































MT Gox ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Bitstamp ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Bitfinex ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
BTC-e ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
itBit ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Coinbase ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Kraken ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
OKCoin ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Huobi ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Localbitcoins ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
LakeBTC ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Other.... ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q5.16 Have you ever used any of the following exchanges for bitcoin?
Q5.17 Which methods for adding funds to your exchange account(s) have you used?
[ ] Direct funds transfer from your bank account (1)
[ ] Wire transfer (2)
[ ] Cash purchase (say through Localbitcoins) (3)
[ ] Inter-exchange transfer (4)
[ ] Other..... (5)
Q5.18 Have you mined your own Bitcoin?
( ) Yes (1)
( ) No (2)
Q5.22 As you use websites to obtain information before making bitcoin trading
decisions; can you name the website you trust the most for that information?
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Q5.23 When searching for bitcoin news; do you search within your trusted news










































































Please select statement that
most applies
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q5.24 You said you look at bitcoin market charts / data; can you place the following
in order of importance to you when making buy / sell decisions?
[ 1 = Most important — 3 = Least important ]
Price chart on a single single exchange (1)
Price charts on multiple exchanges (2)
Third party price charts or indicies (3)
Q5.26 You said you trusted ${Q5.24/ChoiceWithLowestValue} the most; can you
briefly explain why?






B.1 Article Banners Presented
This appendix contains a copies of the stimulus used within the experimental
parts of this thesis. To recap, six news stories were presented both as a banner
and a full article to participants. Three stories were presented left as is, being
deemed broadly accurate. Three stories were edited to be of low quality (LQ) by
















1 HQ 212 Neg Reuters 02/09/14 Russian authorities say Bitcoin illegal
2 LQ 237 Neu Coindesk 02/27/14 New Fed Chair: We Have Authority To Regulate...
3 HQ 467 Neu Coindesk 12/30/13 The Reserve Bank of India Has No Plans to Reg...
4 LQ 402 Pos Coindesk 02/23/14 Top UK Payments Body Weighs in on Bitcoins...
5 LQ 375 Neg Coindesk 07/29/13 Bank of Thailand officially declares bitcoin illegal
6 HQ 378 Pos Coindesk 12/05/13 Bank of America: Bitcoin Has Clear Potential...
B.1 Article Banners Presented
(a) Banner 1 - HQ Negative
(b) Banner 2 - LQ Neutral
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B.1 Article Banners Presented
(c) Banner 3 - HQ Neutral
(d) Banner 4 - LQ Positive
(e) Banner 5 - LQ Negative
(f) Banner 6 - HQ Positive
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B.2 Fullpage Articles Presented
B.2 Fullpage Articles Presented
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B.2 Fullpage Articles Presented
(a) Article 1 - HQ Negative (footer clipped to fit page)
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B.2 Fullpage Articles Presented
(b) Article 2 - LQ Neutral (footer clipped to fit page)
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B.2 Fullpage Articles Presented
(c) Article 3 - HQ Neutral (footer clipped to fit page)
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B.2 Fullpage Articles Presented
(d) Article 4 - LQ Positive (footer clipped to fit page)
164
B.2 Fullpage Articles Presented
(e) Article 5 - LQ Negative (footer clipped to fit page)
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<title>Russian authorities say Bitcoin illegal</title>
<description>Russia’s central bank also said on January 27 that Bitcoin trade was highly ...
in Russia, has already come under intense scrutiny as authorities ...</description>
<body>Russian authorities have issued warnings against using Bitcoin, saying the virtual
currency could be used for money laundering or financing terrorism and that treating it
as a parallel currency is illegal. ‘‘Systems for anonymous payments and cyber currencies
that have gained considerable circulation − including the most well−known, Bitcoin −
are money substitutes and cannot be used by individuals or legal entities,’’ the Russian
Prosecutor General’s Office said on February 6. It added that Russian law stipulates
that the rouble is the sole official currency and that introducing any other monetary
units or substitutes was illegal. Russia’s central bank also said on January 27 that
Bitcoin trade was highly speculative and that the unit carried a big risk of losing value.
‘‘Citizens and legal entities risk being drawn − even unintentionally − into illegal
activity, including laundering of money obtained through crime, as well as financing
terrorism,’’ it warned. The Prosecutor’s General Office said it was working with the
central bank and other law enforcement agencies to tighten regulations and prevent
legal offences committed with the use of pseudo−currencies. The Bitcoin community in
the United States, far more developed than the one in Russia, has already come under











<title>New Fed Chair: We Have Authority To Regulate Bitcoin</title>
<description>If you were worried about the Federal Reserve trying to step in to regulate
Bitcoin, don’t breathe easy: Its leader thinks that the Fed has the authority
to..</description>
<body>Fears over the future of Bitcoin were heightened today after the leader of the
Federal Reserve Janet Yellen said regulating the cryptocurrency could soon be within its
power. Yellen was plain on the matter: ‘‘The Federal Reserve is pushing forward with
plans to acquire the necessary authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin, as well as any
other digital currency.’’ She went on to express worries that Bitcoin is ‘‘a payment
innovation that is taking place entirely outside the banking industry.’’ Yellen also
added that one of the issues is that Bitcoin is ‘‘decentralized’’ and ‘‘global,’’ according
toBusiness Insider. Her remarks, made today before the Senate, set the tone for future
regulation of Bitcoin. In Yellen’s view, it is certainly appropriate for Congress to move
toward regulation and ‘‘to ask questions about what the right legal structure would be
for virtual currencies that involve nontraditional players.’’ Recently, Bitcoin has also
taken hits following the demise of the Mt.Gox exchange. Though a core ideal for Bitcoin
is its lack of government control and regulation, some members of the Senate have been
particularly critical. Senator Joe Munchkin warned that, unless there’s ‘‘strict regulation
or an outright ban’’ on Bitcoin ‘‘Americans will be left holding the bag on a valueless
currency.’’ Other countries have taken restrictive measures towards cryptocurrencies, so
the option isn’t beyond the pale. The Bitcoin Foundation, however, warned










<title>Federal Reserve Chair: US Central Bank Can’t Regulate Bitcoin</title>
<description>In an address to the Senate Banking Committee, the US central bank head
discussed bitcoin regulation.</description>
<body>After months of silence on the matter, Federal Reserve chairwoman Janet Yellen has
stated that the US central bank does not have the authority to regulate bitcoin. Yellen
was appointed as chair of the Federal Reserve last October after she was nominated to
replace Ben Bernanke. During an address to the Senate Banking Committee on 27th
February, the top US banking official, said: ‘‘The Fed doesn’t have authority to
supervise or regulate bitcoin in any way.’’ In her response, Yellen commented broadly
on a score of issues including the impact of recent weather on US economic output,
ongoing turmoil in the Ukraine and the new technologies that are more broadly
impacting payments. It was on the latter subject that the topic of bitcoin was
introduced, with Yellen noting that such developments are ‘‘taking place outside the
banking industry.’’ Notably, the remarks came in response to a question about bitcoin
regulation by US Senator Joe Manchin, a noted critic of bitcoin. The news follows
Manchin’s 26th February letter to the Federal Reserve chairwoman, which called for her
to take aggressive action against bitcoin due to its involvement in criminal activity. The
Bitcoin Foundation has also since responded to the letter. Yellen continued, saying that
FinCEN has indicated that current money laundering statutes are ‘‘adequate to meet
enforcement needs.’’ Manchin later asked whether Yellen believed the US to be ‘‘behind
the curve’’ in regards to regulation, a nod to his previously stated belief that the US
should follow the lead of countries like China and Thailand in banning bitcoin. Yellen
said: ‘‘Certainly it would be appropriate for Congress to ask questions about what the
right legal structure would be for digital currencies [...] My understanding is Bitcoin
doesn’t touch [US] banks.’’ She ended her response by stating that the Federal Reserve
is looking into the matter. The statement notably comes at a time when many US state
regulators are looking for guidance on how to put controls or safeguards on the bitcoin
industry. Though the most notable example would be New York, which held detailed
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hearings on the matter in January, Alabama and Texas have joined the conversation












<title>The Reserve Bank of India Has No Plans to Regulate B...</title>
<description>According to the Times of India, the RBI does not even plan to develop ...He
was keen to point out that bitcoin regulation has not been enacted ...</description>
<body>Last week the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a public notice warning users to
stay away from digital currencies. It made it clear that Indian bitcoin exchanges lack
the regulatory approval needed to exchange digital currencies for rupees and other
national currencies. Local exchanges were quick to suspend operations, but that was not
enough. Within 48 hours of the RBI notice, India’s Enforcement Directorate (ED)
raided at least two bitcoin exchanges, buysellbitco.in and rbi.rbit.co.in, owned by Nilam
Doctor. Investigators questioned the owners of both sites in an effort to ascertain
whether any transactions carried out on their platforms violated the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act and the Foreign Exchange Management Act. For the time being,
the owners of the platforms are not in custody and they do not appear to be facing any
criminal charges. This may be indicative of another problem even Indian regulators do
not know what to do and even if they do, they lack a clear regulatory framework for
digital currencies. According to the Times of India, the RBI does not even plan to
develop a regulatory framework for digital currencies. Therefore, at this moment in
time, bitcoin platforms based in India simply cannot get regulatory approval.
Additionally, it seems that this situation is not set to change anytime soon. ‘‘Regulation
comes only when people are doing certain business and we come to understand that
something wrong is happening,’’ RBI deputy governor KC Chakrabarty told a gathering
of Indian entrepreneurs on Saturday. ‘‘First of all, we don’t understand this subject.’’
Chakrabarty stressed that the RBI does not regulate nor support digital currencies. He
was keen to point out that bitcoin regulation has not been enacted anywhere else in the
world, and that people who understand the risks are free to do whatever they like with
their money. ‘‘Whether it is ... legal or illegal, we don’t know,’’ he said bluntly. ‘‘If it
crosses the limit of legality then people may face a problem. So people should be
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cautious.’’ Chakrabarty’s statements are unusually candid, and illustrate a wider
problem for financial authorities. Regulators simply cannot deal with digital currencies
as they have to operate within the existing legal framework, which does not contain the
provisions needed to regulate such currencies. Furthermore, he seems to imply that
regulating digital currencies is not RBI’s job to begin with. Hence, it is understandable
why the RBI does not plan to assist in the development of a new regulatory framework
for digital currencies. In essence, the executive branch and national regulators have their
hands tied, they cannot take any meaningful, constructive action without new
legislation and there is simply no political will to deal with the issue. They can,
however, try to apply existing foreign currency legislation to bitcoin operators, which










<title>Top UK Payments Body Weighs in on Bitcoin’s Future</title>
<description>The Payments Council is the governing body for UK payments systems and
services. As such, its task is to lead the development of future...</description>
<body>The Payments Council, the organisation that sets strategy for payment mechanisms
in the UK, has issued a statement saying that it is generally positive on Bitcoin, and
sees numerous ‘‘fantastic opportunities’’ for digital currencies. In response to questions
from CoinDesk, the Payments Council said that it had been tracking the progress of
digital currencies ‘with interest’, and that Bitcoin is only one of many ‘‘competitive
offerings’’ that are emerging in the UK. The organisation appeared to be concerned but
positive over the future of digital currencies: As shopping habits are increasingly moving
across borders and continents, it seems certain that there will be increased possibility of
issues arising with virtual currency providers, most of whom will remain unregulated
and outside of traditional domestic banking systems and laws. The council’s statement
also noted that digital currencies, like other payment services, would be driven by
consumer demand. The council appeared to be using the terms ‘‘digital currency’’ and
‘‘virtual currency’’ interchangeably in its statement. CoinDesk refers to Bitcoin as a
‘‘crypto currency.’’ The Payments Council is the governing body for UK payments
systems and services. As such, its task is to lead the development of future payment
systems and regulate the accountability and transparency of existing systems. It is an
organisation with a compulsory membership comprising banks and building societies,
including HSBC, Nationwide Building Society, Citibank and others. Among the schemes
that the Procurement Council operates is the LINK ATM scheme, which ensures cash
cards issued by banks, building societies and other institutions can be used across
different ATMs. Around 30% of the UKs ATMs are connected to the LINK network.
The council sets rules on the security of transactions, customer data and fees charged.
The council has an interest in promoting speedier Internet transactions. Under the
Speedier Payments Scheme, launched in 2004, Internet and phone payments for
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individuals and businesses in the UK saw transaction times improved from three
working days to around 24 hours. The system was designed to allow quick transactions
for amounts of less than 1,000 (US$1,680). The council is now working on a UK−wide
mobile Bitcoin payments scheme that will allow consumers to send secure payments to
mobile phone numbers instead of a bank account number. The council promises that
this process will be ‘as easy as texting.’ Some 9% of UK current accounts will be able to









<title>Top UK Payments Body Weighs in on Bitcoin’s Future</title>
<description>The Payments Council is the governing body for UK payments systems and
services. As such, its task is to lead the development of future...</description>
<body>The Payments Council, the organisation that sets strategy for payment mechanisms
in the UK, has issued a statement saying that it is ‘‘neutral’’ on bitcoin, though it sees
‘‘opportunities’’ for digital currencies. In response to questions from CoinDesk, the
Payments Council said that it had been tracking the progress of digital currencies ‘with
interest’, and that bitcoin was one of many ‘‘competitive offerings’’ that are emerging in
the UK. The organisation appeared to be relatively positive on the future of digital
currencies: ‘‘As shopping habits are increasingly moving across borders and continents,
it seems certain that there will be real opportunities for virtual currency providers who
are outside of traditional domestic banking systems.’’ The council’s statement also
noted that digital currencies, like other payment services, would be driven by consumer
demand. The council appeared to be using the terms ‘digital currency’ and ‘virtual
currency’ interchangeably in its statement. CoinDesk refers to bitcoin as a ‘digital
currency’. The Payments Council is the governing body for UK payments systems and
services. As such, its task is to lead the development of future payment systems and
regulate the accountability and transparency of existing systems. It is a voluntary
organisation with a membership comprising banks and building societies, including
HSBC, Nationwide Building Society, Citibank and others. Among the schemes that the
Payment Council operates is the LINK ATM scheme, which ensures cash cards issued
by banks, building societies and other institutions can be used across different ATMs.
Almost all of the UK’s ATMs are connected to the LINK network. The council sets
rules on the security of transactions, customer data and fees charged. The council has
an interest in promoting speedier Internet transactions. Under the Faster Payments
Scheme, launched in 2008, Internet and phone payments for individuals and businesses
in the UK saw transaction times reduced from three working days to several hours. The
system was designed to allow quick transactions for amounts of less than 100,000
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(US$166,680). The council is now working on a UK−wide mobile payments scheme that
will allow consumers to send secure payments to mobile phone numbers instead of a
bank account number. The council promises that this process will be ‘‘as easy as











<title>Bank of Thailand officially declares bitcoin illegal</title>
<description>A Thai bitcoin exchange suspends trading, after the Bank of Thailand
declared the cryptocurrency illegal</description>
<body>A Thai bitcoin exchange has suspended trading after the Bank of Thailand declared
the cryptocurrency illegal, throwing the community into heated debate. Bitcoin Co Ltd,
a Thai exchange, posted a note on its website saying that the Bank of Thailand held a
conference earlier today to discuss the exchange’s business operations. ‘‘At the
conclusion of the meeting senior members of the Foreign Exchange Administration and
Policing Department advised that due to lack of existing applicable laws, capital
controls and the fact that Bitcoin straddles multiple financial facets the following
Bitcoin activities are illegal in Thailand,” says the post. It outlined the purchase or sale
of bitcoins themselves as illegal, alongside the buying and selling of goods or services in
exchange for bitcoins. Sending or receiving bitcoins to or from anyone outside Thailand
would also be illegal. ‘‘Based on such a broad and encompassing advisement, Bitcoin
Co. Ltd. therefore has no choice but to suspend operations until such as time that the
laws in Thailand are updated to account for the existance of Bitcoin,” the exchange
said. Debate heated up on the online forums, with some agreeing with the statement,
and some arguing that senior officials at a bank agreeing on something doesn’t make it
law. ‘‘Bitcoin was not ruled illegal in Thailand. There is poor reporting and
interpretation going on. The Bank of Thailand has no legal power,” said one
commenter. Another commenter claimed ”a senior official at the central bank told us at
point−blank, ‘buying or selling Bitcoins is illegal’, so unless you have a seriously large
legal fund and are willing to fight all the way to the constitutional courts if necessary,
you take this seriously... But despite the official saying laws will be enforced, I would
assume the blackmarket will still operate business−as−usual.” What is known is that
the Bank of Thailand, a non−government agency under the Bank of Thailand Act, acts
as a regulator for various aspects of the Thai financial industry. Though Bitcoin Co has
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suspended its trading operations; other Thai Bitcoin exchanges have ignored the ruling.
Bahtcoin was still trading as of 5:10 EST today, and so was Coinmill, which trades in
Thai Offshore Baht.The Bank of Thailand’s Edinburgh office refused to comment on the










<title>Bank of Thailand allegedly declares bitcoin illegal, Thai exchange suspends
trading</title>
<description>Did the Bank of Thailand really just make bitcoin illegal, Thai exchange
suspends trading</description>
<body>A Thai bitcoin exchange has suspended trading alleging that the Bank of Thailand
has declared the cryptocurrency illegal, throwing the community into heated debate.
Bitcoin Co Ltd, a Thai exchange, posted a note on its website saying that the Bank of
Thailand held a conference earlier today to discuss the exchange’s business operations.
‘‘At the conclusion of the meeting senior members of the Foreign Exchange
Administration and Policy Department advised that due to lack of existing applicable
laws, capital controls and the fact that Bitcoin straddles multiple financial facets the
following Bitcoin activities are illegal in Thailand,” says the post. It outlined the
purchase or sale of bitcoins themselves as illegal, alongside the buying and selling of
goods or services in exchange for bitcoins. Sending or receiving bitcoins to or from
anyone outside Thailand would also be illegal. ”Based on such a broad and
encompassing advisement, Bitcoin Co. Ltd. therefore has no choice but to suspend
operations until such as time that the laws in Thailand are updated to account for the
existance of Bitcoin,” the exchange said. Debate heated up on the online forums, with
some agreeing with the statement, and some arguing that senior officials at a bank
agreeing on something doesn’t make it law. ‘‘Bitcoin was not ruled illegal in Thailand.
There is poor reporting and interpretation going on. The Bank of Thailand has no legal
power,” said one commenter. ‘‘When a senior official at a central bank tells you
point−blank, ‘buying or selling bitcoins is illegal’, unless you have a seriously large legal
fund and willing to fight all the way to the constitutional courts if necessary, you take it
seriously,” said another. ‘‘They made no comment about these laws (or lack of laws)
being enforced; so I would assume the blackmarket will still operate business−as−usual”
What is known is that the Bank of Thailand, a non−government agency under the
Bank of Thailand Act, acts as a regulator for various aspects of the Thai financial
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industry. Bitcoin Co is not the only bitcoin exchange in Thailand. Bahtcoin was still
trading as of 5:10 EST today, and so was Coinmill, which trades in Thai Offshore Baht.












<title>Bank of America: Bitcoin Has Clear Potential for Growth</title>
<description>Bank of America has become the first UK bank to talk openly about bitcoin,
having issues a client note stating that the digital currency has ‘‘clear ...</description>
<body>Bank of America has become the first US bank to talk openly about bitcoin, having
issued a client note stating that the digital currency has ‘‘clear potential for growth”.
The news came in a 14−page note sent to clients by Bank of America currency
strategist David Woo. He said he believes the maximum market cap of bitcoin is $15bn,
or about 1,300 USD per 1 BTC. In the note, Woo pointed out that bitcoin makes sense
as a medium of exchange and has the potential to become a major means of payment
for e−commerce. It could even emerge as a serious competitor to traditional money
transfer providers, Woo wrote. It is interesting to note that Woo unambiguously
identified e−commerce as a possible catalyst for growth. E−commerce and mobile
commerce are slowly becoming more mainstream and even many traditional retailers are
embracing the ‘‘click−and−mortar” business model, where they run both online and
oﬄine operations, which effectively blurs the line between e−tail and traditional retail.
Cross border e−commerce is also booming, particularly in the UK, so bitcoin could have
a few more practical applications if it is embraced as an exchange medium, especially in
certain markets. However, Woo also pointed out that bitcoin could be used for other,
unsavoury activates. He said bitcoin could be used to avoid tax, capital controls and
confiscation. On the other hand, all bitcoin transactions are a matter of public record
and every single bitcoin has a unique transaction history that cannot be changed, which
could limit its use in the black market. After all, countries like Cyprus or Switzerland
have banking laws that are far more suitable for money laundering than bitcoin. Woo
argued that bitcoin is not a bubble, provided it becomes a major force in e−commerce
and money transfer. It also needs to become a ‘‘store of value with a reputation close to
silver” to make it happen. Woo puts the maximum market cap of bitcoin at $15bn, or
about 1,300 USD per 1 BTC. Woo’s market cap estimation is considerably more modest
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than the estimation voiced by the Winklevoss twins last month. The brothers, who are
major investors in bitcoin after becoming wealthy from an early partnership with






Mann-Whitney U Tests Used in
Chapter 4
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Median Cred.Score Confidence Level Effect
Grouping n Aligned Counter U z p Low High Size
ALL Evals 147 4.0 3.0 3137.0 -1.753 0.080 0.000 1.000 258.735
B 50 4.0 3.0 417.0 -2.135 0.033 ** 0.000 2.000 58.973
A 97 4.0 3.0 1242.5 -0.504 0.614 0.000 1.000 126.157
B:0 38 4.0 3.0 239.0 -1.766 0.077 *** 0.000 2.000 38.771
B:1 12 4.0 3.0 21.0 -1.355 0.175 -1.000 3.000 6.062
A:0 79 3.0 3.0 852.5 -0.794 0.427 0.000 1.000 95.914
A:1 18 4.0 4.0 43.0 -0.432 0.666 0.000 1.000 10.135
B:0:None 13 3.0 3.0 22.0 -0.228 0.820 -2.000 2.000 6.102
B:0:Some 25 4.0 3.0 116.5 -2.135 0.033 ** 0.000 2.000 23.300
B:1:None 3 4.0 4.0 1.0 0.000 1.000 -1.000 1.000 0.577
B:1:Some 9 4.0 2.0 12.0 -1.402 0.161 0.000 3.000 4.000
A:0:None 30 3.0 3.0 118.5 -0.605 0.545 -1.000 1.000 21.635
A:0:Some 49 4.0 3.0 335.0 -0.713 0.476 0.000 1.000 47.857
A:1:None 8 4.0 3.5 10.0 -0.461 0.645 -3.000 3.000 3.536
A:1:Some 10 4.0 4.0 10.5 0.000 1.000 -1.000 1.000 3.320
B:0:LQ 19 3.5 3.0 57.0 -1.072 0.284 -1.000 2.000 13.077
B:0:HQ 19 4.0 3.0 57.5 -1.302 0.193 0.000 2.000 13.191
B:1:LQ 6 4.0 3.0 3.5 -0.302 0.763 -1.000 2.000 1.429
B:1:HQ 6 4.0 2.5 7.0 -1.230 0.219 0.000 3.000 2.858
A:0:LQ 39 3.0 3.0 217.5 -1.105 0.269 0.000 1.000 34.828
A:0:HQ 40 4.0 3.0 204.0 -0.113 0.910 -1.000 1.000 32.255
A:1:LQ 8 4.0 4.0 6.0 -0.318 0.751 -4.000 2.000 2.121
A:1:HQ 10 4.0 4.0 16.5 -1.217 0.224 0.000 1.000 5.218
B:0:None:LQ 8 3.5 2.5 10.0 -0.449 0.653 -3.000 3.000 3.536
B:0:None:HQ 5 2.5 3.0 1.5 0.000 1.000 -2.000 1.000 0.671
B:0:Some:LQ 11 3.5 3.0 19.5 -0.979 0.328 -1.000 3.000 5.879
B:0:Some:HQ 14 4.0 2.5 37.5 -1.734 0.083 *** 0.000 3.000 10.022
B:1:None:LQ 3 4.0 4.0 1.0 0.000 1.000 -1.000 1.000 0.577
B:1:None:HQ - — zero participants, no test run —
B:1:Some:LQ 3 — all participants aligned, nothing to test —
B:1:Some:HQ 6 4.0 2.5 7.0 -1.230 0.219 0.000 3.000 2.858
A:0:None:LQ 19 3.0 3.0 45.0 -0.222 0.824 -1.000 1.000 10.324
A:0:None:HQ 11 4.0 2.5 17.0 -0.522 0.601 -1.000 2.000 5.126
A:0:Some:LQ 20 4.0 2.5 63.5 -1.199 0.231 0.000 2.000 14.199
A:0:Some:HQ 29 3.5 4.0 102.0 0.000 1.000 -1.000 1.000 18.941
A:1:None:LQ 5 2.5 3.0 2.5 0.000 1.000 -3.000 2.000 1.118
A:1:None:HQ 3 4.5 4.0 1.5 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.866
A:1:Some:LQ 3 4.0 4.5 0.5 0.000 1.000 -1.000 0.000 0.289
A:1:Some:HQ 7 4.0 4.0 6.0 -0.316 0.752 0.000 1.000 2.268
Notes: * signif at 0.01 level, ** signif at 0.05 level, *** signif at 0.10 level
H1A - Credibility Scoring Differences (Mann-Whitney U Test Results)
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Median Time (secs) Confidence Level Effect
Grouping n Aligned Counter U z p Low High Size
ALL Evals 147 55.0 82.0 2166.5 -2.069 0.039 ** -38.000 -1.000 178.690
B 50 11.0 66.0 110.5 -3.886 0.000 * -74.000 -20.000 15.627
A 97 82.0 91.0 1137.0 -0.271 0.787 -29.000 22.000 115.445
B:0 38 10.0 69.0 43.5 -3.979 0.000 * -82.000 -24.000 7.057
B:1 12 19.0 40.0 9.5 -0.649 0.516 -194.000 91.000 2.742
A:0 79 69.0 83.5 708.0 -0.645 0.519 -34.000 18.000 79.656
A:1 18 143.0 97.0 55.0 -1.499 0.147 -36.000 135.000 12.964
B:0:None 13 11.0 89.0 7.0 -1.840 0.066 *** -87.000 1.000 1.941
B:0:Some 25 10.0 64.0 13.0 -3.510 0.000 * -91.000 -18.000 2.600
B:1:None 3 19.0 27.5 1.0 0.000 1.000 -21.000 4.000 0.577
B:1:Some 9 58.0 77.0 5.5 -0.294 0.769 -221.000 110.000 1.833
A:0:None 30 111.0 77.0 121.0 -0.689 0.491 -39.000 66.000 22.091
A:0:Some 49 56.5 89.0 221.0 -1.570 0.116 -51.000 6.000 31.571
A:1:None 8 161.0 100.0 14.0 -1.588 0.112 -13.000 146.000 4.950
A:1:Some 10 122.0 95.0 12.0 -0.228 0.820 -201.000 279.000 3.795
B:0:LQ 19 39.5 38.0 34.5 -0.743 0.457 -57.000 23.000 7.915
B:0:HQ 19 7.0 96.0 0.0 -3.528 0.000 * -96.000 -57.000 0.000
B:1:LQ 6 19.0 40.0 1.0 -0.594 0.552 -205.000 4.000 0.408
B:1:HQ 6 58.0 93.0 3.5 0.000 1.000 -194.000 110.000 1.429
A:0:LQ 39 82.0 75.0 190.5 -0.289 0.773 -31.000 46.000 30.504
A:0:HQ 40 49.0 95.0 155.5 -1.179 0.238 -58.000 16.000 24.587
A:1:LQ 8 179.0 97.0 13.0 -1.491 0.136 -13.000 318.000 4.596
A:1:HQ 10 132.5 112.0 12.0 0.000 1.000 -180.000 146.000 3.795
B:0:None:LQ 8 46.5 79.5 6.0 -0.433 0.665 -108.000 215.000 2.121
B:0:None:HQ 5 7.0 89.0 0.0 -1.186 0.236 -86.000 -82.000 0.000
B:0:Some:LQ 11 31.0 31.0 11.0 -0.472 0.637 -312.000 28.000 3.317
B:0:Some:HQ 14 8.5 99.5 0.0 -3.041 0.002 * -101.000 -51.000 0.000
B:1:None:LQ 3 19.0 27.5 1.0 0.000 1.000 -21.000 4.000 0.577
B:1:None:HQ - — zero participants, no test run —
B:1:Some:LQ 3 — all participants aligned, nothing to test —
B:1:Some:HQ 6 58.0 93.0 3.5 0.000 1.000 -194.000 110.000 1.429
A:0:None:LQ 19 125.0 77.0 53.5 -0.930 0.352 -41.000 103.000 12.274
A:0:None:HQ 11 69.0 66.0 14.5 0.000 1.000 -104.000 90.000 4.372
A:0:Some:LQ 20 61.0 62.5 45.0 -0.193 0.847 -52.000 31.000 10.062
A:0:Some:HQ 29 45.0 99.0 73.0 -1.262 0.207 -70.000 23.000 13.556
A:1:None:LQ 5 139.0 103.0 4.0 -0.289 0.773 -13.000 82.000 1.789
A:1:None:HQ 3 187.5 86.0 2.0 -0.612 0.540 57.000 146.000 1.155
A:1:Some:LQ 3 331.0 54.0 2.0 -0.612 0.540 236.000 318.000 1.155
A:1:Some:HQ 7 72.5 138.0 2.0 -0.968 0.333 -300.000 70.000 0.756
Notes: * signif at 0.01 level, ** signif at 0.05 level, *** signif at 0.10 level
H2A - Time on Task Differences (Mann-Whitney U Test Results)
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